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Broadcast encryption was introduced to improve the efficiency of encryption when
a message should be sent to or shared with a group of users. Only the legitimate
users chosen in the encryption phase are able to retrieve the message. The primary
challenge in constructing a broadcast encryption scheme is to achieve collusion resis-
tance such that the unchosen users learn nothing about the content of the encrypted
message even they collude.
Revocation is an important issue of broadcast encryption. In the identity-based
revocation system, the encryption algorithm takes the identities of revoked users
as input, instead of the identities of selected users who are allowed to decrypt the
ciphertext in the broadcast encryption so that the revoked users cannot obtain the
message. This kind of revocation system can deal with the situation where some
of the receivers’ private keys are leaked or compromised in a broadcast encryption
system, and should be revoked in the future broadcast. While a recipient revocable
identity-based broadcast encryption scheme introduced by Susilo et al. allows a
third party to revoke some receivers from the identity set stated in the original
broadcast ciphertext without the knowledge of the encrypted message. This notion
has been showed that it is still expressive enough for practical scenarios.
Anonymity in the broadcast encryption has been considered as an important
property, since the receiver might be unwilling to expose its identity information
in some applications. In this thesis, we further study the identity-based broadcast
encryption (IBBE) and mainly focus on how to anonymously revoke the receivers
from the ciphertext generated by a broadcast encryption scheme without knowing
the encrypted message, and how to protect user privacy including the privacy of
revoked users. Aiming to protect the user privacy, we use the technique of Lagrange
polynomial interpolation to hide the users’ identities when performing the message
(data) encryption. In this research topic, we propose the first anonymous revocable
identity-based broadcast encryption scheme, where the user revocation process does
not require knowing the identity information of the receivers and the encrypted
message. As our second result, we present a fully privacy-preserving revocable
identity-based broadcast encryption scheme, where both the identity information
of the receivers and the revoked users are protected. To improve the efficiency when
iii
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the number of the revoked users is large, we propose an authorization scheme as our
third result, which also can achieve the anonymity of all receivers. This authoriza-
tion scheme can be viewed as the re-allocation of decryption rights of receivers in
the identity-based broadcast encryption.
In order to solve the all-or-noting affair in the broadcast encryption and meet the
requirements of new applications, we consider a variant of identity-based broadcast
encryption and introduce a new notion of identity-based broadcast encryption for
inner products (IBBE-IP for short), where the message encryption is replaced by
inner product encryption. The IBBE-IP can further protect the confidentiality of the
encrypted data compared to the IBBE and allows the encryptor to control who are
permitted to obtain the decryption result. It is useful in the context of descriptive
statistics. More specifically, in the IBBE-IP, the user’s private key is associated
with a pair of a user identity and a vector (ID, ~y). The user with a private key of
(ID, ~y) can decrypt the encrypted vector (message) ~x for an identity set S selected
by the encryptor and learn the inner product 〈~x, ~y〉 if and only if ID ∈ S and
nothing else. In this thesis, we present a construction of IBBE-IP by combining
the technique of identity-based broadcast encryption and inner protect encryption.
The proposed scheme achieves constant size private keys and supports unbounded
private key queries issued by the adversary.
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In 1976, Diffie and Hellman [DH76] introduced the notion of public key cryptography,
which has become one of the greatest revolutions in the history of cryptography. In
the public key cryptography, the key used for encrypting the message is different
from the one used in the decryption phase and we call them the public key and
private key respectively. If a user named Bob wants to send a message to another
user named Alice, Bob just encrypts the message using Alice’s public key which is
publicly known and generated from Alice’s private key known by Alice only. After
receiving the encrypted message, Alice uses her private key to decrypt it and retrieves
the message. As the public key is publicly known, it arises a problem: how can Bob
believe the received public key is really Alice’s? Therefore, to securely transmit a
message in the traditional public key encryption (PKE), it requires a trusted third
party, called trusted authority (TA), to generate a certificate of public key for each
user. The certificate can be used to verify the validity of the user’s public key. As
the TA needs to issue the certificate for each user, the certificate management is
usually very complex and costly.
To address this issue appeared in the traditional public key cryptography, Shamir
introduced the notion of identity-based encryption (IBE) [Sha84] in 1984. In the
IBE system, the user’s public key can be an arbitrary string binding its identity,
such as an email address or a telephone number. The corresponding private key is
generated by binding the identity with a system master key known by the private
key generator (PKG). In such a system, there are four algorithms: (1) Setup run
by the PKG takes a security parameter as input and generates the system master
public key and the master secret key which is only known by itself, (2) KeyGen run
by the PKG generates a private key for the user with a particular identity by using
the master secret key, (3) Encrypt run by a sender allows it to encrypt a message
to a specified identity, and (4) Decrypt run by the receiver allows it to decrypt the
encrypted message by providing a private key for the corresponding identity.
IBE provides a simple way for certificate management. Considering the above
1
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example, Bob can send an encrypted message to Alice at alice@iacr.org by using
the string “alice@iacr.org”. In this system, there is no requirement that Bob has to
obtain Alice’s public key and verify it first. Alice could decrypt the message using
a private key corresponding to “alice@iacr.org” received from the PKG. Inevitably,
in this solution, Alice needs to authenticate her identity to the PKG. Alice can do
this authentication in the same way as in the traditional public key cryptography.
The IBE system provides a useful and efficient way to securely share a message
with someone whose identity is known. When a sender wants to send a message
to a group of users, it can trivially repeat the encryption scheme for each receiver
independently. However, this trivial solution is too inefficient to be of practical
use especially when the number of receivers is large. The ciphertext size and the
computational cost are linear in the number of receivers. Therefore, this trivial
solution is impractical and not suitable for the situation when a message should be
sent to several users.
Aiming to improve the efficiency when a message to be sent (shared) to (with) a
group of users, Fiat and Naor [FN94] introduced the notion of broadcast encryption
(BE), which allows an encryptor to broadcast a message to a group of users via a
public channel. In an identity-based broadcast encryption (IBBE) scheme, a message
is encrypted under a set of identities selected by the encryptor in a way that only
those users can decrypt the encrypted message and learn the content by providing
their private keys. While the users who are not chosen in the encryption phase
learn nothing about the message even they collude. IBBE (or BE) has been widely
deployed in the real-life applications, such as in Pay TV, and has been extensively
studied to capture more properties. However, as the encrypted message in the IBBE
system can be decrypted by several users, in some scenarios, the receiver might not
willing to expose its identity information to others. For instance, when a user
subscribes some sensitive TV programs, the user might be unwilling any other users
to know that he/she has subscribed the programs. The receiver privacy-preserving
(anonymity) has received more and more attention in many practical cryptography
fields, and has been extensively studied in the IBBE.
When some of receivers have left the system in the BE or their private keys
have been leaked, we would like to revoke them from the future broadcasts. Simply
encrypting the new message under the a new receiver set using the same broadcast
encryption scheme might lead to a large computational cost in message encryption
if the number of revoked users is small. To address this situation, Naor and Pinkas
[NP00] introduced a novel technique for broadcast encryption, where the encryption
is performed under the revoked users instead of the receivers such that any receiver
can retrieve the encrypted message except the revoked users. This kind of broadcast
encryption is also viewed as revocation system. The first revocation system with
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small private keys in the identity-based setting was proposed by Lewko, Sahai and
Waters [LSW10]. The revocation system is particularly useful for the situations
where we would like to revoke some of receivers in the broadcast encryption from
the future broadcasts.
In the IBBE, once the receivers’ identities have been determined and used to
encrypt the message, we cannot revoke some of them. This might restrict its de-
ployment as in some cases, the decryption right of receivers might be relocated by
other entities. To addresses this issue, Susilo et al. [SCG+16] extended IBBE and
introduced a new notion of recipient revocable identity-based broadcast encryption
(RR-IBBE). In the RR-IBBE system, it allows a third party to remove some of iden-
tities (users) from the identity set stated in the original IBBE ciphertext without
knowing the encrypted message. The third party is unable to decrypt the ciphertext
but it is permitted to revoke some of the receivers.
The aforementioned encryption notions, including the traditional public key
encryption, identity-based encryption, identity-based broadcast encryption and re-
cipient revocable identity-based broadcast encryption, provide data confidentiality
by encrypting a message under the public key or identity of an intended receiver,
who is the only person that is allowed to decrypt the ciphertext using the corre-
sponding private key (or in the multi-user setting). In these systems, the decryption
is an all-or-nothing affair, namely, a receiver is able to retrieve either the entire
message or nothing. In order to satisfy some new application scenarios, functional
encryption [BSW11] was introduced as a generalization of the PKE. In a functional
encryption system, the amount of information which is revealed to the receiver from
a given ciphertext is finely controlled. In a nutshell, given an encrypted message
x and a private key skF associated with a value y over a function F , it allows the
key holder to learn the value of F (x, y) and nothing else. It perfectly overcomes the
all-or-nothing affair appeared in the PKE system.
Inner product encryption (IPE) as a special functional encryption recently in-
troduced by Abdalla et al. [ABCP15] considers the inner product functionality and
aims to compute the actual value of inner product via decryption, which is entirely
different from the predicate encryption [SSW09], which checks whether the inner
product is zero or not, and retrieves the corresponding encrypted message if so. In
an IPE scheme, each message is described as a vector. A ciphertext CT is created
under a message vector ~x, and a user with a private key of the vector ~y from the
same space of the message is allowed to learn the value of 〈~x, ~y〉 via decryption and
nothing else about the message ~x. IPE is useful in the context of descriptive statis-
tics. For example, it can be used to compute the weighted mean of a collection of
data without leaking the contents of data. As the encrypted message in the IPE
can be decrypted by at most n− 1 private keys with the message length n, IPE can
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 4
also be viewed as a broadcast encryption with different decryption results.
1.2 Related Work
The work of Diffie and Hellman in [DH76] is a milestone of public key cryptography.
The first public key scheme presented in [DH76] is for secure secret key exchange but
not a general-purpose encryption algorithm. Rivest, Shamir and Adleman proposed
the so-called RSA scheme [RSA78] in 1978. RSA scheme has become the most widely
accepted and implemented general-purpose method to public key encryption. Its
security is based on the hardness of prime factorization of the large number. Later,
Rabin proposed the Rabin cryptosystem [Rab80], which is the first asymmetric
cryptosystem where recovering the message from a ciphertext can be proved to be
as hard as factoring. ElGamal, based on the Diffie-Hellman key exchange, proposed
the ElGamal encryption scheme [Gam84] in 1984. Although the ElGamal encryption
scheme has been shown insecure against malleable attacks, it has been widely used
as a building block to construct many cryptosystems. Cramer and Shoup [CS98]
extended the ElGamal system and proposed a scheme which can deal with the
malleable attack appeared in the ElGamal encryption. The proposed scheme is the
first efficient scheme proven to be secure against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks
(CCA) under the standard cryptographic assumption.
1.2.1 Identity-Based Encryption
The notion of identity-based encryption (IBE) was introduced by Shamir [Sha84] in
1984, but the first two concrete IBE schemes were realized about twenty years later
and proposed by Cocks [Coc01], Boneh and Franklin [BF01] in 2001 respectively.
The Cocks’ scheme uses the technique of quadratic residues and its security is based
on the hardness of the integer factorization problem. While Boneh and Franklin
[BF01] proposed a paring based IBE scheme (BF-IBE for short). BF-IBE scheme
is the first IBE scheme with a security proof in a well-formulated model under the
random oracle which has been regarded as a heuristic method. BF-IBE scheme has
received much attention from researchers since the authors proposed it. In compar-
ison, Cocks’ system encrypts the message bit-by-bit and consequently outputs long
ciphertexts, which is somewhat harder to use in practice than the BF-IBE scheme.
Subsequently, significant research effort has been devoted to realizing efficient and
secure IBE schemes.
Boneh and Boyen solved the open problem proposed in BF-IBE, and presented
the first IBE scheme without random oracles and it was proved to be secure against
chosen-plaintext attacks (CPA). This scheme is not very practical and mostly serves
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as an existence proof. Later, the authors proposed two efficient schemes shown to
be secure without using the random oracle, but in a weaker security model known
as selective identity model (selective-ID, for short) [BB04]. The study of Waters in
[Wat05] aimed to improve the efficiency and achieve higher security, and presented
the first efficient IBE scheme which was fully secure (against adaptive identity at-
tacks) without random oracles under the DBDH assumption. The first practical
identity-based encryption scheme without random oracles is given by Gentry [Gen06]
in 2006 (Gentry IBE, for short). The Gentry IBE scheme has several advantages over
previous such systems, namely computational efficiency, shorter public parameters
and a tighter security reduction. Further researches along this line mostly are based
on the above IBE systems. Another research line of IBE focuses on the construction
based on the learning-with-errors assumption [GPV08, CHKP10].
Horwitz and Lynn [HL02] suggested that the users are no longer identified by a
single identity, but a tuple of identities which contain the identities of their ances-
tors in the hierarchy. The authors then introduced the notion of hierarchical IBE
(HIBE). Based on the scheme in [BF01], Gentry and Silverberg [GS02] presented a
full functional HIBE scheme with n-level hierarchy. Boneh and Boyen also gave a se-
lective identity secure HIBE scheme without random oracles by extending their first
scheme described in [BB04]. Boneh et al. [BBG05] presented a HIBE system with
constant size ciphertext which is regardless of the hierarchy depth. Their scheme
has been proved to be selective-ID secure in the standard model and fully secure in
the random oracle model. Several following HIBE schemes are known based on the
bilinear map [SW08, Wat09, GH09, LW10].
1.2.2 Broadcast Encryption
Broadcast encryption (BE) introduced by Fiat and Naor [FN94] aimed to efficiently
send a message to a group of users. The primary challenge in the BE is to achieve
collusion resistance, where the users who are not chosen in the encryption phase
cannot retrieve the message even they collude. The proposed scheme in [FN94]
is only secure against bounded collusions. Naor et al. [NNL01] proposed a fully
collusion resistant broadcast encryption scheme for all but a small set of revoked
users. The first full collusion resistant broadcast encryption scheme with constant
size secret keys and ciphertexts is given by Boneh, Gentry and Waters [BGW05] in
2005. Subsequent work [DF03a, BGW05, DPP07, Del07, GW09, PPSS12, BWZ14]
have proposed broadcast encryption systems with different properties. They mainly
focused on reducing public key sizes, private key sizes, ciphertext sizes and com-
putational costs for encryption and decryption. The first two broadcast encryption
schemes in the identity-based setting have been realized in [SF07, Del07] in their
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independent work, where the ciphertext is generated using receivers’ identities in-
stead of their public keys. The proposed schemes in both work achieve constant size
ciphertext and private keys.
Anonymous Broadcast Encryption.
In the aforementioned broadcast encryption schemes, the receivers’ identities
(public key information) must be attached to the ciphertext and taken as input to
perform the decryption algorithm. This definitely exposes the privacy of receivers.
In other words, the public knows the identities of receivers from the ciphertext as
the ciphertext is transmitted over a public channel. This might not be desirable for
some applications. For example, in the TV-subscription system, when a customer
subscribes some sensitive programs, he/she is usually unwilling other users to know
his/her subscription. Anonymity is another important research area of broadcast
encryption.
The first work addressing the anonymity in broadcast encryption appears in
[BBW06]. The authors presented the notion of private broadcast encryption to
protect the identities of receivers and gave a generic construction from any key
indistinguishable against chosen-ciphertext attacks scheme, which achieves receiver
anonymity and CCA security. Boneh, Sahai and Waters [BSW06] extended this
notion to construct private linear broadcast encryption and proposed a fully collusion
resistant traitor tracing scheme with sublinear size ciphertexts and constant size
private keys.
Libert, Paterson and Quaglia [LPQ12] examined the security of the number-
theoretic construction in [BBW06] and suggested the proof techniques without the
random oracle. The authors then proposed an anonymous broadcast encryption
scheme which achieves adaptive security without random oracles. The size of ci-
phertext in their schemes is linear in the number of receivers and the security de-
pends on a one-time signature. Later, Fazio and Perera [FP12] formalized the notion
of outsider-anonymous broadcast encryption. Their construction achieves sublinear
size ciphertext but fails to obtain anonymity among receivers.
The work of Kiayias and Samari [KS13] aims to study the lower bounds for
the ciphertext size of private broadcast encryption. They showed that an atomic
private broadcast encryption scheme with fully anonymous must have a ciphertext
size of Ω(n · λ), where n is the number of identities selected in the encryption and
λ is a security parameter. Fazio, Nicolosi and Perera [FNP14] studied the broad-
cast steganography and introduced a new construction called outsider-anonymous
broadcast encryption with pseudorandom ciphertexts, which achieves sublinear size
ciphertext and is secure without random oracles.
Multi-Receiver Encryption. Another approach to share a message among a
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group of users is called multi-receiver encryption. The concept of multi-receiver
public key encryption was formalized by Bellare, Boldyreva and Micali in [BBM00].
Their main result is that the security in the multi-receiver setting can be reduced to
the security of public key encryption in the single-receiver setting. Later, based on
ElGamal encryption, Kurosawa [Kur02] proposed an efficient multi-receiver public
key encryption scheme by using the technique of “randomness re-use”.
Baek, Naini and Susilo [BSS05] proposed the notion of multi-receiver identity-
based encryption (MR-IBE) in PKC 2005 and gave the corresponding formal defini-
tion and security model. Comparing to simply re-encrypting a message n times for
n receivers using BF-IBE [BF01], their scheme only needs one pairing computation
to encrypt a single message. Fan, Huang and Ho [FHH10] proposed the first anony-
mous multi-receiver identity-based encryption scheme by using the technique of
Lagrange interpolating polynomial mechanism. Unfortunately, it has been pointed
out in [Chi12] that the scheme cannot protect the receiver privacy. The work in
[PPT13] aims to deal with multiple messages simultaneously. The authors proposed
multi-channel broadcast encryption schemes for pay-TV and used the dummy-help
technique to prove the security. However, Phan et al.’s schemes [PPT13] suffer from
the problems that the decryption has to take into account the public keys of all
users in all sets, and cannot protect the receivers’ identities from being exposed.
It has been showed that any multi-receiver public key encryption scheme can be
transferred into the corresponding broadcast encryption scheme.
1.2.3 Revocation
Revocation system is a variant of broadcast encryption, which takes a set of re-
voked users as input to the encryption algorithm in the way that the revoked users
cannot decrypt the ciphertext anymore. We can view the revocation system as a
negative analogue of broadcast encryption. When some of receivers’ private keys
are compromised in one broadcast encryption system, this kind of revocation can
prevent these users from retrieving the future broadcasts. Similar to the broadcast
encryption, the primary challenge in revocation system is to achieve full collusion
resilience. Several elegant revocation constructions [NP00, NNL01, DF03b, GST04,
BW06, LSW10, LKLP14] have been proposed.
Generally, there are three main techniques to construct revocation systems.
The first technique called subset-cover framework was proposed by Naor, Naor and
Lotspiech [NNL01]. Based on this framework, they proposed the first stateless
tree-based revocation scheme which is secure against a collision of any number of
users. Later, this method has been improved by Halevy and Shamir [HS02], and
Goodrich, Sun and Tamassia [GST04] respectively, to achieve shorter ciphertext size
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and private key size. The second type of techniques was introduced by Kurosawa and
Desmedt [KD98] and Naor and Pinkas [NP00], which uses polynomial interpolation.
However, the constructions based on this technique suffer from that both the secret
key size and ciphertext size are either linear in the number of revoked users or linear
in the maximal number of revoked users. The third technique to construct revocation
schemes uses exponent-inversion technique introduced by Delerablée, Paillier and
Pointcheval [DPP07], which can achieve either constant size secret keys or constant
size ciphertexts.
Boneh and Waters [BW06] introduced a primitive called augmented broad-
cast encryption which is claimed to be sufficient for constructing trace and revoke
schemes. The authors proposed a revocation scheme with sublinear size ciphertexts
and private keys. The scheme is proved to be secure against the adaptive adversary.
Lewko, Sahai and Waters [LSW10] proposed a revocation system in the identity-
based setting (IBRS), which achieves constant size master public key and private
keys using secret sharing and the “two equation” technique. The size of ciphertext in
Lewko et al.’s scheme is linear in the number of revoked users. Subsequently, IBRS
schemes with constant-size ciphertexts are proposed by Attrapadung and Libert in
[AL10] and Attrapadung, Libert and Panafieu in [ALdP11] respectively. However,
the size of both the master public key and private keys in their schemes is linear in
the maximal number of revoked identities.
Lee et al. [LKLP14] presented a single revocation encryption (SRE) scheme,
which allows a sender to broadcast a message to a group of selected users and one
group user is revoked. Any group member can decrypt the ciphertext except the
revoked user. The authors then proposed a public key trace and revoke scheme by
combining the layered subset difference scheme and their SRE scheme. We note
that among these schemes, the revocation list is determined by the encryptor.
Revocable encryption is a notion similar to the revocation system, which uses
key update to revoke users, and the revocation list is maintained by the key authority
(PKG) who issues the user’s private keys. In a revocable identity-based encryption
scheme [BGK08], a user with identity ID is given a long-term private key skID
from the key authority. For each time period T , the key authority broadcasts key
update information kuT using the revocation list, and the user with identity ID can
generate a short-term decryption key dkID,T by using skID and kuT if and only if
ID is not a revoked identity. The user with the decryption key dkID,T is able to
decrypt the ciphertexts created in the time T . Significant research effort has been
devoted to realizing revocable IBE schemes [AI09, LV09, SE13a, SE13b, PLL15].
Another notion called self-updatable encryption [LCL+13] uses ciphertext updating
to revoke users. Each private key and ciphertext are associated with a time T ′
and T respectively. Only the private key with T ′ ≥ T can decrypt the ciphertext
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successfully.
1.2.4 Inner product Encryption
Abdalla et at. [ABCP15] showed that the inner product functionality for very sim-
ple and efficient realizations can be constructed from the DDH assumption. They
proposed the first IPE scheme with a selective security. Subsequently, Agrawal et al.
in [ALS16] improved the work of Abdalla et al. and presented a construction which
is provably secure against adaptive attacks without compromising the efficiency.
Bishop et al. [BJK15] took the first step forward towards exploring the possibility
of obtaining the IPE with function privacy using the efficient and well-studied prim-
itives in the private-key setting1. They presented a function hiding IPE construction
from asymmetric bilinear pairing groups. Their construction supports any polyno-
mial number of private key queries and encryption queries in the full-hiding security
model [BS15] and they derived its security from the SXDH assumption. Datta et
al. [DDM16] improved Bishop et al.’s work by constructing a simple and efficient
function private IPE scheme. Compared with the work in [BJK15], their construc-
tion achieves the strongest notion (indistinguishability-based) of function privacy in
the private-key setting. Later, Kim et al. [KLM+16] reduced the parameter sizes
and the run-time complexity of the work in both [BJK15] and [DDM16].
Goldwasser et al. [GGG+14] introduced the notion of multi-input functional
encryption (MIFE), where decryption keys are associated with functions of several
inputs and the decryption algorithm takes multiple ciphertexts as input. Lee and
Lee [LL16] presented the first two-input IPE scheme from composite-order bilinear
groups in the private-key setting, which achieves selective IND-security. In an in-
dependent work, Kim et al. [KLM+16] showed how function-private IPE directly
yields the single-key two-input function encryption for general functions over a small
message space. The first multi-input IPE scheme was proposed by Abdalla et al.
in [ARW16, AGRW17]. They showed how to realize n slots MIFE for the inner
product for any polynomial number n under standard assumptions. The resulting
scheme avoids the exponential security loss. Benhamouda et al. [BBL17] moved
a step further to achieve security against chosen-ciphertext attacks (CCA). They
gave a generic construction of IND-CCA IPE from projective hash functions with
homomorphic properties and presented several instantiations based on different as-
sumptions.
1In the private-key IPE, the encryption key is the master secret key which is used to generate
the decryption key.
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1.3 Problem Statements
In the IBBE, once the identities of receivers have been decided and used in the
message encryption, we cannot revoke some of them before the next broadcast,
which might be not suitable for some real-life applications. The above revocation
system which is a negative analogue of IBBE by encrypting the message under the
identities of revoked users can only prevent the revoked users from retrieving the
future broadcast message, rather than the encrypted message stated in the IBBE.
To address this issue and meet the requirements of new applications, Susilo et al.
[SCG+16] combined the revocation together with IBBE, and introduced the notion
of recipient revocable identity-based broadcast encryption (RR-IBBE). In the RR-
IBBE, it allows a third party to remove some receivers from the original IBBE
ciphertext without knowing the encrypted message or performing any decryption
operation.
However, we observe that the work of Susilo et al. does not consider the receiver
privacy. In order to revoke some receivers stated in the IBBE ciphertext, the original
receiver set should be provided to the third party who performs the revocation
algorithm. Both the identities of original receivers and the revoked users are attached
in the final ciphertext. As stated in the IBBE, receiver anonymity is desirable when
designing a scheme for some applications, even for the third party who performs
user revocation. The pioneer work of Susilo et al. [SCG+16] cannot preserve the
privacy of receivers. The identity information of receivers and the revoked users
exposes not only to the third party, but also to the public. In this thesis, we will
continue the study of recipient revocable identity-based broadcast encryption and
focus on the user privacy-preserving in this system. Additionally, we also consider
the negative analogue of RR-IBBE to meet the requirements when the receivers of
one encrypted message are decided by different parties. The primary challenge is to
achieve collusion resistant.
In the IPE, we observe that with any private key, one can decrypt any encrypted
message and obtains the corresponding inner product. Which inner products asso-
ciated with an encrypted message can be computed are determined by the private
keys that have been generated. A wide range of practical applications, however, the
encryptor not only wants to further protect the data confidentiality, but also decides
who can learn the inner product associated with the encrypted message like in the
IBBE. All the previous schemes in the literature have not considered this situation.
Additionally, noting that none of the known IPE constructions in public-key
setting supports unbounded private key queries, which has been considered as some-
thing inherent to the functionality itself, as the functionality is linear. With n (the
length of message) private key queries, the adversary can recover the encrypted
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message. Although the works in [BJK15, DDM16] allow the adversary to query
arbitrary private keys, both are in the private-key setting, where the encryption key
is the master secret key which is used to generate the decryption key. In this thesis,
we continue the study of IPE and focus on the possibility to design an IPE scheme
in the public-key setting which allows the encryptor to control the decryption results
and supports unbounded private key queries issued by the adversary.
1.4 Our Contributions
In this thesis, we further study the broadcast encryption in the identity-based setting
and recipient revocable identity-based broadcast encryption. Roughly speaking,
based on the above problem statements, we focus on how to achieve user (receiver)
anonymity in the recipient revocable identity-based broadcast encryption against
both the third party who performs user revocation and the public. Apart from
protecting the receiver privacy, we also consider the privacy of the revoked users,
which might be desired in some practical applications. If both the receivers’ privacy
and the revoked users’ privacy are protected, we call it fully privacy-preserving in
this thesis.
Additionally, we study a variant of recipient revocable identity-based broadcast
encryption, namely, identity-based broadcast encryption with authorization. In the
authorization system, only the users whose identities are in both the original broad-
cast identity set and the authorized identity set can retrieve the encrypted message.
The authorization algorithm can be performed by several third parties with differ-
ent authorized identity sets in a way that only the user with identity belonging to
the intersection set of the selected identity set and all authorized identity sets can
retrieve the encrypted message.
Finally, based on the problem statement in the IPE, we introduce a new notion
of identity-based broadcast encryption for inner products (IBBE-IP), where the
message encryption is replaced by the inner product encryption. In this system,
each private key is associated with an identity and a vector. The encryptor can not
only further protect the message confidentiality, but also control who are allowed
to learn the inner product associated with the encrypted message like in the IBBE
system. We then describe a construction of IBBE-IP which supports unbounded
private key queries. In a nutshell, in this thesis, we study the following research
objectives.
– The anonymity of receivers in the recipient revocable identity-based broadcast
encryption.
– The anonymity of receivers and the revoked users in the recipient revocable
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identity-based broadcast encryption. Here, we refer to it as fully anonymous.
– The re-allocation of decryption rights of receivers in the identity-based broad-
cast encryption or how to improve the efficiency when the number of revoked
users is large.
– How to control the decryption rights of users in the inner product encryption
system.
1.5 Structure of This Thesis
The thesis is composed of the following seven chapters.
In Chapter 1, we review some backgrounds of encryption and its development
from one receiver setting to multi-receiver setting, which helps us understand our
work better, including public key encryption, identity-based encryption, broadcast
encryption, revocation and inner product encryption. We then review the corre-
sponding related work and show the problem statements, and describe our contri-
butions. In this chapter, we also give the structure of this thesis.
In Chapter 2, we give some mathematical tools towards constructing schemes,
including the finite field and cyclic group. Bilinear pairing and some complexity
assumptions which the security of schemes presented in this thesis based on are given
in this chapter. We give several cryptographic foundations including hash function
and random oracle, and the definitions of the public key encryption, identity-based
encryption, identity-based broadcast encryption and inner product encryption. We
then describe the corresponding security models in terms of each primitive.
In Chapter 3, we put forward an anonymous revocable identity-based broadcast
encryption scheme. Our proposed scheme preserves the receiver privacy against
the third party who performs the revocation. The first work of revocable identity-
based broadcast encryption does not take the receiver privacy into consideration and
derived its security under a q-type assumption. The security of our proposed scheme
is based on the BDH assumption which is a standard assumption. One limitation
is that to successfully perform decryption, the identities of revoked users should be
attached to the ciphertext after revocation.
In Chapter 4, we further study the receiver anonymity in recipient revocable
IBBE and present a fully privacy-preserving revocable IBBE scheme. The scheme
presented in this chapter addresses the limitation of the scheme described in chapter
3. The fully privacy-preserving scheme not only protects the identity information
of receivers, but also protects the identity information of the revoked users. The
security of the proposed scheme is based on the hardness of the BDH problem in
the random oracle model.
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In Chapter 5, we consider a negative analogue of revocable identity-based broad-
cast encryption, namely, authorization. We present a fully privacy-preserving identity-
based broadcast encryption with authorization scheme. Compared to the recipient
revocable IBBE, it allows a third party to perform an authorization algorithm with
an authorized identity set, in a way that only the user belonging to both the iden-
tity set stated in the original broadcast ciphertext and the authorized identity set
can retrieve the encrypted message. Its security is based on the BDH assumption.
The proposed authorization scheme also supports multiple authorizations. The au-
thorization algorithm can be performed several times by using different authorized
identity sets such that only the user in all authorized identity sets can retrieve the
message by providing the corresponding private keys.
In Chapter 6, we study the inner product encryption proposed by Abdalla et
al. [ABCP15] and introduce a notion of identity-based broadcast encryption for
inner products (IBBE-IP). The notion of IBBE-IP features both the metrics of
identity-based broadcast encryption and the metrics of inner product encryption.
In the IBBE-IP, the user private key is associated with its identity and a vector.
The decryption only gives the inner product of the encrypted message and the
vector associated with the decryption key, which can further protect the encrypted
message. Meanwhile, the encryptor can determine who are allowed to learn the
inner products as in the broadcast encryption. In this chapter, we give a concrete
IBBE-IP construction and derive its security from a q-type assumption in the generic
group model.




In this chapter, we review some preliminaries which are used in this thesis, including
mathematic tools and cryptographic notions. We begin with a description of some
notations appeared in the definitions.
2.1 Notations
Table 2.1 presents some notations which are used throughout this thesis. Some
special notations will be defined when they are first used.
If S is a finite set, then |S| is its cardinality. Sn is a set of n-tuples of elements
of S. x
$← S denotes the assignment to x of an element picked uniformly from S. If
A is a probability or stateful algorithm, then y ← A(x) denotes the assignment to y
of the output of A on input x. Let N denote the set of natural numbers. A function
ε : N → [0, 1] is said to be negligible if for every d ∈ N, there exists a λd ∈ N such
that ε(λ) ≤ λ−d for all λ > λd.
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Table 2.1: Notations
Symbol Description
λ System security parameter.
~x A vector x.
Z The set of integers.
Zp The set consists of the integers modulo p.
Z∗p The multiple group of integers modulo p.
x ∈ A x is a member of set A.
x ∈R A x is a random element chosen from set A.
x ∈ A ∩B x is a member of both set A and set B.
x ∈ A ∪B x is a member of either set A or set B.
x ∈ A\B x is a member of set A but not a member of set B.
x ∈ A4B x is a member of set A but not a member of set B, or
x is a member of set B but not a member of set A.
ε(λ) A negligible function associated with λ.
2.2 Mathematical Foundations
In this section, we review some cryptographic mathematical foundations including
finite fields, cyclic groups and the Lagrange polynomial interpolation.
2.2.1 Finite Field
Definition 2.1 (Finite Field). A finite field denoted by (F,+, ∗) is a set F con-
taining a finite number of elements together with two binary operations “ + ” (called
addition), and “ ∗ ” (called multiplication) defined as follows.
1. for all u, v ∈ F, we have u+ v ∈ F and u ∗ v ∈ F;
2. for all u1, u2, u3 ∈ F, we have u1+(u2+u3) = (u1+u2)+u3 and u1∗(u2∗u3) =
(u1 ∗ u2) ∗ u3;
3. for all u, v ∈ F, we have u+ v = v + u and u ∗ v = v ∗ u;
4. there exist 0F, 1F ∈ F (called the identity elements) such that for all u ∈ F,
we have 0F + u = u+ 0F = u and 1F ∗ u = u ∗ 1F = u;
5. for all u ∈ F, there exists −u ∈ F (called the additive inverse of u) such
that u+ (−u) = 0F;
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6. for all u ∈ F, there exists u−1 ∈ F (called the multiplicative inverse of u)
such that u ∗ u−1 = 1F;
7. for all u1, u2, v ∈ F, we have (u1 + u2) ∗ v = u1 ∗ v + u2 ∗ v.
The symbol 0F is the identity element under the addition operation while the
symbol 1F ∈ F is the identity element under the multiplication operation. We stress
that the binary operations within the finite field definitions are different from the
mathematical addition and the mathematical multiplication. Usually, we define
u− v = u+ (−v) and call it subtraction operation, while define u
v
= u ∗ v−1 and call
it division operation.
In the design of group-based cryptography systems, we usually choose a prime
field Fq with a large prime q. This is the field of residue classes modulo q, and there
are q elements in this field which are {0, 1, 2, · · · , q−1}. The operations in this field
are the modular addition and the modular multiplication. Furthermore,
−u = q − u and u−1 = uq−2 mod q.
We use Zq to denote the prime field instead of Fq.
2.2.2 Cyclic Group
Definition 2.2 (Abelian Group). An abelian group denoted by (G, ∗) is a set G
together with a binary operation “ ∗ ” defined as follows.
(i) for all u1, u2, u3 ∈ G, we have u1 ∗ (u2 ∗ u3) = (u1 ∗ u2) ∗ u3 (i.e. “ ∗ ” is
associative);
(ii) there exists 1G ∈ G (called the identity element) such that for all u ∈ G, we
have 1G ∗ u = u ∗ 1G = u;
(iii) for all u ∈ G, there exists u−1 ∈ G (called the inverse of u) such that u∗u−1 =
1G;
(iv) for all u, v ∈ G, we have u ∗ v = v ∗ u (i.e. “ ∗ ” is commutative).
If we drop the property (iv) from the definition 2.2, we get the definition of a
more general notion of a group. Let G be an abelian group with binary operation
∗, we have that G contains only one identity element and every element of G has
only one inverse.
Definition 2.3. An abelian group is a cyclic group if there exists one element
that can generate the whole group. If a cyclic group denoted by G = 〈g〉, we say this
cyclic group is generated by g and g is a generator of group G.
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Let |G| denote the number of elements in G and we call it the order of group G.
For an element g ∈ G, we call the minimum a ∈ Z such that ga = 1G as the order
of g and denote it as ord(g). Then we have following theorem.
Theorem 2.1. If G is a cyclic group and g ∈ G, then |G| is divisible by ord(g).
2.2.3 Lagrange Polynomial Interpolation
Here we review the Lagrange interpolation polynomial that will be used in the pro-












we have fi(xj) = 1, if i = j and fi(xj) = 0, if i 6= j. Then there exists a unique






Let G1, G2 and GT be three cyclic groups of the same order p for some large prime p.
Let g1 be the generator of G1, g2 be the generator of G2. A map e : G1 ×G2 → GT
is a bilinear map if it satisfies the following three properties.
1. Bilinear: for all u ∈ G1, v ∈ G2 and for all a, b ∈ Zp, we have e(ua, vb) =
e(u, v)ab.
2. Non-Degenerate: e(g1, g2) is a generator of GT .
3. Computable: for all u ∈ G1, v ∈ G2, there exists efficient algorithms to
compute e(u, v).
A bilinear group BG = (G1,G2,GT , g1, g2, p, e) is composed of objects as described
above. If G1 = G2, we call the pairing is a symmetric pairing. Otherwise, we call
the pairing is a asymmetric pairing. In this thesis, we use the symmetric pairing in
the scheme construction and denote the corresponding symmetric bilinear group as
BG = (G,GT , e, p).
2.4 Complexity Assumptions
In this section, we review some hard problems mentioned in this thesis which are
believed to be intractable. The security of our proposed schemes are based on the
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corresponding assumptions. Roughly speaking, the hard problems can be classified
into computational hard problems and decisional hard problems. We list some hard
problems which will be used in the analysis of our proposed schemes. In the follow-
ing, G and GT are cyclic groups of the large prime order p, and G × G → GT is a
pairing map unless it is specified otherwise.





to compute gab, where a, b are from Zp and are unknown.




, we say the CDH assumption
holds in G if no probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversary A can compute gab
with the advantage









where the probability is taken over the random choice of a, b ∈ Zp and bits consumed
by the adversary A.
Decisional Diffie-Hellman Problem (DDH) [Bon98]. Given
(
g, ga, gb, Z
)
∈ G,
to decide whether Z = gab, where a, b are from Zp and are unknown.
Definition 2.5 (DDH Assumption). Given
(
g, ga, gb, Z
)
, we say the DDH assump-
tion holds in G if no PPT adversary A can distinguish
(









∣∣∣Pr [A (g, ga, gb, gab) = 1]− Pr [A (g, ga, gb, Z) = 1] ∣∣∣ ≥ ε(λ)
where the probability is taken over the random choice of a, b, c ∈ Zp and bits con-
sumed by the adversary A.
Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem (BDH) [BF01]. Given
(
g, ga, gb, gc
)
∈ G, to
compute e(g, g)abc, where a, b, c are from Zp and are unknown.
Definition 2.6 (BDH Assumption). Given
(
g, ga, gb, gc
)
, we say the BDH assump-
tion holds in G if no PPT adversary A can compute e(g, g)abc with the advantage









where the probability is taken over the random choice of a, b, c ∈ Zp and bits con-
sumed by the adversary A.





∈ G, to decide whether Z = e(g, g)abc or a random element from GT , where
a, b, c are from Zp and are unknown.
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Definition 2.7 (DBDH Assumption). Given
(
g, ga, gb, gc, Z
)
, we say the DBDH
assumption holds in G if no PPT adversary A can distinguish
(








∣∣∣Pr [A (g, ga, gb, gc, e(g, g)abc) = 1]− Pr [A (g, ga, gb, gc, Z) = 1] ∣∣∣
≥ ε(λ),
where the probability is taken over the random choice of a, b, c ∈ Zp and bits con-
sumed by the adversary A.
2.4.1 General Diffie-Hellman Exponent Problem
Following [Del07], we describe the general Diffie-Hellman exponent problem. In
[BBG05], Boneh, Boyen and Goh introduced a number of Diffie-Hellman-type com-
plexity assumptions in the generic group model [Sho97]. They include the BDH
assumption [BF01], the DH Inversion assumption (DHI)[BB04], the Linear DH
assumption[BBS04], and the BDHE assumption[BGW05], and others.
We give an overview of the generalization of the Diffie-Hellman exponent as-
sumptions in the symmetric case. Let BG = (G,GT , e, p) be a bilinear map, g0 be
a generator of G. Let s, n be positive integers and P,Q ∈ Fp[X1, X2, · · · , Xn]s be
two s-tuples of n-variate polynomials over Fp. Therefore, P and Q are just two
lists containing s multi-variate polynomials each. We write P = (p1, p2, · · · , ps) and
Q = (q1, q2, · · · , qs) and require that p1 = q1 = 1. For a set Ω, a function h : Fp → Ω
and vector (x1, x2, · · · , xn) ∈ Fnp , we write
h
(






p1(x1, x2, · · · , xn)
)
, · · · , h
(
ps(x1, x2, · · · , xn)
))
∈ Ωs.
We use similar notion for the s-tuple Q.
We say that a polynomial F ∈ Fp[X1, X2, · · · , Xn] depends on the sets (P,Q)









We say that F is independent of (P,Q) which we denote by F /∈ 〈P,Q〉 if F is
not dependent on (P,Q). The (P,Q, F )- General Decision Diffie-Hellman Exponent
Problem ((P,Q,F)-GDDHE) is defined as follow.
Definition 2.8 ((P,Q,F)-GDDHE). Given the tuple




0 , e(g0, g0)
Q(x1,x2,··· ,xn)
)
∈ Gs ×GsT ,
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and Z ∈ GT , to decide whether Z = e(g0, g0)F (x1,x2,··· ,xn).
We say that an algorithm D that outputs a bit µ ∈ {0, 1} has advantage
Advgddhe(D) in solving the (P,Q, F )-GDDHE problem in G if∣∣∣∣Pr [D (H(x1, · · · , xn), gF (x1,··· ,xn)T ) = 1]
− Pr
[
D(H(x1, · · · , xn), Z) = 1
]∣∣∣∣ ≥ Advgddhe(D),
where the probability is over the random choice of generator g0 ∈ G, the random
choice of x1, · · · , xn ∈ Fp, the random choice of Z ∈ GT , and the random bits con-
sumed by D. Then, we have the following result on the (P,Q, F )-GDDHE problem
stated in [BBG05].
Theorem 2.2 ([BBG05]). Let P,Q ∈ Fp[X1, · · · , Xn]s be two s-tuples of n variate
polynomials over Fp and let F ∈ Fp[X1, · · · , Xn]. Let dP (resp. dQ, dF ) denote the
maximal degree of elements of P (resp. of Q, F ) and d = max(2dP , dQ, dF ). If
F /∈ 〈P,Q〉 then for any generic model distinguisher D that makes a total of at most
q queries to the oracles computing the group operation in G, GT and the bilinear
pairing e : G×G→ GT , we have





In this section, we describe some basic cryptographic primitives and useful crypto-
graphic tools.
2.5.1 Hash Function
Hash function was introduced by Carter and Wegman [CW79]. A hash function
H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}l is a deterministic function which takes an arbitrary length
string as input and returns a constant size string as output. A hash function features
the following properties:
1. One-wayness. Given a value y, any PPT algorithm cannot find a value x
such that y = H(x) with non-negligible probability.
2. Collusion Resistance. No PPT algorithm can find x 6= y such that H(x) =
H(y) with non-negligible probability.
Hash function has been widely used as a building block to scheme construction,
including the encryption and digital signatures.
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2.5.2 Random Oracle
Random oracle introduced by Bellare and Rogaway [BR93] provides a bridge be-
tween cryptographic theory and cryptographic practice. Random oracle has been
regarded as a powerful tool to program the security reduction. A random oracle is
typically used to represent an ideal hash function whose output is random and uni-
formly distributed in its output space. In the security reduction, if a hash function
H is viewed as a random oracle, then we say this reduction is programmed in the
random oracle model. In this model, when given an input x, we cannot compute
the value of H(x). The only way to obtain the value of H(x) is to query the oracle.
Before query x, H(x) is unknown and uniformly distributed. While if H is a hash
function, everyone can compute the value of H(x) for the knowing input x.
When programming a security reduction in the random oracle model, random
oracles are very helpful for the simulator, as the simulator can control the random
oracles. To respond the oracle queries, the simulator selects any output that looks
random from the corresponding output space. It helps the simulator complete the
simulation. Usually, if a scheme is proved to be secure in the random oracle model,
at least one of hash functions is regarded as random oracles. To obtain the value of
H(x), the adversary has to query x to the random oracle. As the value of H(x) is
determined by the simulator, it can help the simulator to solve the underlying hard
problem. Therefore, the security proof in the random model are believed easier than
that without random oracles.
2.5.3 Public Key Encryption
A public key encryption (PKE) scheme consists of the following four algorithms.
– SysGen(1λ). Taking as input a security parameter λ, the system param-
eter generation algorithm returns the system parameter SP .
– KeyGen(SP ). Taking as input the system parameter SP , the key gener-
ation algorithm returns a public/secret key pair (pk, sk).
– Encrypt(SP, pk,M). Taking as input the system parameter SP , the pub-
lic key pk, and a message M from its message space, the encryption algo-
rithm returns a ciphertext CT .
– Decrypt(SP, sk, CT ). Taking as input the system parameter SP , the
secret key sk, and a ciphertext CT , the decryption algorithm returns a
message m or ⊥ to denote failure.
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Correctness. A PKE scheme should satisfy the following correctness require-
ment. For all SP ← SysGen(1λ), (pk, sk) ← KeyGen(SP ) and CT ← Encrypt(SP,
pk,M), we have M ← Decrypt(SP, sk, CT ).
Security models. The indistinguishability security of public key encryption is
defined by a game played between a challenger and an adversary. The challenger
first generates the public key to the adversary. Then the adversary outputs two
messages M0,M1 from the same message space for challenge and the challenger
generates a challenge ciphertext CT ∗ on a message randomly chosen from {M0,M1}.
Finally, the adversary outputs its guess of the message in CT ∗. During the game, the
adversary is allowed to make queries with some restrictions to avoid trivial solutions.
The security model of indistinguishability chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA) is
defined by the following game.
– Setup: Let SP be the system parameter. The challenger runs the key gener-
ation algorithm to generate the public key pk and sends pk to the adversary.
– Phase 1: The adversary issues decryption queries on ciphertexts CTi. To
respond the query, the challenger runs the decryption algorithm and sends the
decryption result to the adversary.
– Challenge: Once the adversary decides that the phase 1 is over, it outputs
two distinct messages M0,M1 from the same message space for challenge. The
challenger picks a random bit µ ∈ {0, 1} and generates a challenge ciphertext
CT ∗, then it sends CT ∗ to the adversary.
– Phase 2: The adversary continues to make decryption queries on ciphertext
CTi with the restriction that CTi 6= CT ∗. The challenger responds to the
queries the same as in phase 1.
– Guess: The adversary outputs a guess µ′ of µ and wins the game if µ′ = µ.
We define the advantage of the adversary in winning this game as
AdvPKE(λ) =
∣∣∣∣Pr[µ′ = µ]− 12
∣∣∣∣ .
Definition 2.9. A public key encryption scheme is IND-CCA secure if there exists
no probabilistic polynomial time adversary who can win the above game with a non-
negligible advantage.
If we require that the adversary is not allowed to make the decryption query
in the IND-CCA security model, we get the security model of indistinguishability
chosen-plaintext attacks (IND-CPA) for public key encryption.
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2.5.4 Identity-Based Encryption
An identity-based encryption scheme (IBE) consists of the following four algorithms.
– Setup(1λ). Taking as input a security parameter λ, the system setup
algorithm returns a master public key mpk which is publicly known and a
master secret key msk which is kept secretly.
– KeyGen(mpk,msk, ID). Taking as input the master key pair (mpk,msk)
and a user identity ID, the key generation algorithm returns a user private
key dID.
– Encrypt(mpk, ID,M). Taking as input the master public key mpk, an
identity ID, and a message M from its message space, the encryption
algorithm returns a ciphertext CT .
– Decrypt(mpk,CT, dID). Taking as input the master public key mpk, a
ciphertext CT , an identity ID and the corresponding private key dID, the
decryption algorithm returns a message M or ⊥ to denote failure.
Correctness. An IBE scheme should satisfy the following correctness re-
quirement. For all (mpk,msk) ← Setup(1λ), dID ← KeyGen(mpk,msk, ID) and
CT ← Encrypt(mpk, ID,M), we have M ← Decrypt(mpk,CT, dID).
Security models. The security of IBE requires that without a private key,
the adversary cannot decrypt the encrypted message. More precisely, the indis-
tinguishability security of IBE is defined by a game playing between a challenger
and an adversary. The challenger first generates the master public key to the ad-
versary. Then the adversary outputs two message M0,M1 from the same message
space for challenge and the challenger generates a challenge ciphertext CT ∗ on a
message randomly chosen from {M0,M1}. Finally, the adversary outputs its guess
of the message in CT ∗. During the game, the adversary is allowed to make private
key queries and decryption queries as needed with some restrictions. The security
model of indistinguishability chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA) is defined by the
following game.
– Setup: The challenger runs the setup algorithm to generate the master public
key mpk and sends mpk to the adversary.
– Phase 1: In this phase, the adversary can issue private key queries and de-
cryption queries as needed.
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- Private key query. For the query on IDi, the challenger runs the key
generation algorithm to generate dIDi and sends dIDi to the adversary.
- Decryption query. For the query on (IDi, CTi), the challenger runs the
key generation algorithm to generate the private key dIDi and runs the
decryption algorithm to decrypt the ciphertext CTi using dIDi .
– Challenge: Once the adversary decides that the phase 1 is over, it outputs an
identity ID∗ and two distinct messages M0,M1 from the same message space
for challenge. We require that the private key of ID∗ has not been queried
in the phase 1 to avoid trivial solutions. The challenger picks a random bit
µ ∈ {0, 1} and generates a challenge ciphertext CT ∗, then it sends CT ∗ to the
adversary.
– Phase 2: The adversary continues to make private key queries on IDi 6= ID∗
and decryption queries on (IDi, CTi) with the restriction that CTi 6= CT ∗.
The challenger responds to the queries the same as in phase 1.
– Guess: The adversary outputs a guess µ′ of µ and wins the game if µ′ = µ.
We define the advantage of the adversary in winning this game as
AdvIND-CCAIBE (λ) =
∣∣∣∣Pr[µ′ = µ]− 12
∣∣∣∣ .
Definition 2.10. An identity-based encryption scheme is IND-CCA secure if there
exists no probability polynomial time adversary who can win the above game with a
non-negligible advantage.
If we require that the adversary is not allowed to make the decryption query
in the IND-CCA security model, we get the security model of indistinguishability
chosen-plaintext attacks (IND-CPA). We also get selective security if the adversary
must commit the challenge identity ID∗ before seeing the master public key.
2.5.5 Identity-Based Broadcast Encryption
An identity-based broadcast encryption (IBBE) scheme consists of the following four
algorithms.
– Setup(1λ, N). Taking as input a security parameter λ and N the maximal
size of the set of receivers for one encryption, the setup algorithm returns
a master public key mpk and a master secret key msk. The master public
key mpk is publicly known and the master secret key msk is kept secretly.
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– KeyGen(mpk,msk, ID). Taking as input the master key pair (mpk,msk)
and a user identity ID, the key generation returns a user private key dID.
– Encrypt(mpk,M, S). Taking as input the master public key mpk, a mes-
sage M , and a set of identities S with |S| ≤ N , the encryption algorithm
returns a ciphertext CT .
– Decrypt(mpk,CT, ID, dID, S). Taking as input the master public key
mpk, a ciphertext CT , a set S, an identity ID and the corresponding
private key dID, the decryption algorithm returns M if ID ∈ S or ⊥
otherwise.
Correctness. An IBBE scheme should satisfy the following correctness re-
quirement. For all (mpk,msk)← Setup(1λ, N), dID ← KeyGen(mpk,msk, ID) and
CT ← Encrypt(mpk,M, S), if ID ∈ S, we have M ← Decrypt(mpk,CT, ID, dID, S).
Security models. The standard security notion of identity-based broadcast
encryption scheme is indistinguishability security against chosen-ciphertext attacks
(IND-CCA). It requires that given a set of identities S and two distinct messages
M0 and M1 from the same message space, the adversary has a negligible advantage
to tell apart which message has been encrypted in the challenge ciphertext. The
adversary is permitted to access the private key query and the decryption query
under some restrictions to avoid trivial solutions. Precisely, the IND-CCA secruity
is defined via a security game played by a challenger and an adversary below. Both
the adversary and the challenger are given as input N , the maximal size of the set
of receivers S.
– Setup: The challenger runs the setup algorithm to generate the master public
key mpk and sends mpk to the adversary.
– Phase 1: In this phase, the adversary can make private key queries and
decryption queries as needed.
- Private key query. For the query on IDi, the challenger runs the key
generation algorithm to generate dIDi and sends dIDi to the adversary.
- Decryption query. For the query on (IDi, Si, CTi) with IDi ∈ Si, the
challenger runs the key generation algorithm to generate the private key
dIDi and runs the decryption algorithm to decrypt the ciphertext CTi
using dIDi .
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– Challenge: Once the adversary decides that the phase 1 is over, it outputs an
identity set S∗ with |S∗| ≤ N and two distinct messages M0,M1 from the same
message space for challenge. We require that the private keys of ID∗i ∈ S∗ have
not been queried. The challenger picks a random bit µ ∈ {0, 1} and generates
a challenge ciphertext CT ∗ under S∗, then it sends CT ∗ to the adversary.
– Phase 2: The adversary continues to make private key queries on IDi /∈ S∗
and decryption queries on (IDi, Si, CTi) with the restriction that CTi 6= CT ∗.
The challenger responds to the queries the same as in phase 1.
– Guess: The adversary outputs a guess µ′ of µ and wins the game if µ′ = µ.
We define the advantage of the adversary in winning this game as
AdvIND-CCAIBBE (λ,N) =
∣∣∣∣Pr[µ′ = µ]− 12
∣∣∣∣ .
Definition 2.11. An identity-based broadcast encryption scheme is IND-CCA se-
cure if there exists no probabilistic polynomial time adversary who can win the above
game with a non-negligible advantage.
One weaker notion of IBBE is selective-ID security, where the adversary must
choose the set of identities he wants to attack at the beginning of the game. We
define IND-sID-CCA security of an IBBE system via the following game between
an adversary and a challenger. Both the adversary and the challenger are given as
input N , the maximal size of the set of receivers S.
– Init: The adversary first outputs a set S∗ = {ID∗1, ID∗2, · · · , ID∗s} of identities
that he wants to attack with s ≤ N .
– Setup: The challenger runs the setup algorithm to generate the master public
key mpk and sends mpk to the adversary.
– Phase 1: In this phase, the adversary can make private key queries and
decryption queries as needed.
- Private key query. For the query on IDi with the restriction that IDi /∈
S∗, the challenger runs the key generation algorithm to generate dIDi and
sends dIDi to the adversary.
- Decryption query. For the query on (IDi, Si, CTi) with IDi ∈ Si and Si ⊆
S∗, the challenger runs the private key generation algorithm to generate
the private key dIDi and runs the decryption algorithm to decrypt the
ciphertext CTi using dIDi .
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– Challenge: Once the adversary decides that the phase 1 is over, it outputs
two distinct messages M0,M1 from the same message space for challenge. The
challenger picks a random bit µ ∈ {0, 1} and generates a challenge ciphertext
CT ∗ under S∗, then it sends CT ∗ to the adversary.
– Phase 2: The adversary continues to make private key queries and decryption
queries as in the phase 1 with the restriction that CTi 6= CT ∗. The challenger
responds to the queries the same as in phase 1.
– Guess: The adversary outputs a guess µ′ of µ and wins the game if µ′ = µ.
We define the advantage of the adversary in winning this game as
AdvIND-sID-CCAIBBE (λ,N) =
∣∣∣∣Pr[µ′ = µ]− 12
∣∣∣∣ .
Definition 2.12. An identity-based broadcast encryption scheme is IND-sID-CCA
secure if there exists no probabilistic polynomial time adversary who can win the
above game with a non-negligible advantage.
If we require that the adversary is not allowed to access the decryption query in
the above two security models, we get the corresponding indistinguishability security
against chosen-plaintext attacks (IND-CPA).
2.5.6 Inner Product Encryption
The inner product encryption (IPE) is a special functional encryption [BSW11] for
inner products. The output of the function is a real value of inner product. An IPE
scheme can be specified by the following four algorithms.
– Setup(1λ, n). Taking as input a security parameter λ and n the length of
vectors, it outputs a master public key mpk and a master secret key msk.
The master public key mpk is made public and the master secret key msk
is kept secretly. The master public key contains the descriptions of a key
space K and a message space X .
– KeyGen(mpk,msk, ~y). Taking as input the master key pair (mpk,msk)
and a vector ~y ∈ Kn, it outputs a private key sk~y of ~y.
– Encrypt(mpk, ~x). Taking as input the master public key mpk and a message
~x ∈ X n, it outputs a ciphertext CT .
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– Decrypt(mpk,CT, sk~y). Taking as input the master public key mpk, a
ciphertext CT , and a private key sk~y of ~y, it outputs 〈~x, ~y〉 or ⊥.
We make the following correctness requirement: for any (mpk,msk)←Setup(1λ,
n), all ~y ∈ Kn, ~x ∈ X n, for sk~y←KeyGen(mpk,msk, ~y) and CT←Encrypt(mpk, ~x),
we have that Decrypt(mpk,CT, sk~y) = 〈~x, ~y〉 whenever Decrypt(mpk,CT, sk~y) = ⊥
except with a negligible probability.
IND-CPA Security. For an IPE scheme IPE = (Setup,KeyGen,Encrypt, Decrypt)
over (K,X ), we define security against chosen-plaintext attacks (IND-CPA, for
short) via a security game played by a challenger and an adversary. The secu-
rity model of IND-CPA is defined by the following game. Both the adversary and
the challenger are given as input n, the length of the message.
– Setup: The challenger runs the setup algorithm to generate the master public
key mpk and sends mpk to the adversary. It then sets V ← ∅.
– Phase 1: In this phase, the adversary can issue private key queries as needed.
For the query on ~yi, the challenger runs the key generation algorithm to gen-
erate sk~yi and sends sk~yi to the adversary. It then sets V ← V ∪ {~yi}.
– Challenge: Once the adversary decides that the phase 1 is over, it outputs
two distinct vectors ~x0, ~x1 from the same space for challenge. We require that
for all ~y ∈ V , we have 〈~x0, ~y〉 = 〈~x1, ~y〉. The challenger picks a random bit
µ ∈ {0, 1} and generates a challenge ciphertext CT ∗, then it sends CT ∗ to the
adversary.
– Phase 2: The adversary continues to make private key queries on ~yi with the
restriction that 〈~x0, ~yi〉 = 〈~x1, ~yi〉. The challenger responds to the queries the
same as in phase 1.
– Guess: The adversary outputs a guess µ′ of µ and wins the game if µ′ = µ.
We define the advantage of the adversary in winning this game as
AdvIND-CPAIPE (λ) =
∣∣∣∣Pr[µ′ = µ]− 12
∣∣∣∣ .
Definition 2.13. An IPE scheme is IND-CPA secure if there exists no probability
polynomial time adversary who can win the above game with non-negligible advan-
tage.
If we require A to commit to the challenge messages ~x0, ~x1 before seeing the
master public key, we get selective security.
Chapter 3
Anonymous Revocable IBBE
This chapter describes a new construction of anonymous revocable identity-based
broadcast encryption scheme. It is the first revocable IBBE scheme which considers
the user privacy. The original scheme was presented at ACISP 2016 [LMG+16].
3.1 Introduction
Since the pioneering work of Fiat and Naor in [FN94], broadcast encryption has
been extensively studied and in many flavors to achieve more functionalities, higher
efficiency and higher security [BGW05, DPP07, GW09, LPQ12]. Broadcast en-
cryption in the identity-based setting (IBBE) [Del07] plays a significant role in the
applications in terms of the metrics of identity-based cryptography. In the IBBE,
a user is allowed to retrieve the encrypted message if and only if the corresponding
identity is selected to perform the encryption. As some receivers might leave the
system, such as the employees leave one company, or some receivers’ private keys
are exposed or compromised, we have to revoke these users such that they cannot
retrieve the encrypted message anymore. Therefore, user revocation becomes an
important research topic in the broadcast encryption system. Unfortunately, all the
revocation systems in the broadcast encryption can only prevent the revoked users
from decrypting the future broadcast message rather than the message stated in the
broadcast encryption.
Aiming to revoke some users from the original receivers stated in the ciphertext
generated in a broadcast encryption system, Susilo et al. [SCG+16] introduced a
notion called recipient revocable identity-based broadcast encryption (RR-IBBE),
which is an extension of the identity-based broadcast encryption. In the RR-IBBR,
it allows a third party to remove some of receivers from the original ciphertext,
but the third party cannot decrypt the ciphertext. That is, the receiver revocation
operation does not require the knowledge of the message. The revoked users are
unable to decrypt the encrypted message even they collude. Compared to the IBBE
system, the RR-IBBE system is of one additional algorithm “revoke”, which is used
for the receiver revocation. In [SCG+16], the authors presented the first recipient
29
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revocable broadcast encryption scheme in the identity-based setting. The ciphertext
after revocation surprisingly achieves constant size. While this scheme does not take
the receiver privacy into consideration. The decryption requires knowing the identity
information of the receivers and the revoked users. However, the receiver privacy-
preserving in the broadcast encryption is a very important issue when deploying a
broadcast encryption system as we stated in chapter 1.
In this chapter, we will continue to study RR-IBBE and describe the first anony-
mous construction of RR-IBBE. We propose an anonymous revocable identity-based
broadcast encryption scheme and derive its security based on the hardness of BDH
problem (see Section 2.4) in the random oracle. In the proposed scheme, the re-
ceiver identity information is hidden to the third party who performs the revocation
algorithm and to the public. The decryption does not need to know the receivers’
identities.
Organization. The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In the next Section,
we give the definitions of anonymous revocable identity-based broadcast encryption
and the corresponding security models. The concrete construction is described in
Section 3.3. In Section 3.4, we provide the security analysis of the proposed scheme
under the defined security models and conclude this chapter in Section 3.5.
3.2 Definitions and Security Models
This section will define the syntax and the security of anonymous revocable identity-
based broadcast encryption (AR-IBBE). An AR-IBBE scheme consists of five algo-
rithms defined as follows.
– Setup(1λ). Taking as input a security parameter λ, the setup algorithm
returns a master public key mpk and a master secret key msk. The mpk
is publicly known while the msk is kept secretly.
– KeyGen(mpk,msk, ID). Taking as input the master key pair (msk,mpk)
and a user identity ID, the key generation algorithm returns a user private
key dID.
– Encrypt(mpk,M, S). Taking as input the master public key mpk, a mes-
sage M and a set of identities S = (ID1, ID2, ..., IDn), the encryption
algorithm returns a ciphertext CT .
– Revoke(mpk,R,CT ). Taking as input the master public key mpk, a ci-
phertext CT and a set of revoked identities R = (ID1, ID2, · · · , IDt) with
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t < n, the revocation algorithm returns a new ciphertext CT ′ including
the set R.
– Decrypt(mpk,CT ′, ID, dID, R, ). Taking as input the master public key
mpk, a ciphertext CT ′ with a set R, an identity ID and the corresponding
private key dID, the decryption algorithm returns M if ID ∈ S\R, and ⊥
otherwise to denote failure.
Correctness. Note that if t = 0, the AR-IBBE scheme is an anonymous
identity-based broadcast encryption scheme. Thus, an AR-IBBE scheme should
satisfy the following correctness requirements. For any (mpk,msk) ← Setup(1λ),
dID ← KeyGen(mpk,msk, ID), CT ← Encrypt(mpk,M, S), and CT ′ ← Revoke(mpk,
R,CT ), if ID ∈ S\R, we have Decrypt (mpk,CT, ID, dID) = M and Decrypt(mpk,
CT ′, ID, dID, R) = M.
Remark. In the definition, there are two identity sets. One is the original receiver
set S, another is the revoked identity set R. In the application, R is relatively small
comparing to S. Therefore, the requirement t < n is reasonable and for simplicity,
we always assume that t < n in the rest of this chapter.
Security Notions. The security of AR-IBBE requires that without a valid
private key, both the encrypted message and the intended receivers are unknown to
the adversary. Let CT be the original ciphertext for receivers S, R be the revoked
users and CT ′ be the ciphertext after revocation. The indistinguishability security
of AR-IBBE should satisfy the follows.
1. The message in the ciphertext CT cannot be distinguished without a valid
private key associated with an identity ID ∈ S. The message in CT ′ cannot
be distinguished without a valid private key associated with an identity ID′ ∈
S\R.
2. The identity set in the ciphertext CT cannot be distinguished without a valid
private key associated with an identity ID ∈ S. The identity set in CT ′
cannot be distinguished without a valid private key associated with an identity
ID′ ∈ S\R.
We define the IND-ID-CPA security and ANON-ID-CPA security for the AR-IBBE
system in a similar way as anonymous IBBE system.
IND-ID-CPA Security (Confidentiality). The IND-ID-CPA security in the
AR-IBBE allows the adversary to issue private key query to obtain the private key
associated with any identity ID of its choice. The adversary is challenged on an
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identity set S∗, two distinct messages M0,M1 from the same message space and a
revoked identity set R∗ adaptively. The adversary’s goal is to distinguish whether
the challenge ciphertext is generated under M0 or M1 for S
∗ with some restrictions
to avoid trivial solutions. We say that the adversary breaks the scheme if it can
guess the message correctly. Specifically, the security of IND-ID-CPA is defined
under the following game between a challenger and an adversary.
– Setup: The challenger runs the setup algorithm to generate the master public
key mpk and sends mpk to the adversary.
– Phase 1: In this phase, the adversary can issue private key queries as needed.
Upon receiving a private key query on IDi. The challenger runs the key
generation algorithm to generate the private key dIDi and sends the result
back to the adversary.
– Challenge: Once the adversary decides that the phase 1 is over, it out-
puts two distinct messages M0, M1 from the same message space, a chal-
lenge identity set S∗ = (ID1, ID2, · · · , IDn), and a revoked identity set R∗ =
(ID′1, ID
′
2, · · · , ID′t)(t < n) with the restriction that the adversary has not
queried the private key on IDi in the phase 1, where IDi ∈ S∗\R∗. The chal-
lenger randomly picks a bit µ ∈ {0, 1} and generates the challenge ciphertext
CT ∗ as follows:
CT = Encrypt(mpk,Mb, S
∗), CT ′ = Revoke(mpk,R∗, CT ).
If R∗ 6= ∅, it sets CT ∗ = CT ′ as the challenge ciphertext, otherwise sets
CT ∗ = CT as the challenge ciphertext, then it sends CT ∗ to the adversary.
– Phase 2: The adversary issues more private key queries on IDi with the
restriction established in the challenge phase.
– Guess: Finally, the adversary outputs its guess µ′ ∈ {0, 1} of µ and wins the
game if µ′ = µ.
We refer to such an adversary as an IND-ID-CPA adversary and define the
adversary’s advantage in winning the above game as
AdvIND-ID-CPAAR−IBBE (λ) =
∣∣∣∣Pr [µ = µ′]− 12
∣∣∣∣ .
The probability is over the random bits used by the challenger and the adversary.
Definition 3.1. We say that an AR-IBBE scheme is IND-ID-CPA secure if for any
probabilistic polynomial time IND-ID-CPA adversary, AdvIND-ID-CPAAR−IBBE (λ) is negligible.
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ANON-ID-CPA Security (Anonymity). ANON-ID-CPA security in the AR-
IBBE allows the adversary to issue the private key query to obtain the private key
of any identity ID of its choice. Similarly, the adversary is challenged on a message
M∗, two distinct identity sets S0, S1 and a revoked identity set R
∗ of its choice.
Adversary’s goal is to distinguish whether the challenge ciphertext is generated
under S0 or S1 with some restrictions to avoid trivial solutions. We say that the
adversary breaks the scheme if it can guess the identity set correctly. Specifically, the
notion of ANON-ID-CPA is defined under the following game between a challenger
and an adversary.
– Setup: The challenger runs the setup algorithm to generate the master public
key mpk and sends mpk to the adversary.
– Phase 1: In this phase, the adversary can issues private key queries as needed.
Upon receiving a private key query on IDi. C runs the key generation algo-
rithm to generate the private key dIDi and sends dIDi to the adversary.
– Challenge: When the adversary decides that the phase 1 is over, it outputs
a message M∗, two distinct identity sets S0 = (ID0,1, ID0,2, ..., ID0,n), S1 =
(ID1,1, ID1,2, ..., ID1,n) and a revoked identity set R
∗ = (ID′1, ID
′
2, · · · , ID′t)
(t < n). We require that the adversary has not made the private key queries on
IDi in the phase 1, where IDi ∈ (S0∪S1)\(S0∩S1). The challenger randomly
picks a bit µ ∈ {0, 1} and generates the challenge ciphertext CT ∗ as follows:
CT = Encrypt(mpk,M∗, Sµ), CT
′ = Revoke(mpk,R∗, CT ).
If R∗ 6= ∅, set CT ∗ = CT ′ as the challenge ciphertext, otherwise set CT ∗ = CT
as the challenge ciphertext, then send CT ∗ to the adversary.
– Phase 2: The adversary issues more private key queries as in the phase 1 with
the restriction established in the challenge phase. The challenger responds the
same as in phase 1.
– Guess: Finally, The adversary outputs its guess µ′ ∈ {0, 1} of µ and wins the
game if µ′ = µ.
We refer to such an adversary as an ANON-ID-CPA adversary and define the
adversary’s advantage in winning the scheme as
AdvANON-ID-CPAAR−IBBE (λ) =
∣∣∣∣Pr [µ′ = µ]− 12
∣∣∣∣ .
The probability is over the random bits used by the challenger and the adversary.
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Definition 3.2. We say that an AR-IBBE scheme is ANON-ID-CPA secure if for
any probabilistic polynomial time ANON-ID-CPA adversary, AdvANON-ID-CPAAR−IBBE (λ) is
negligible.
3.3 The Proposed Scheme
In this section, we describe the proposed scheme.
3.3.1 Construction
Setup(1λ). Given a security parameter λ, the setup algorithm randomly chooses
a bilinear group BG = (G,GT , e, p) with a generator P ∈ G. It picks a random
s ∈ Zp and computes Ppub = sP . It then picks four cryptographic hash functions
H : {0, 1}∗ → Zp, H1 : {0, 1}∗ → G, H2 : GT×{0, 1}∗ → G, and H3 : GT×{0, 1}∗ →
G. The master public key and master secret key are
mpk = (BG, P, Ppub, H,H1, H2, H3) , msk = s.
KeyGen(mpk,msk, ID). Given the master key pair (mpk,msk) and an identity
ID ∈ {0, 1}∗, the key generation outputs the private key
dID = sH1(ID).
Encrypt(msk, S,M). Given the master public key mpk, a set of identity S =
(ID1, ID2, . . . , IDn) with n > 2 and a message M ∈ G, the encryption algorithm
performs as follows.
1. Randomly choose r1, r2 ∈ Zp and v ∈ G.























We have fi(xi) = 1 and fi(xj) = 0 for i 6= j.
3. Create the ciphertext CT as C0 = v+M, C1 = r1P, C2 = r2P, together with,
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Revoke(mpk,CT,R). Given a ciphertext CT which has been parsed as (C0, C1, C2,
Qi, Ui, i ∈ [1, n]), the master public key mpk and a revoked identity set R, where
|R| = t < n. The revocation algorithm performs as follows.
1. If R = ∅, set CT ′ = CT . Otherwise, perform as follows.
2. Randomly choose u ∈ G and compute C ′0 = u+ C0.









and set bi = 0 for i = t+ 1, t+ 2, · · · , n− 1
4. For each i = 1, 2, · · · , n compute
Q′i = Qi + bi−1u,
and set CT ′ = (R,C ′0, C1, C2, Q
′
i, Ui, i ∈ [1, n]).
Decrypt(mpk,CT ′, IDi, dIDi). Given a ciphertext CT
′ after revocation which has
been parsed as (R,C ′0, C1, C2, Q
′
i, Ui, i ∈ [1, n]), the master public key mpk, and an
identity IDi and the corresponding private key dIDi , the decryption algorithm per-
forms as follows.
1. Compute xi = H(IDi) and
U = U1 + xiU2 + x
2
iU3 + · · ·+ xn−1i Un,






3 + · · ·+ xn−1i Q′n.









3. Use the private key dIDi to compute
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u′ = g(xi)
−1 (Q−H2(e(C1, dIDi), IDi)) .
and recover the message by computing M = C ′0 − u′ − v′.
If IDi ∈ S\R, we have u′ = u, v′ = v, then it obtains the correct M after decryption.
Remark: For simplicity, we omit the modular operation and assume that the co-
efficients of all polynomials are from Zp in this chapter unless otherwise stated
explicitly.
3.3.2 Discussion and Correctness
In the encryption phase, we require that the size of the identity set S is at least 3.
This requirement is resulted from using the technique of Lagrange base polynomial.
This setting can also simplify our security proof and we do not consider the case
where there are only two users in S. One may think that after revocation, the
revoked identity set may be updated multiple times. Our scheme allows the third
party (or server ) to update the revoked identity set. For each update, the third
party uses the original ciphertext and the new revoked identity set to perform the
revocation algorithm. Thus, the third party needs to store the original ciphertext
CT in our scheme. In our setting, there is no requirement of R ⊂ S. The revocation
set R can be arbitrary users.
From our setting, only the users in S can decrypt the ciphertext CT . After
revocation, the revoked users cannot decrypt the ciphertext CT ′. We note that if
ID ∈ R, g(H(ID)) = 0 and g(H(ID))u = 0G. The user with identity ID cannot
retrieve one of the decryption keys u, even all users in R conclude. To obtain the
decryption keys u and v, the user must belong to S and not belong to R. Thus our
scheme ensures that even if all the revoked users collude, they still cannot access the
file and learn the identities of receivers. However, the revoked identity set should
be attached in the final ciphertext. Therefore, our scheme does not consider the
privacy of the revoked users.
Next we show that our construction meets the requirements of correctness as
we claimed in the definition. For any IDi ∈ S and IDi /∈ R, if xi = H(IDi) is
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computed correctly, we have g(xi) 6= 0 and






3 + · · ·+ xn−1i Q′n
=
(
Q1 + xiQ2 + x
2




b0 + b1xi + b2x
2
i + · · ·+ bn−1xn−1i
)
u
= (a1,0A1 + a2,0A2 + · · ·+ an,0An)
+ xi (a1,1A1 + a2,1A2 + · · ·+ an,1An) + · · ·
+ xn−1i (a1,n−1A1 + a2,n−1A2 + · · ·+ an,n−1An) + g(xi)u
=
(
a1,0 + a1,1xi + a1,2x
2





a2,0 + a2,1xi + a2,2x
2
i + · · ·+ a2,n−1xn−1i
)
A2 + · · ·
+
(
an,0 + an,1xi + an,2x
2
i + · · ·+ an,n−1xn−1i
)
An + g(xi)u
= f1(xi)A1 + f2(xi)A2 + · · ·+ fn(xi)An + g(xi)u



























The user with identity IDi uses its private key dIDi to remove Ai from Qi via the
above computation. As g(xi) 6= 0 , the user can obtain u. For another decryption
key, it computes
U = U1 + xiU2 + x
2
iU3 + · · ·+ xn−1i Un
= (a1,0B1 + a2,0B2 + · · ·+ an,0Bn)
+ xi(a1,1B1 + a2,1B2 + · · ·+ an,1Bn) + · · ·
+ xn−1i (a1,n−1B1 + a2,n−1B2 + · · ·+ an,n−1Bn)
=
(
a1,0 + a1,1xi + a1,2x
2





a2,0 + a2,1xi + a2,2x
2
i + · · ·+ a2,n−1xn−1i
)
B2 + · · ·
+
(
an,0 + an,1xi + an,2x
2
i + · · ·+ an,n−1xn−1i
)
Bn
= f1(xi)B1 + f2(xi)B2 + · · ·+ fn(xi)Bn
= Bi,

















)sr2 , IDi)−H3(e(H1(IDi), Ppub)r2 , IDi)
= v.
After recovering u and v, we get the message as C ′0−u′−v′ = M+v+u−u−v = M .
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3.4 Security Analysis
In this section, we show the security of the proposed scheme under the BDH as-
sumption in the random oracle model.
Theorem 3.1. Let H1, H2, H3 be random oracles. If the BDH problem is hard,
our proposed scheme is IND-ID-CPA secure. Specifically, suppose there is an IND-
ID-CPA adversary who has advantage ε against our proposed scheme by making
qE private key queries and qH1, qH2, qH3 queries to the functions H1, H2 and H3
respectively. Then there is an algorithm B can solve the BDH problem with advantage
ε′ ≥ ε
n · e · qE · (qH2 + qH3)
,
where n is the number of the identities stated in the ciphertext.
Proof. Suppose there exists an adversary A who can break the confidentiality of our
scheme with advantage ε. We build a simulator B that can solve the BDH problem
with advantage ε′ by running A. Let (P, aP, bP, cP ) be a random instance of BDH
problem taken as input by B and its goal is to compute e(P, P )abc. In order to use
A to solve the problem, B needs to simulate a challenger and respond all queries
from A. For ease of exposition, we assume that the H2 and H3 queries are after the
H1 query for the same identity. B works by interacting with A in an IND-ID-CPA
game as follows.
Setup: B sets Ppub = aP and creates the master public as mpk = (p, P, Ppub, e,H).
Then it sends mpk to A. Here, the hash functions H1, H2, H3 are viewed as random
oracles controlled by the simulator.
H1-queries: A makes H1 queries. B responds a query on IDi as follows. B main-
tains a list L1 of a tuple (IDi, ci, ri, hi). This list is initially empty. B first checks
L1. If the query IDi has already appeared in the L1 in a tuple (IDi, ci, ri, hi), it
returns the corresponding hi as the value of H1(IDi). Otherwise, B performs as
follows.
1. Select ci ∈R {0, 1} with Pr[ci = 0] = δ for some δ (determine later).
2. Pick ri ∈R Zp, if ci = 0, compute hi = ribP . If ci = 1, compute hi = riP .
3. Add the tuple (IDi, ci, ri, hi) to the L1 and respond with hi to A.
H2-queries: A makes H2 queries. B responds a query on (Xi, IDi) as follows. B
maintains a list L2 of a tuple (Xi, IDi, λi). This list is initially empty. B first checks
L2. If the query (Xi, IDi) has already appeared in the L2 in a tuple (Xi, IDi, λi),
it returns the corresponding λi as the value of H2(Xi, IDi). Otherwise, B randomly
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picks a λi ∈ G as the value of H2(Xi, IDi), adds the tuple (Xi, IDi, λi) to the L2
and responds to A with λi.
H3-queries: A makes H3 queries. B responds a query on (Yi, IDi) as follows. B
maintains a list L3 of a tuple (Yi, IDi, γi). This list is initially empty. B first checks
L3. If the query (Yi, IDi) has already appeared in the L3 in a tuple (Yi, IDi, γi),
it returns the corresponding γi as the value of H3(Yi, IDi). Otherwise, B randomly
picks a γi ∈ G as the value of H3(Yi, IDi), adds the tuple (Yi, IDi, γi) to the L3 and
responds to A with γi.
Phase 1: In this phase, A issues the private key queries on IDi as needed. For
each time, B first runs the H1 query to get the corresponding ci and ri. If ci = 0, B
aborts. If ci = 1, B computes dIDi = sH1(IDi) = ariP = riPpub.
Challenge: When A decides phase 1 is over, it outputs two distinct messages
M0,M1 from the same message space, a challenge identity set S
∗ = (ID1, ID2, · · · ,
IDn) and a revoked identity set R
∗ = (ID′1, ID
′
2, · · · , ID′t) with the restriction that
A has not queried the private key on IDi in the phase 1, where IDi ∈ S∗\R∗. B
randomly picks a random bit µ ∈ {0, 1} and performs as follows.
Case 1: R∗ = ∅. In this case, B randomly picks r∗ ∈ Zp, C∗0 ∈ G, and for each











Then B generates the challenge ciphertext CT ∗ as C0, C∗1 = r∗cP, C∗2 = cP , together














Case 2: R∗ 6= ∅. In this case, B performs as follows.
1. Pick r∗ ∈R Zp, v∗, u∗ ∈R G, compute C ′∗0 = v∗+u∗+Mb, C∗1 = r∗cP , C∗2 = cP .
2. For each IDi ∈ S∗\R∗, B randomly chooses A∗i , B∗i ∈ G. For each IDi ∈
S∗ ∩ R∗, B gets ri from the L1 (If IDi is not in the L1, run H1 queries to
get ri). Then it computes Xi = e(aP, cP )
r∗ri and checks whether the tuple
(Xi, IDi) in the L2. If yes, it obtains the corresponding λi and sets A∗i = λi.
Otherwise, it randomly choose A∗i ∈ G and adds the new tuple (Xi, IDi, A∗i )
to the L2. Then B computes Yi = e(aP, cP )ri and checks whether the tuple
(Yi, IDi) in the L3. If yes, it obtains the corresponding γi and sets w∗i = γi.
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Otherwise, it randomly chooses w∗i ∈ G and adds the new tuple (Yi, IDi, w∗i )
to the L3, and computes B∗i = w∗i + v∗.

































Then set bi = 0 for i = t+ 1, t+ 2, · · · , n− 1.













i , i ∈ [1, n]).
Phase 2: A continues to issue private key queries as needed with the restriction
established in the challenge phase. B responds the same as in phase 1.
Guess: Finally, A outputs its guess µ′ ∈ {0, 1} of µ.
Note that in the case R∗ = ∅, we can view v∗ as the encryption key to encrypt
the challenge message. Let W = (e(H1(IDi), Ppub)
c, IDi) where IDi ∈ S∗. In the
real scheme, B∗i = v
∗+H3(W ), thus we also can regard H3(W ) as the encryption key
to encrypt v∗. Before querying the H3 value on W , the result of H3(W ) is unknown
and random. From the view of the adversary, v∗ is encrypted with a random key
independent of W . Therefore, B∗i is a one-time pad. In other words, the challenge
ciphertext is a one-time pad. According to the assumption(A can break our scheme
with advantage ε), the adversary will query H3 on W . In this case, the simulator
decides the corresponding hard problem’s solution is in the L3 and solves it with
probability δ
n
as the value of H1(IDi) contains the b with probability δ.
When R∗ 6= ∅, we can view v∗ and u∗ as the encryption keys to encrypt the
challenge message. However, in this case, the adversary can retrieve v∗ by querying






, where IDi ∈ S∗\R∗. Similarly, in real scheme
Q∗ = A∗i + g(x
∗
i )u
∗ = H2(Ω) + g(x
∗
i )u
∗, we can regard Ω as the encryption key to
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encrypt u∗. Before querying the H2 value on Ω, the result of H2(Ω) is unknown
and random. From the view of the adversary, u∗ is encrypted with a random key
independent of Ω. Therefore, Q∗ is a one-time pad, that is, the challenge ciphertext
is a one-time pad. According to the assumption(A can break our scheme with
advantage ε), the adversary will query H2 on Ω. In this case, the simulator can
decide the solution of the corresponding hard problem is in the L2 and solve it with
probability δ
n−l where l = |S
∗ ∩ R∗|. Here, we define the query which can solve the
hard problem as challenge query.
If the challenge query is made, it means cj = 0, H1(IDj) = rjbP and dIDj =
rjabP . From the decryption algorithm, we have e(C
∗
1 , dIDj) = e(P, P )
r∗rjabc and
e(C∗2 , dIDj) = e(P, P )
rjabc. Here B ignores the guess of A and picks a random tuple
from the L2 or L3. It first obtains the corresponding rj from the L1. If B picks the
tuple (Xj, IDj, λj) from the L2, it computes X
(r∗rj)−1
j as the solution to the given
instance of BDH problem. If B picks the tuple (Yj, IDj, γj) from the L3, it computes
X
r−1j
j as the solution to the given instance of BDH problem.
The above completes the description of the simulation. To complete the security
proof, it remains to show that B correctly computes e (P, P )abc with advantage at
least ε′. According to our above analysis, we first define the following events:
E1: The simulation does not abort in private key query.
E2: At least one of the H1 values of challenge identities contains b.
E3: The adversary chooses an identity where ci = 0 to distinguish challenge mes-
sage.
E4: The simulator correctly chooses the solution from the L2 or L3.
The simulator can successfully solve the hard problem if and only if all events happen
simultaneously. Next, we analyze the probability of all events. From the private key
query, we know when each ci = 1, simulation will not abort, thus
Pr[E1] = Pr[ci = 1, i = 1, 2, · · · , qE] = (1− δ)qE .
All ci are chosen by the simulator where ci = 0 with probability δ, ci = 1 with
probability 1− δ. When ci = 0, the value of H1 contains b, thus Pr[E2] = δ. Since
all ci are chosen by the simulator and they are secretly to A, the adversary does not
know which ci of each identity is equal to 0 or 1. That is, from the point view of
the adversary, it does not know the probabilities of ci = 0 and ci = 1. Therefore,
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under event E2, we have
Pr[E3] = Pr[E3|ci = 0] Pr[ci = 0] + Pr[E3|ci = 1] Pr[ci = 1]
= 1
n−l Pr[ci = 0] +
1






Note that the identity IDi ∈ S∗ ∩ R∗ allows to query the corresponding private
key. In our setting, these identities cannot provide any help for A to distinguish the
encrypted message in the challenge ciphertext. Since |S∗ ∩ R∗| = l, the potential




Finally, from the point view of the simulator, if A has non-negligible advantage
to guess the correct µ′ and with the conditions that E1, E2, E3 happen, it only
knows that the solution of the hard problem is in the L2 or L3, but it does not
know which one is. Thus Pr[E4] ≥ 1qH2+qH3 . It is clear that these four events are
independent, therefore, we have
ε′ ≥ Pr[E1 ∧ E2 ∧ E3 ∧ E4] · ε
= Pr[E1] · Pr[E2] · Pr[E3] · Pr[E4] · ε





= (1− δ)qE · δ · ε
n(qH2+qH3 )
.
The function (1− δ)qE · δ is maximized at δ = 1
qE+1
, we have























, thus we have
ε′ ≥ (1− δ)qE · δ · ε
n(qH2 + qH3)
≈ ε
n · e · qE · (qH2 + qH3)
.
This completes the proof.
Discussion. When R∗ = ∅, the challenge message is encrypted by v∗. If the
adversary can distinguish the message, the simulator can decide it must have made
the challenge query to the H3, but the simulator does not know which input contains






R∗ 6= ∅, even the inputs of H3 contain the hard problem, the adversary can retrieve
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Theorem 3.2. Let H1, H2, H3 be random oracles. The proposed scheme is ANON-
ID-CPA secure under the BDH assumption. Specifically, suppose there is an ANON-
ID-CPA adversary who has advantage ε against our proposed scheme by making
qE private key queries and qH1, qH2, qH3 queries to the functions H1, H2 and H3
respectively. Then there is an algorithm B to solve the BDH problem with advantage
ε′ ≥ ε
n · e · qE · (qH2 + qH3)
,
where n is the number of the identities stated in the ciphertext.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 3.1. Suppose there exists an
adversary A who can break the anonymity of our scheme with advantage ε. We
build a simulator B that can solve the BDH problem with advantage ε′ by running
A. Given a random instance of BDH problem (P, aP, bP, cP ), B’s goal is to compute
e(P, P )abc. In order to use A to solve the problem, B needs to simulate a challenger
and respond all queries from A. For ease of exposition, we assume that the H2 and
H3 queries are after the H1 query for the same identity. B works by interacting with
A in an ANON-ID-CPA game as follows.
Setup: B sets Ppub = aP and creates the master public as mpk = (p, P, Ppub, e,H).
Then it sends mpk to A. Here, the hash functions H1, H2, H3 are viewed as random
oracles controlled by the simulator.
H1-queries: A makes H1 queries. B responds a query on IDi as follows. B main-
tains a list L1 of a tuple (IDi, ci, ri, hi). This list is initially empty. B first checks
L1. If the query IDi has already appeared in the L1 in a tuple (IDi, ci, ri, hi), it
returns the corresponding hi as the value of H1(IDi). Otherwise, B performs as
follows.
1. Select ci ∈R {0, 1} with Pr[ci = 0] = δ for some δ (determine later).
2. Pick ri ∈R Zp, if ci = 0, compute hi = ribP . If ci = 1, compute hi = riP .
3. Add the tuple (IDi, ci, ri, hi) to the L1 and respond with hi to A.
H2-queries: A makes H2 queries. B responds a query on (Xi, IDi) as follows. B
maintains a list L2 of a tuple (Xi, IDi, λi). This list is initially empty. B first checks
L2. If the query (Xi, IDi) has already appeared in the L2 in a tuple (Xi, IDi, λi),
it returns the corresponding λi as the value of H2(Xi, IDi). Otherwise, B randomly
picks a λi ∈ G as the value of H2(Xi, IDi), adds the tuple (Xi, IDi, λi) to the L2
and responds to A with λi.
H3-queries: A makes H3 queries. B responds a query on (Yi, IDi) as follows. B
maintains a list L3 of a tuple (Yi, IDi, γi). This list is initially empty. B first checks
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L3. If the query (Yi, IDi) has already appeared in the L3 in a tuple (Yi, IDi, γi),
it returns the corresponding γi as the value of H3(Yi, IDi). Otherwise, B randomly
picks a γi ∈ G as the value of H3(Yi, IDi), adds the tuple (Yi, IDi, γi) to the L3 and
responds to A with γi.
Phase 1: In this phase, A issues the private key queries on IDi as needed. For
each time, B first runs the H1 query to get the corresponding ci and ri. If ci = 0, B
aborts. If ci = 1, B computes dIDi = sH1(IDi) = ariP = riPpub.
Challenge: When A decides that the phase 1 is over, it outputs a challenge mes-
sage M∗, two distinct identity sets S0 = (ID0,1, ID0,2, · · · , ID0,n), S1 = (ID1,1,
ID1,2, · · · , ID1,n) and a revoked identity set R∗ = (ID′1, ID′2, · · · , ID′t). We require
that any identity IDi ∈ (S0 ∪ S1)\(S0 ∩ S1) has not been queried the private key in
the phase 1. B picks a random bit µ ∈ {0, 1} and performs as follows.
1. Pick r∗ ∈R Zp, v∗ ∈ G, compute C∗0 = v∗ +M , C∗1 = r∗cP , C∗2 = cP .
2. For each IDi ∈ Sµ\(S0 ∩ S1), B randomly chooses A∗i , B∗i ∈ G. For each
IDi ∈ S0 ∩ S1, B first gets ri from the L1 (If IDi is not in the L1, run H1
queries to get ri). Then it computes Xi = e(aP, cP )
r∗ri and checks whether
the tuple (Xi, IDi) is in the L2. If yes, it obtains the corresponding λi and
sets A∗i = λi. Otherwise, it randomly chooses A
∗
i ∈ G and adds the new
tuple (Xi, IDi, A
∗
i ) to the L2. Then B computes Yi = e(aP, cP )ri and checks
whether the tuple (Yi, IDi) in the L3. If yes, it obtains the corresponding γi
and sets w∗i = γi. Otherwise, it randomly chooses w
∗
i ∈ G and adds the new
tuple (Yi, IDi, w
∗
i ) to the L3, and computes B∗i = w∗i + v∗.
































i , i ∈ [1, n]).
Case 1: R∗ = ∅. B sets the challenge ciphertext CT ∗ = CT .
Case 2: R∗ 6= ∅. B performs as follows.
1. Randomly choose u∗ ∈ G and compute C ′∗0 = u∗ + C∗0 .
CHAPTER 3. ANONYMOUS REVOCABLE IBBE 45









Then it sets bi = 0 for i = t+ 1, t+ 2, · · · , n− 1.













i , i ∈ [1, n]).
Phase 2: A continues to issue more private key queries with the restriction estab-
lished in the challenge phase. B responds the same as in phase 1.
Guess: Finally, A outputs its guess µ′ ∈ {0, 1} of µ.
From the scheme construction, we note that the adversary A can obtain the
private keys for the identity IDi where IDi ∈ S0∩S1, then it computes v∗ correctly
through the decryption algorithm. If for the identities IDi, IDj ∈ S0 ∩ S1, where
i 6= j, vi 6= vj. A can distinguish the simulation from the real scheme and aborts
immediately.
Similarly, for IDi ∈ S0 ∩ S1 ∩R∗, A can get A∗i correctly through the challenge
ciphertext. Meanwhile, A can use the private key to compute A∗i . If both results
are not equal for the same identity, A can distinguish the simulation from the real
scheme and aborts immediately. Additionally, for IDi ∈ S0 ∩ S1, but IDi /∈ R∗, A
can compute u∗ correctly. For different identities IDi, if A gets different u∗, it can
distinguish the simulation from the real scheme and aborts immediately. Thus, in
the security proof, we should take these issues into consideration. The settings in our
proof can address these issues perfectly. As the same analysis in Theorem 3.1, the
challenge ciphertext is a one-time pad unless the adversary has made the challenge
query. According the assumption at the beginning of the proof, the adversary will
make the challenge query to break the scheme.
When cj = 0, we have H1(IDj) = rjbP and dIDj = rjabP . From the decryption
algorithm, we have e(C∗1 , dIDj) = e(r
∗cP, rjabP ) = e(P, P )
r∗rjabc and e(C∗2 , dIDj) =
e(cP, rjabP ) = e(P, P )
rjabc. Here B ignores the guess of A and picks a random tuple
from L2 or L3. It first obtains the corresponding rj from the L1. If B picks the tuple
(Xj, IDj, λj) from L2, it computes X
(r∗rj)−1
j as the solution to the given instance of
BDH problem. If B picks the tuple (Yj, IDj, γj) from L3, it computes Y
r−1j
j as the
solution to the given instance of BDH problem.
The above completes the description of the simulation. To complete the security
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proof, it remains to show that B correctly computes e (P, P )abc with advantage at
least ε′. We first define the following events.
E1: The simulation does not abort in private key query.
E2: At least one of the H1 values of challenge identities contains b.
E3: The adversary chooses an identity where ci = 0 to distinguish the challenge
identity sets.
E4: The simulator correctly chooses the solution from L2 or L3.
The simulator can successfully solve the hard problem if and only if all events
happen simultaneously. Next, we analyze the probability of all events. From the
private key queries, we know when each ci = 1, simulation will not abort, thus
Pr[E1] = Pr[ci = 1, i = 1, 2, · · · , qE] = (1− δ)qE .
All ci are chosen by the simulator where ci = 0 with probability δ, ci = 1 with
probability 1− δ. When ci = 0, the value of H1 contains b, thus Pr[E2] = δ. Since
all ci are chosen by a certain probability which is decided by the simulator and they
are secretly to the adversary and A does not know which identity’s ci is equal to 0 or
1. That is, from the point view of the adversary, it does not know the probabilities
of ci = 0 and ci = 1. Therefore, under event E2, we have
Pr[E3]
= Pr[E3|ci = 0] Pr[ci = 0] + Pr[E3|ci = 1] Pr[ci = 1]
≥ 1
n













Note that the identity IDi ∈ S0 ∩ S1 allows to query the corresponding private
keys, these identities cannot provide any help for A to distinguish the challenge
identity sets in our setting. If |S0 ∩ S1| = k, the potential useful identity is n − k.






Finally, from the point view of the simulator, if the adversary has non-negligible
advantage to guess the correct µ′ and with the conditions that E1, E2, E3 happen,
it only knows that the solution of the hard problem is embed in the H2 query or
H3 query, thus Pr[E4] ≥ 1qH2+qH3 . It is clear that these four events are independent,
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therefore, we have
ε′ ≥ Pr[E1 ∧ E2 ∧ E3 ∧ E4] · ε
= Pr[E1] · Pr[E2] · Pr[E3] · Pr[E4] · ε





= (1− δ)qE · δ · ε
n(qH2+qH3 )
.
The function (1− δ)qE · δ is maximized at δ = 1
qE+1
, we have























, thus we have
ε′ ≥ (1− δ)qE · δ · ε
n(qH2 + qH3)
≈ ε
e · qE · n · (qH2 + qH3)
.
This completes the proof.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we considered the receiver privacy in the recipient revocable identity-
based broadcast encryption for the first time and described a new construction of
anonymous revocable identity-based broadcast encryption. The receivers’ identity
information in the proposed scheme can be protected well. Not only the message
but also the receivers’ identities are hidden to the third party. The security of the
proposed scheme is based on the hardness of the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH)
problem in the random oracle model.
Chapter 4
Fully Privacy-Preserving Revocable IBBE
This chapter describes a fully privacy-preserving revocable identity-based broadcast
encryption scheme. The proposed scheme not only protects the receiver privacy, but
also preserves the identity information of the revoked users. The original scheme
was published in the Personal and Ubiquitous Computing [LMG+17].
4.1 Introduction
In chapter 3, we continued to study the recipient revocable identity-based broadcast
encryption and proposed the first anonymous revocable identity-based broadcast
encryption (AR-IBBE) scheme. In the proposed AR-IBBE, the receiver identity
information can be protected well. One limitation is that the privacy of the revoked
users has not been considered. To perform decryption successfully, the revoked user
identity information should be attached as part of ciphertext and known publicly,
which might not be desired in some applications. For example, if the original ci-
phertext is generated for a group of users who have featured some special attribute.
When some of the receivers have been revoked, the special attribute held by the
whole receivers will be exposed to the public from the revoked user if the identity
information of them are not protected. As a consequence, the receivers’ information
are leaked. This motivates us to design a scheme with fully user privacy-preserving.
In this chapter, we present a revocable identity-based broadcast encryption
scheme which can fully preserve the user privacy. Both the identity information
of the receivers and the revoked users in the proposed scheme can be protected.
The encrypted message can be securely protected and only the authorized user can
retrieve it. The revocation process does not reveal any information about the mes-
sage and the receivers’ identities. The public learns nothing about the identities of
receivers and the revoked users. The proposed scheme is still expressive enough for
practical scenarios, such as in the smart city. The security of our proposed scheme
is proved to be semantically secure in the random oracle model.
Organization. The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In the next Section,
we give the definitions of fully privacy-preserving revocable identity-based broadcast
48
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encryption and the corresponding security models. The concrete construction is
described in Section 4.3. In Section 4.4, we provide the security analysis of the
proposed scheme under the defined security models, and concludes this chapter in
Section 4.5.
4.2 Definition and Security Models
In this section, we will define the syntax and the security of fully privacy-preserving
revocable identity-based broadcast encryption (FPPR-IBBE) following [LMG+16].
Roughly speaking, an FPPR-IBBE scheme should preserve the privacy of the re-
ceivers and the revoked users. It consists of the following five algorithms.
– Setup(1λ). Taking as input a security parameter λ, the setup algorithm
returns a master public key mpk and a master secret key msk. The mpk
is publicly known while the msk is kept secretly.
– KeyGen(mpk,msk, ID). Taking as input the master key pair (msk,mpk)
and a user identity ID, the key generation algorithm returns a user private
key dID.
– Encrypt(mpk,M, S). Taking as input the master public key mpk, a mes-
sage M and a set of identities S = (ID1, ID2, ..., IDn), the encryption
algorithm returns a ciphertext CT .
– Revoke(mpk,R,CT ). Taking the master public key mpk, a ciphertext
CT and a revoked identity set R = (IDl1 , IDl2 , · · · , IDlt) with t < n, the
revocation algorithm returns a new ciphertext CT ′.
– Decrypt(CT ′, ID, dID). Taking as input the master public key mpk, a
ciphertext CT ′, an identity ID and the corresponding private key dID, the
decryption returns a message M if ID ∈ S\R and ⊥ otherwise.
Correctness. The same as Chapter 3, if R = ∅, the FPPR-IBBE scheme is an
anonymous IBBE scheme and we set CT ′ = CT . Thus, for correctness, it requires
that for any message M from its message space, if (mpk,msk)← Setup(1λ), dID ←
KeyGen(mpk,msk, ID), CT ← Encrypt(mpk,M, S), CT ′ ← Revoke (mpk,R,CT ),
we have
Decrypt(mpk,CT ′, ID, dID) =
M If ID ∈ S\R,⊥ otherwise.
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Security Notions. Now, we formalize the security models for an FPPR-IBBE
scheme. In an FPPR-IBBE scheme, the encrypted data firstly will be sent to a third
party (who performs the revocation procedure). Hence apart from the requirement
that the ciphertext CT ′ preserves the message and the receiver privacy against the
public, the message should also be unpredictable from CT and CT should preserve
the receiver privacy against the third party. More specifically, the indistinguishabil-
ity security of an FPPR-IBBE scheme requirements are as follows.
1. The message and the identity set in the ciphertext CT cannot be distinguished
without a valid private key associated with an identity ID ∈ S.
2. The message in the CT ′ cannot be distinguished without a valid private key
associated with an identity ID ∈ S\R.
3. The revoked identity set in CT ′ cannot be distinguished without a valid non-
trivial private key.
Note that the security of CT is similar to the security of anonymous identity-
based broadcast encryption scheme [LPQ12] where the encryption of unpredictable
message must be indistinguishable from a random string of the same length and
the receivers identities must be indistinguishable from a random identity set with
the same length. We follow [LPQ12] to define four security models to capture the
security requirements of the FPPR-IBBE scheme, namely the IND-ID-CPA secu-
rity, ANON-ID-CPA security, IND-rID-CPA security and selective ANON-rID-CPA.
These four security models are defined under the following games between a chal-
lenger and an adversary in each model.
Game 1 (IND-ID-CPA Security). This security model claims that without
a valid private key, the message in the CT is indistinguishable from a random string
of the same length and it works as follows.
– Setup: The challenger runs the setup algorithm to generate the master public
key mpk and gives mpk to the adversary.
– Phase 1: In this phase, the adversary can issue private key queries as needed.
Upon receiving a private key query for IDi, the challenger runs the key gen-
eration algorithm to generate the private key dIDi and responds by returning
dIDi .
– Challenge: Once the adversary decides that the phase 1 is over, it outputs
two distinct messages M0, M1 from the same message space and a challenge
identity set S∗ = (ID1, ID2, · · · , IDn). We require that the adversary has
not queried the private key for any IDi ∈ S∗ in the phase 1. The challenger
CHAPTER 4. FULLY PRIVACY-PRESERVING REVOCABLE IBBE 51
randomly picks a bit µ ∈ {0, 1} and generates the challenge ciphertext CT ∗
for message Mµ under S
∗, then it returns CT ∗ to the adversary.
– Phase 2: The adversary continues to issue more private key queries with
the restriction established in the challenge phase. The challenge responds the
same as in phase 1.
– Guess: Finally, the adversary outputs its guess µ′ ∈ {0, 1} of µ and wins the
game if µ = µ′.
We refer to such an adversary as an IND-ID-CPA adversary and define the
adversary’s advantage in winning the game as
AdvIND-ID-CPAFPPR-IBBE (λ) =
∣∣∣∣Pr [µ = µ′]− 12
∣∣∣∣ .
Definition 4.1. We say that an FPPR-IBBE scheme is IND-ID-CPA secure if for
any probabilistic polynomial time adversary, the advantage AdvIND-ID-CPAFPPR-IBBE (λ) in the
Game 1 is negligible.
Game 2 (ANON-ID-CPA Security). This security model claims that the
receiver set in CT is indistinguishable from a random identity set of the same length
and it works as follows.
– Setup: The challenger runs the setup algorithm to generate the master public
key mpk and gives mpk to the adversary.
– Phase 1: In this phase, the adversary can issue private key queries as needed.
Upon receiving a private key query for IDi, the challenger runs the key gen-
eration algorithm to generate the private key dIDi and responds by returning
dIDi .
– Challenge: Once the adversary decides that the phase 1 is over, it outputs
a message M∗ and two distinct identity sets S0 = (ID0,1, ID0,2, ..., ID0,n),
S1 = (ID1,1, ID1,2, ..., ID1,n). We require that the adversary has not issued
the private key queries for any IDi ∈ S04S1 = (S0\S1)∪ (S1\S0) in the phase
1. The challenger randomly picks a bit µ ∈ {0, 1} and generates the challenge
ciphertext CT ∗ for message M∗ under Sµ.
– Phase 2: The adversary continues to issue more private key queries with the
restriction established in the challenge phase. The challenger responds the
same as in phase 1.
– Guess: Finally, the adversary outputs its guess µ′ ∈ {0, 1} of µ and wins the
game if µ = µ′.
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We refer to such an adversary as an ANON-ID-CPA adversary and define the
adversary’s advantage in winning the game as
AdvANON-ID-CPAFPPR-IBBE (λ) =
∣∣∣∣Pr [µ = µ′]− 12
∣∣∣∣ .
Definition 4.2. We say that an FPPR-IBBE scheme is ANON-ID-CPA secure if
for any probabilistic polynomial time adversary, the advantage AdvANON-ID-CPAFPPR-IBBE (λ) in
the Game 2 is negligible.
Game 3 (IND-rID-CPA Security). This security model claims that without
a valid private key, the message in CT ′ is indistinguishable from a random string of
the same length and it works as follows.
– Setup: The challenger runs the setup algorithm to generate the master public
key mpk and gives mpk to the adversary.
– Phase 1: In this phase, the adversary can issue private key queries as needed.
Upon receiving a private key query for IDi. The challenger runs the key gen-
eration algorithm to generate the private key dIDi and responds by returning
dIDi .
– Challenge: Once the adversary decides that the phase 1 is over, it out-
puts two distinct messages M0, M1 from the same message space, a chal-
lenge identity set S∗ = (ID1, ID2, · · · , IDn) and a revoked identity set R∗ =
(IDl1 , IDl2 , · · · , IDlt) (t < n) with the restriction that the adversary has not
queried the private key for any IDi ∈ S∗\R∗ in the phase 1. The challenger
randomly picks a bit µ ∈ {0, 1} and runs the algorithms of encryption and re-
vocation to generate the challenge ciphertext CT ′∗ for the message Mµ under
S∗ and R∗, then it returns CT ′∗ to the adversary.
– Phase 2: The adversary can issue more private key queries as needed with
the restriction established in the challenge phase. The challenger responds the
same as in phase 1.
– Guess: Finally, the adversary outputs its guess µ′ ∈ {0, 1} of µ and wins the
game if µ = µ′.
We refer to such an adversary as an IND-rID-CPA adversary and define adversary’s
advantage in winning the game as
AdvIND-rID-CPAFPPR-IBBE (λ) =
∣∣∣∣Pr [µ = µ′]− 12
∣∣∣∣ .
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Definition 4.3. We say that an FPPR-IBBE scheme is IND-rID-CPA secure if for
any probabilistic polynomial time adversary, the advantage AdvIND-aID-CPAFPPR-IBBE (λ) in the
Game 3 is negligible.
Game 4 (Selective ANON-rID-CPA Security). This security model claims
that given two equal-length distinct revoked identity sets, it is hard to distinguish
that CT ′ is generated under which one without a valid non-trivial private key. It
works as follows.
– Init: The adversary outputs two distinct revoked identity sets R0 = (ID0,1,
ID0,2, ..., ID0,t), R1 = (ID1,1, ID1,2, ..., ID1,t) that it wants to attack.
– Setup: The challenger runs the setup algorithm to generate the master public
key mpk and gives mpk to the adversary.
– Phase 1: In this phase, the adversary can issue private key queries with the
restriction that IDi /∈ R04R1. Upon receiving a private key query for IDi.
The challenger runs the key generation algorithm to generate the private key
dIDi and responds by returning dIDi .
– Challenge: Once the adversary decides that the phase 1 is over, it outputs
a message M∗ and an identity set S∗ = (ID1, ID2, · · · , IDn) where n > t.
The challenger randomly picks a bit µ ∈ {0, 1} and generates the challenge
ciphertext CT ′∗ for message M∗ under S∗ and Rµ.
– Phase 2: The adversary can issue more private key queries for IDi /∈ R04R1,
B responds the same as in phase 1.
– Guess: Finally, the adversary outputs its guess µ′ ∈ {0, 1} of µ and wins the
game if µ = µ′.
We refer to such an adversary as an ANON-rID-CPA adversary and define the
adversary’s advantage in winning the game as
AdvANON-rID-CPAFPPR-IBBE (λ) =
∣∣∣∣Pr [µ = µ′]− 12
∣∣∣∣ .
Definition 4.4. We say that an FPPR-IBBE scheme is selective ANON-rID-CPA
secure if for any probabilistic polynomial time ANON-rID-CPA adversary, the ad-
vantage AdvANON-rID-CPAFPPR-IBBE (λ) in the Game 4 is negligible.
4.3 The Proposed Scheme
In this section, we present the construction of our proposed scheme.
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4.3.1 Construction
Setup(1λ). Given a security parameter λ, the setup algorithm randomly chooses a
bilinear group BG = (G,GT , e, p) with generator P ∈ G. It picks s ∈ Zp and sets
Ppub = sP . Then it chooses four cryptographic hash functions H : {0, 1}∗ → G,
H1 : GT × {0, 1}∗ → Zp, H2 : GT × {0, 1}∗ → G, and H3 : GT × {0, 1}∗ → G. The
master public key and the master secret key are
mpk = (BG, P, Ppub, H,H1, H2, H3) , msk = s.
KeyGen(mpk,msk, ID). Given the master key pair (mpk,msk) and a user identity
ID ∈ {0, 1}∗, the key generation algorithm returns a user private key as
dID = sH(ID).
Encrypt(mpk,M, S). Given the master public key mpk, a message M ∈ G and an
identity set S = (ID1, ID2, . . . , IDn), the encryption algorithm chooses a dummy
user denoted as ID0 /∈ S and performs as follows.
1. Randomly choose an encryption key K1 ∈ G and random numbers r1, r2, r3 ∈
Zp, compute
C0 = K1 +M, C1 = r1P, C2 = r2P, C3 = r3P.






)r1 , IDi) .
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The output ciphertext is CT = (C0, C1, C2, C3, r1, [Qi, Ui]
n
i=0).
Revoke(mpk,CT,R). Given a ciphertext CT which is parsed as CT = (C0, C1, C2,
r1, [Qi, Ui]
n
i=0), the master public key mpk and a revoked identity set R = (IDl1 ,
IDl2 , · · · , IDlt) where t < n. If R = ∅, the revocation algorithm sets the new
ciphertext CT ′ = CT . Otherwise, it does as follows.
1. Randomly choose K2 ∈ G and computes C ′0 = K2 + C0.














3. For i = 0, 1, 2, · · · , t compute
Q′i = Qi + biK2.
and set the new ciphertext as CT ′ = (C ′0, C1, C2, C3, b0, b1, · · · , bt−1, Q′0, Q′1, · · · ,
Q′t, Qt+1, · · · , Qn, U0, U1, · · · , Un).
Decrypt(mpk,CT ′IDi, dIDi). Given a ciphertext parsed CT
′ which is parsed as
(C ′0, C1, C2, C3, b0, b1, · · · , bt−1, Q′0, Q′1, · · · , Q′t, Qt+1, · · · , Qn, U0, · · · , Un), the mas-
ter public key mpk, an identity IDi and the corresponding private key dIDi , the















2. If g(xi) = 0, it aborts, otherwise, it computes
U = U0 + xiU1 + x
2
iU2 + · · ·+ xni Un,






2 + · · ·+ xtiQ′t + xt+1i Qt+1 + · · ·+ xniQn.
3. Use the private key dIDi to recover the encryption keys by computing





K ′2 = g(xi)
−1 (Q−H2(e(C2, dIDi), IDi)) ,
and obtain the message M ′ = C ′0 −K ′1 −K ′2.
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If IDi ∈ S\R, we have K ′1 = K1, K ′2 = K2 and can obtain the message M correctly.
4.3.2 Correctness and Discussion
Now, we give the correctness checking of the proposed scheme. For a user with






















After getting xi by using its private key, the user computes






2 + · · ·+ xtiQ′t + xt+1i Qt+1 + · · ·+ xniQn
= (Q0 + xiQ1 + x
2
iQ2 + · · ·+ xniQn) + (b0 + b1xi + b2x2i + · · ·+ btxti)u
= (a0,0A0 + a1,0A1 + a2,0A2 + · · ·+ an,0An)
+ xi (a0,1A0 + a1,1A1 + a2,1A2 + · · ·+ an,1An) + · · ·
+ xni (a0,nA0 + a1,nA1 + a2,nA2 + · · ·+ an,nAn) + g(xi)u
= (a0,0 + a0,1xi + a0,2x
2
i + · · ·+ a0,nxni )A0
+ (a1,0 + a1,1xi + a1,2x
2
i + · · ·+ a1,nxni )A1
+ (a2,0 + a2,1xi + a2,2x
2
i + · · ·+ a2,nxni )A2 + · · ·
+ (an,0 + an,1xi + an,2x
2
i + · · ·+ an,nxni )An + g(xi)u
= f0(xi)A0 + f1(xi)A1 + f2(xi)A2 + · · ·+ fn(xi)An + g(xi)u,
U = U0 + xiU1 + x
2
iU2 + · · ·+ xni Un
= (a0,0B0 + a1,0B1 + a2,0B2 + · · ·+ an,0Bn)
+ xi(a0,1B0 + a1,1B1 + a2,1B2 + · · ·+ an,1Bn) + · · ·
+ xni (a0,nB0 + a1,nB1 + a2,nB2 + · · ·+ an,nBn)
= (a0,0 + a0,1xi + a0,2x
2
i + · · ·+ a0,nxni )B0
+ (a1,0 + a1,1xi + a1,2x
2
i + · · ·+ a1,nxni )B1
+ (a2,0 + a2,1xi + a2,2x
2
i + · · ·+ a2,nxni )B2 + · · ·
+ (an,0 + an,1xi + an,2x
2
i + · · ·+ an,nxni )Bn
= f0(xi)B0 + f1(xi)B1 + f2(xi)B2 + · · ·+ fn(xi)Bn.
Note that in our construction, fi(xi) = 1 and fi(xj) = 0 for i 6= j. Therefore, we
have
Q = f0(xi)A0 + f1(xi)A1 + f2(xi)A2 + · · ·+ fn(xi)An + g(xi)u
= Ai + g(xi)u,
U = f0(xi)B0 + f1(xi)B1 + f2(xi)B2 + · · ·+ fn(xi)Bn
= Bi.
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Then K1 can be obtained by computing

















)sr3 , IDi)−H3(e(H(IDi), Ppub)r3 , IDi)
= K1.
If IDi ∈ S\R, we have g(xi) 6= 0 and K2 can be obtained by computing







































After recovering K1 and K2, the user gets the message as
C ′0 −K ′1 −K ′2 = M +K1 +K2 −K1 −K2 = M.
From the construction of our proposed scheme, one may observe that in the
encryption algorithm, we choose a dummy user outside the identity set S. There is
no such requirement in the work of Chapter 3. In the construction of Chapter 3, it
is required that the size of broadcast identity set must be at least three, otherwise,
the scheme is not secure in the case where there are only two user in S under the
defined security models. In this scheme, we consider a more general situation and
remove this restriction by using a dummy user which does not have any effect on
the user decryption.
4.4 Security Analysis
In this section, we show that the proposed FPPR-IBBE scheme achieves the security
requirements defined in the security models previously. The security of the proposed
scheme is derived in the random oracle model under BDH assumption.
Theorem 4.1. Let hash functions H,H3 be random oracles. If the BDH assumption
holds, the proposed scheme is IND-ID-CPA secure. Specifically, if there is an IDN-
ID-CPA adversary A with advantage ε against our scheme, there is an algorithm B
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that solves the BDH problem with advantage
ε′ ≥ ε
e · n · qE · qH3
,
where n is the number of the set S of identities, qE and qH3 are the number of private
key queries and H3 respectively. e is the natural logarithm.
Proof. Suppose there exists an IND-ID-CPA adversary A that break our scheme
with non-negligible advantage ε. We build a simulator (algorithm) B that can solve
the BDH problem with advantage ε′ by running A. Let (P, aP, bP, cP ) be a random
instance of BDH problem taken as input by B and its goal is to compute e(P, P )abc.
In order to use A to solve the problem, B needs to simulate a challenger and respond
all queries from A. B works by interacting with A in an IND-ID-CPA game (Game
1) as follows.
Setup: B sets Ppub = aP and generates the master public key asmpk = (BG, P, Ppub,
H1, H2). Here, H and H3 are viewed as random oracles controlled by the simulator.
H-queries: For a query on IDi, B responds as follows. B maintains a list L of tuples
(IDi, ci, ti, hi). This list is initially empty. B first checks the L. If the query IDi
has already appeared in L in a tuple (IDi, ci, ti, hi), it returns the corresponding hi
as the value of H(IDi). Otherwise, B randomly picks ti ∈ Zp and selects a random
ci ∈ {0, 1} with Pr[ci = 0] = δ for some δ (determine later). If ci = 0, it computes
hi = tibP , otherwise, it computes hi = tiP . Then it adds the tuple (IDi, ci, ti, hi)
to the L and responds with hi.
H3-queries: For a query on (Yi, IDi), B responds as follows. B maintains a list
L3 of tuples (Yi, IDi, γi). This list is initially empty. B first checks L3. If the
query (Yi, IDi) has already appeared in L3 in a tuple (Yi, IDi, γi), it returns the
corresponding γi as the value of H3(Yi, IDi). Otherwise, B randomly picks a γi ∈ G
as the value of H3(Yi, IDi), then it adds (Yi, IDi, γi) to the L3 and responds with
γi.
Phase 1: In this phase, the adversary can issue the private key queries on IDi as
needed. B firstly gets the corresponding ci and ti from L. (If they do not exist, it
runs the H query to get the corresponding ci and ti.) If ci = 0, B aborts. If ci = 1,
B computes dIDi = sH1(IDi) = atiP = tiPpub.
Challenge: Once A decides that the phase 1 is over, it outputs two distinct mes-
sages M0,M1 from the same message space and an identity set S
∗ = (ID1, ID2, · · · ,
IDn). We require that A has not queried the private key for any IDi ∈ S∗ in the
phase 1. B picks a random bit µ ∈ {0, 1} and performs as follows.
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1. Choose a random dummy identity ID0 /∈ S∗ and randomly choose B∗i ∈ G for
i = [0, n].
2. Randomly choose r∗1, r
∗
2 ∈ Zp, C∗0 ∈ G and compute C∗1 = r∗1P , C∗2 = r∗2P ,
C∗3 = cP .
3. For i = [0, n], get the value of H(IDi) from L (If IDi does not exist in L, run












)r∗2 , IDi) ,








































Phase 2: A continues to issue private key queries as needed with the restriction
established in the challenge phase. B responds the same as in phase 1.
Guess: Finally, A outputs its guess µ′ ∈ {0, 1} of µ.
The above completes the description of the simulation. From above setting, we
note that the correctness and randomness hold. B simulates a real attack environ-







= e(P, P )tjabc. According to the breaking assumption that the
adversary will break the scheme with non-negligible advantage. At this point, B
ignores the guess of A and picks a random tuple (Yj, IDj, γj) from the list L3. It
then obtains the corresponding tj from L and outputs Y
t−1j
j as the solution to the
given instance of BDH. To complete the security proof, it remains to show that B
outputs the correct solution with advantage at least ε′.









where IDi ∈ S∗. In the real scheme, B∗i = K+H3(Wi). Before querying
the H3 value of Wi, the result of H3(Wi) is unknown and random. From the view of
the adversary, K is encrypted with a random number independent of Wi. Therefore,
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B∗i is a one-time pad. In other words, the challenge ciphertext is a one-time pad.
According to the assumption (A breaks our scheme with advantage ε), the adversary
must at least query H3 on one Wi with probability δ. In this case, B decides the
solution is in the L3. According to the above analysis, we define the following events.
E1: The simulation does not abort in the private key query.
E2: At least one of the H values of challenge identities contains b.
E3: The adversary chooses an identity where ci = 0 to distinguish challenge mes-
sage.
E4: The simulator correctly chooses the solution from the L3.
The simulator can successfully solve the hard problem if and only if all events
happen simultaneously. Next, we analyze the probability of all events. From the
private key query, we know when each ci = 1, the simulation will not abort, thus
Pr[E1] = Pr[ci = 1, i = 1, 2, · · · , qE] = (1− δ)qE .
For the event E2, it is easy to compute that Pr[E2] = δ. As ci are secretly chosen by
the simulator, from the point view of the adversary, it does not know the probabilities
of ci = 0 and ci = 1. Therefore, we have
Pr[E3] = Pr[E3|ci = 0] Pr[ci = 0] + Pr[E3|ci = 1] Pr[ci = 1]
= 1
n







Finally, from the point view of B, if the adversary can guess µ′ correctly, B only
knows that the correct solution of the hard problem is in the L3, but it does not
know which one is, thus Pr[E4] =
1
qH3
. It is not hard to see that these four events
are independent, hence, we have
ε′ = Pr[E1 ∧ E2 ∧ E3 ∧ E4] · ε
= Pr[E1] · Pr[E2] · Pr[E3] · Pr[E4] · ε
≥ (1− δ)qE · δ · ε
n·qH3
.
The function (1− δ)qE · δ is maximized at δopt = 1qE+1 . Using δopt, we have
ε′ ≥ ε
e · n · qE · qH3
.
This completes the proof.
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Theorem 4.2. Let hash functions H,H2, H3 be random oracles. If the BDH as-
sumption holds, the proposed scheme is ANON-ID-CPA secure. Specifically, if there
is an ANON-ID-CPA adversary A with advantage ε against our scheme, there is an
algorithm B that solves the BDH problem with advantage
ε′ ≥ ε
e · n · qE · (qH2 + qH3)
,
where n is the number of the set S of identities, qE, qH2 and qH3 are the number of
queries to private key, H2 and H3 respectively. e is the natural logarithm.
Proof. Suppose there exists an ANON-ID-CPA adversary A that breaks our scheme
with non-negligible advantage ε. We build a simulator (algorithm) B that can solve
the BDH problem with advantage ε′ by running A. Let (P, aP, bP, cP ) be a random
instance of BDH problem taken as input by B and its goal is to compute e(P, P )abc.
In order to use A to solve the problem, B needs to simulate a challenger and respond
all queries fromA. B works by interacting withA in an ANON-ID-CPA game (Game
2) as follows.
Setup: B sets Ppub = aP and generates the master public key asmpk = (BG, P, Ppub,
H1). Here, we viewed hash functions H,H2, H3 are random oracles controlled by
the simulator.
H-queries: For a query on IDi, B responds as follows. B maintains a list L of tuples
(IDi, ci, ti, hi). This list is initially empty. B first checks the L. If the query IDi
has already appeared in L in a tuple (IDi, ci, ti, hi), it returns the corresponding hi
as the value of H(IDi). Otherwise, B randomly picks ti ∈ Zp and selects a random
ci ∈ {0, 1} with Pr[ci = 0] = δ for some δ (determine later). If ci = 0, it computes
hi = tibP , otherwise, it computes hi = tiP . Then it adds the tuple (IDi, ci, ti, hi)
to the L and responds with hi.
H2-queries: For a query on (Xi, IDi), B responds as follows. B maintains a list
L2 of tuples (Xi, IDi, λi). This list is initially empty. B first checks the L2. If the
query (Xi, IDi) has already appeared in the L2 in a tuple (Xi, IDi, λi), it returns
the corresponding λi as the value of H2(Xi, IDi). Otherwise, B randomly picks a
λi ∈ G as the value of H2(Xi, IDi), then it adds (Xi, IDi, λi) to the L2 and responds
with λi.
H3-queries: For a query on (Yi, IDi), B responds as follows. B maintains a list
L3 of tuples (Yi, IDi, γi). This list is initially empty. B first checks L3. If the
query (Yi, IDi) has already appeared in L3 in a tuple (Yi, IDi, γi), it returns the
corresponding γi as the value of H3(Yi, IDi). Otherwise, B randomly picks a γi ∈ G
as the value of H3(Yi, IDi), then it adds (Yi, IDi, γi) to the L3 and responds with
γi.
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Phase 1: In this phase, the adversary can issue the private key queries on IDi as
needed. B firstly gets the corresponding ci and ti from L. (If they do not exist, it
runs the H query to get the corresponding ci and ti.) If ci = 0, B aborts. If ci = 1,
B computes dIDi = sH1(IDi) = atiP = tiPpub.
Challenge: Once A decides that the phase 1 is over, it outputs a message M∗ and
two distinct identity sets S0 = (ID0,1, ID0,2, · · · , ID0,n), S1 = (ID1,1, ID1,2, · · · , ID1,n).
We require that A has not queried the private key for any IDi ∈ S04S1 in the phase
1. B picks a random bit µ ∈ {0, 1} and performs as follows.
1. Randomly choose a dummy identity ID0 /∈ S0 ∪ S1, B∗0 ∈ G, r∗1, r∗2 ∈ Zp and
K∗ ∈ G, and compute C∗0 = K∗ +M∗, C∗1 = r∗1P, C2 = r∗2cP, C3 = cP .
2. For i = [0, n], get the value of H(IDi) from L (If IDi does not exist in L, run






)r∗1 , IDi) ,











3. For each IDi ∈ Sµ\S1−µ, randomly choose Ai, B∗i ∈ G. For each IDi ∈ S0∩S1,
B first gets ci, ti from the L. If ci = 0, it randomly chooses Ai, B∗i ∈ G. If
ci = 1, it computes Xi = e(aP, cP )
r∗2ti and checks whether the tuple (Xi, IDi)
is in the L2. If yes, it obtains the corresponding λi and setsA∗i = λi. Otherwise,
it randomly chooses A∗i ∈ G and adds the new tuple (Xi, IDi, A∗i ) to the L2.
Then it computes Yi = e(aP, cP )
ti and checks whether the tuple (Yi, IDi) in
the L3. If yes, it obtains the corresponding γi and sets w∗i = γi. Otherwise,
it randomly chooses w∗i ∈ G and adds the new tuple (Yi, IDi, w∗i ) to the L3.
Then it computes B∗i = K
∗ + w∗i .














and set the challenge ciphertext as CT ∗ = (C∗0 , C
∗









Phase 2: A continues to issue private key queries as needed with the restriction
established in the challenge phase. B responds the same as in phase 1.
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Guess: Finally, A outputs its guess µ′ ∈ {0, 1} of µ.
The above completes the description of the simulation. From the setting, we note
that the correctness and randomness hold. B simulates a real attack environment
for the adversary A. At this point, B ignores the guess of A and picks a random
tuple (Xj, IDj, λj) from the list L2 or (Yj, IDj, γj) from the list L3. If its choice is
L2, it outputs X
(r∗2tj)
−1
j as the solution to the given instance of BDH. If its choice
is L3, it outputs Y
t−1j
j as the solution to the given instance of BDH. Similar to the
analysis in Theorem 4.1, we have ε′ ≥ ε
e·n·qE ·(qH2+qH3)
.
This completes the proof.
Theorem 4.3. Let hash functions H,H2 be random oracles. If the BDH assumption
holds, the proposed scheme is IND-rID-CPA secure. Specifically, if there is an IND-
rID-CPA adversary A with advantage ε against our scheme, there is an algorithm
B that solves the BDH problem with advantage
ε′ ≥ ε
e · n · qE · qH2
,
where n is the number of the set S of identities, qE and qH2 are the number of queries
to private key and H2 respectively. e is the natural logarithm.
Proof. Suppose there exists an IND-rID-CPA adversary A that breaks our scheme
with non-negligible advantage ε. We build a simulator (algorithm) B that can solve
the BDH problem with advantage ε′ by running A. Let (P, aP, bP, cP ) be a random
instance of BDH problem taken as input by B and its goal is to compute e(P, P )abc.
In order to use A to solve the problem, B needs to simulate a challenger and respond
all queries from A. B works by interacting with A in an IND-rID-CPA game (Game
3) as follows.
Setup: B sets Ppub = aP and generates the master public key asmpk = (BG, P, Ppub,
H1, H3). Here, we view H,H2 as random oracles controlled by the simulator.
H-queries: For a query on IDi, B responds as follows. B maintains a list L of tuples
(IDi, ci, ti, hi). This list is initially empty. B first checks the L. If the query IDi
has already appeared in L in a tuple (IDi, ci, ti, hi), it returns the corresponding hi
as the value of H(IDi). Otherwise, B randomly picks ti ∈ Zp and selects a random
ci ∈ {0, 1} with Pr[ci = 0] = δ for some δ (determine later). If ci = 0, it computes
hi = tibP , otherwise, it computes hi = tiP . Then it adds the tuple (IDi, ci, ti, hi)
to the L and responds with hi.
H2-queries: For a query on (Xi, IDi), B responds as follows. B maintains a list
L2 of tuples (Xi, IDi, λi). This list is initially empty. B first checks the L2. If the
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query (Xi, IDi) has already appeared in the L2 in a tuple (Xi, IDi, λi), it returns
the corresponding λi as the value of H2(Xi, IDi). Otherwise, B randomly picks a
λi ∈ G as the value of H2(Xi, IDi), then it adds (Xi, IDi, λi) to the L2 and responds
with λi.
Phase 1: In this phase, the adversary can issue the private key queries on IDi as
needed. B firstly gets the corresponding ci and ti from L. (If they do not exist, it
runs the H query to get the corresponding ci and ti.) If ci = 0, B aborts. If ci = 1,
B computes dIDi = sH1(IDi) = atiP = tiPpub.
Challenge: Once A decides that the phase 1 is over, it outputs two distinct mes-
sagesM0, M1 from the same message space, an identity set S
∗ = (ID1, ID2, · · · , IDn)
and a non-empty revoked identity set R∗ = (IDl1 , IDl2 , · · · , IDlt). We require that
A has not issued the private key queries for any IDi ∈ S∗\R∗ in the phase 1. B
picks a random bit µ ∈ {0, 1} and performs as follows.
1. Choose a random dummy identity ID0 /∈ S∗∪R∗, randomly pick A∗0, K∗1 , K∗2 ∈
G, r∗1, r∗3 ∈ Zp and compute C ′0












2. For IDi ∈ S∗ ∩ R∗, it obtains the tuple (ci, ti, hi) from L (If IDi does not
exist in L, run the H query). If ci = 0, it aborts, otherwise, it computes
Xi = e(aP, cP )
ti and checks whether the tuple (Xi, IDi) has appeared in L2.
Return λi if it exists in L2, otherwise B picks a random λi ∈ G. Then it sets
A∗i = λi and adds the new tuple (Xi, IDi, λi) to the L2. For each i where
IDi ∈ S∗\R∗, it picks a random A∗i ∈ G.













































)r∗1 , IDi) ,










5. For i = 0, 1, 2, · · · , t, compute
Q′i
∗
= Q∗i + biK
∗
2 ,
and set the challenge ciphertext as CT ′∗ =
(
C ′0




3 , b0, b1, · · · , bt−1, Q′0
∗,
Q′1
∗, · · · , Q′t
∗, Q∗t+1, · · · , Q∗n, U∗0 , U∗1 , · · · , U∗n
)
.
Phase 2: A continues to issue private key queries as needed with the restriction
established in the challenge phase. B responds the same as in phase 1.
Guess: Finally, A outputs its guess µ′ ∈ {0, 1} of µ.
The above completes the description of the simulation. From the setting, we note
that the correctness and randomness hold. B simulates a real attack environment
for the adversary A. B ignores the guess of A and picks a random tuple (Xj, IDj,
λj) from the list L2. It then obtains the corresponding tj from L and outputs X
t−1j
j
as the solution to the given instance of BDH. A can obtain the private keys for
IDi ∈ S∗ ∩ R∗. But this will not help the adversary to distinguish the message in
our security reduction. According to the breaking assumption that the adversary
will break the scheme with non-negligible advantage, it must query H2 with the
input containing the solution of the hard problem if we only consider the case that
A chooses the IDi where H(IDi) = tibP to break our scheme. As the analysis in
Theorem 4.1, we have ε′ ≥ ε
e·n·qE ·qH2
.
This completes the proof.
Theorem 4.4. Let hash functions H,H1 be random oracles. If the BDH assumption
holds, the proposed scheme is selective ANON-rID-CPA secure. Specifically, if there
is a selective ANON-rID-CPA adversary A with advantage ε against our scheme,




where t is the number of revoked identities and qH1 is the number of H1 queries.
Proof. Suppose there exists an AIND-rID-CPA adversary A that breaks our scheme
with non-negligible advantage ε. We build a simulator (algorithm) B that can solve
the BDH problem with advantage ε′ by running A. Let (P, aP, bP, cP ) be a random
instance of BDH problem taken as input by B and its goal is to compute e(P, P )abc.
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In order to use A to solve the problem, B needs to simulate a challenger and respond
all queries from A. B works by interacting with A in an ANON-rID-CPA game
(Game 4) as follows.
Init: The adversary outputs two distinct target revoked identity sets R0 = (ID0,1,
ID0,2, ..., ID0,t) and R1 = (ID1,1, ID1,2, ..., ID1,t) that he wants to attack.
Setup: B sets Ppub = aP and generates the master public key asmpk = (BG, P, Ppub,
H2, H3). Here, we view H,H1 as random oracles controlled by the simulator. Then
B randomly picks a bit µ ∈ {0, 1} and an identity ID∗ ∈ Rµ\R1−µ.
H-queries: For a query on IDi, B responds as follows. B maintains a list L of
a tuple (IDi, ki, hi). This list is initially empty. B first checks L. If the query IDi
has already appeared in the L in a tuple (IDi, ki, hi), it returns the corresponding
hi as the value of H(IDi), otherwise, it chooses a random ki ∈ Zp. If IDi = ID∗, it
sets hi = kibP and sets hi = kiP if IDi 6= ID∗.
H1-queries: For a query on (Ti, IDi), B responds as follows. B maintains a list
L1 of a tuple (Ti, IDi, ηi). This list is initially empty. B first checks the L1. If the
query (Ti, IDi) has already appeared in the L1 in a tuple (Ti, IDi, ηi), it returns the
corresponding ηi as the value of H1(Ti, IDi). Otherwise, B randomly picks a ηi ∈ G
as the value of H1(Ti, IDi), adds the tuple (Ti, IDi, ηi) to L1 and responds with ηi.
Phase 1: In this phase, A can issue the private key queries for IDi /∈ R04R1 as
needed. B gets the corresponding ki from L (If they do not exist, it runs the H query
and gets the corresponding ki.) and computes dIDi = sH1(IDi) = akiP = kiPpub.
Challenge: Once A decides that the phase 1 is over, it outputs a message M∗ and
an identity set S∗ = (ID1, ID2, · · · , IDn). B performs as follows.
1. Choose a dummy identity ID0 /∈ S∗ ∪ R0 ∪ R1, randomly pick K∗1 , K∗2 ∈ G,
r∗2, r
∗















2. For each IDi ∈ S∗ and ID0, if IDi = ID∗, randomly choose x∗ ∈ Zp and set
x∗i = x
∗. Otherwise, obtain the tuple (ki, hi) from L, compute Ti = e(aP, cP )ki
and check whether the tuple (Ti, IDi) appeared in the L1. Return ηi if it exists
in L1, otherwise pick a random ηi ∈ Zp. Then B sets x∗i = ηi and adds the
new tuple (Ti, IDi, ηi) to the L1.








































4. For each IDi ∈ R0 ∩ R1, obtain the tuple (ki, hi) from L, compute Ti =
e(aP, cP )ki and check whether the tuple (Ti, IDi) has appeared in the L1.
Return ηi if it exists in the L1, otherwise pick a random ηi ∈ Zp. Then it sets
x∗i = ηi and adds the new tuple (Ti, IDi, ηi) to the L1. For IDi ∈ Rµ\R1−µ,









5. For i = 0, 1, 2, · · · , t, compute
Q′i
∗
= Q∗i + biK
∗
2 ,
and set the challenge ciphertext as CT ′∗ = (C ′0




3 , b0, b1, · · · , bt−1, Q′0
∗,
Q′1
∗, · · · , Q′t
∗, Q∗t+1, · · · , Q∗n, U∗0 , U∗1 , · · · , U∗n).
Phase 2: A continues to issue private key queries on IDi /∈ R04R1. B responds
the same as in phase 1.
Guess: Finally, A outputs its guess µ′ ∈ {0, 1} of µ.
The above completes the description of the simulation. From the setting, we note
that the correctness and randomness hold. B simulates a real attack environment
for the adversary A. There is no abortion in our simulation. If the adversary
chooses ID∗ to distinguish the revoked identity sets, B can successfully solve the
BDH problem by computing T ∗
1
k∗ . It is not hard to compute that the probability




where k = |R0 ∩ R1|, we have
ε′ ≥ ε
t·qH1
and yield Theorem 4.4.
This completes the proof.
Note that the reduction in Theorem 4.4 is slightly different from the defined
security model (game 4). In the security model, the random bit µ is chosen in the
challenge phase. But in our simulation, µ is chosen in the setup phase. We claim
that it does not have security issues. As µ is chosen by B secretly, from the point
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view of the adversary, it cannot distinguish whether µ is chosen in the setup phase
or the challenge phase. Thus our proof of Theorem 4.4 is reasonable and correct.
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we further studied the receiver privacy-preserving in the revocable
identity-based broadcast encryption system. We proposed a framework of revoca-
ble identity-based broadcast encryption, which can fully preserve the user privacy
including the receivers stated in the original ciphertext and the revoked users. The
proposed scheme is the first work that can achieve fully user anonymity in the re-
vocable identity-based broadcast encryption. Finally, we gave the concrete security
analysis of the proposed scheme under the hardness of BDH problem in the random
oracle model.
Chapter 5
Fully Privacy-Preserving IBBE with
Authorization
This chapter describes a fully privacy-preserving identity-based broadcast encryp-
tion with authorization scheme. The proposed scheme considers a negative analogue
of revocable identity-based broadcast encryption. The original scheme was published
in The Computer Journal [LMGC17].
5.1 Introduction
Broadcast encryption (BE) introduced by Fiat and Naor [FN94] provides an effi-
cient approach for sharing a message with a group of users. It allows an encryptor
to encrypt a message under a broadcast receiver set S with whom the encryptor
wants to share the message via a public broadcast channel. Only those users whose
identities belong to S are able to obtain the message. The basic security requirement
of broadcast encryption is collusion resistance. A broadcast encryption scheme is
said to be full collusion resistant if the outsiders (the users who are not in S) are
unable to learn any information about the broadcast message even if they collude.
For flexible applications, a new cryptographic primitive called recipient revoca-
ble identity-based broadcast encryption (RR-IBBE) was introduced in [SCG+16].
It attempts to securely share an externally stored data with a group of users while
allowing the encryptor to delegate revocation computations on the outsourced en-
crypted data to revoke some users’ data retrieval rights. In the RR-IBBE, a third
party cannot decrypt the ciphertext, but it can remove some of users from the re-
ceiver set stated in the original ciphertext generated via a broadcast encryption.
Unfortunately, the work in [SCG+16] does not consider the receiver privacy. It
is required to send the receiver identity set to the third party who performs the
revocation operation, which exposes the receiver privacy. Aiming to protect the
receiver privacy, Lai et al. [LMG+16] subsequently put forward the first anonymous
RR-IBBE scheme. The revocation process does not require any information of the
receiver identity. However, the work in [LMG+16] cannot protect the revoked users’
identity information. The identities of revoked users must be attached in the final
69
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ciphertext, which somehow exposes the user privacy, especially the user who has
been revoked. Later, a fully privacy-preserving RR-IBBE scheme has been achieved
in [LMG+17], where both the identities of the receivers and the revoked users can
be protected. The size of ciphertext is linear in the size of the original broadcast
identity set.
In this chapter, we focus on the authorization in identity-based broadcast en-
cryption. Authorization is a negative analogue of revocation. If we consider the
revocation as “black list”, then the authorization can be viewed as “white list”. In
an authorization system, the final ciphertext is generated by an authorized user set
in a way that users who are not in the authorized set are unable to decrypt the
ciphertext even they are in the broadcast identity set. In contrast, a revocation sys-
tem uses the revoked user set to generate the final ciphertext such that the revoked
user cannot retrieve the message anymore. We observe that if the revoked sets are
large, such as larger than half of the universal user set, the authorization system
might be more efficient than the revocation system. Authorization is also suitable
for the scenarios where the receivers are decided by several entities. Unfortunately,
this has never been captured in the literature.
At the first glance, one might think the authorization in broadcast encryption
can be achieved by using a re-encryption mechanism. Although the authorization
looks like re-encryption in some extent, it is entirely different from re-encryption
and requires a higher security level in comparison with re-encryption. In particu-
lar, since it is in a multi-user setting, a traditional re-encryption approach cannot
resist collusion attacks, which are explained as follows. Suppose a user with ID1 is
within the broadcast identity set but not belongs to the authorized set, and a user
with ID2 is not in the broadcast identity set but in the authorized set. These two
users might try to decrypt the ciphertext and let the user with ID2 get the original
broadcast ciphertext and the user with ID1 decrypts it using its secret key. For
the re-encryption in the broadcast encryption, Chu et al. [CWC+09] presented a
conditional proxy broadcast re-encryption scheme which allows a proxy to transform
a ciphertext intended for a receiver set to another ciphertext intended for another
receiver set. Xu et al. [XJW+16] presented a conditional identity-based broadcast
proxy re-encryption scheme with constant size ciphertext based on [Del07]. Never-
theless, the receivers identities are required to send to the proxy in both systems.
In this chapter, we propose a new notion of fully privacy-preserving identity-
based broadcast encryption with authorization (FPP-IBBEA), which allows a third
party to authorize the decryption rights for a set of users. Only the user whose
identity belongs to both the identity set sated in the original broadcast ciphertext
and the authorized identity set is able to retrieve the encrypted message. This notion
is especially suitable for the applications where the user privacy should be considered
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and the users ciphertext decryption rights are able to be reallocated. We present an
FPP-IBBEA construction where the final ciphertext size is linear in the size of the
authorized identity set, instead of the size of the original broadcast identity set. The
security of the proposed scheme is derived from the hardness of BDH problem in the
random oracle model. The proposed scheme supports multiple authorization and all
properties are maintained. Namely, the authorization operation can be performed
dependently by multiple third parties under each selected authorized identity set.
Only the users belonging to all authorized identity sets are able to obtain the message
successfully.
Organization. The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In the next Section,
we give the definitions of fully privacy-preserving identity-based broadcast encryp-
tion with authorization and the corresponding security models to capture its security.
The proposed scheme is presented in Section 5.3. We also give a discussion in this
section. In Section 5.4, we provide the security analysis of the proposed scheme
under the defined security models and conclude this chapter in Section 5.5.
5.2 Definitions and Security Models
This section will define the syntax and the security of the fully privacy-preserving
identity-based broadcast encryption with authorization (FPP-IBBEA). We can view
the authorization is a negative analogue of revocation where only the authorized
users can obtain the encrypted message. An FPP-IBBEA scheme is made up of five
algorithms below.
– Setup(1λ). Taking as input a security parameter λ, the setup algorithm
returns a master key pair (mpk,msk), where the master public key mpk
is publicly known while the master secret key msk is kept secretly.
– KeyGen(mpk,msk, ID). Taking as input the master public/secret key
pair (mpk,msk) and a user identity ID, the key generation returns a user
private key dID.
– Encrypt(mpk,M, S). Taking as input the master public key mpk, a mes-
sage M and an identity set S = (ID1, ID2, · · · , IDn), the encryption al-
gorithm returns a ciphertext CT .
– Authorize(mpk, L, CT ). Taking as input the master public key mpk, a
set of authorized identities L = (IDl1 , IDl2 , · · · , IDlk), and a ciphertext
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CT , the authorization algorithm returns a new ciphertext CT ′ after au-
thorization.
– Decrypt (mpk,CT ′, ID, dID). Taking as input the master public key
mpk, a ciphertext CT ′, an identity ID and the corresponding private key
dID, the decryption algorithm returns the message M if ID ∈ S ∩ L or ⊥
otherwise to denote failure.
Correctness. We require the following correctness requirement. Suppose that
(mpk,msk) are the result of calling Setup(1λ), the dID and CT are then the result
of calling KeyGen(mpk,msk, ID) and Encrypt(mpk,M, S) respectively, CT ′ is the
result of calling Authorize(mpk, L, CT ). We then have
Decrypt(mpk,CT ′, ID, dID) =
M If ID ∈ S ∩ L,⊥ otherwise.
Without loss of generality, we always assume that L is a non-empty set in this
chapter.
Security Notions. In this section, we formalize the indistinguishability secu-
rity models for FPP-IBBEA. The final ciphertext CT ′ should preserve the message
confidentiality and the receiver privacy against the adversary (the public). As the
encrypted message CT firstly will be distributed to a third party. The initial ci-
phertext CT should also be secure against the third party. More specifically, the
security requirements are as follows.
1. The message and the identity set in the ciphertext CT cannot be distinguished
without a valid private key associated with an identity ID ∈ S.
2. The message and the authorized identity set in CT ′ cannot be distinguished
without a valid private key associated with an identity ID ∈ S ∩ L.
Similar to the security of anonymous identity-based broadcast encryption scheme
where the encryption of unpredictable message must be indistinguishable from a ran-
dom string of the same length and the receiver identity set must be indistinguishable
from a random identity set with the same size. Next, we define four indistinguisha-
bility security models to capture the security requirements of the proposed scheme,
namely the IND-ID-CPA security, ANON-ID-CPA security, IND-aID-CPA security
and ANON-aID-CPA security. These four security models are defined with the
following four games played between a challenger and an adversary.
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IND-ID-CPA Security. This security model claims that the message in the CT
is indistinguishable from a random string of the same length and it works as follows.
– Setup: The challenger runs the setup algorithm to generate the master public
key mpk. It then sends mpk to the adversary.
– Phase 1: In this phase, the adversary can issue the private key queries as
needed. Upon receiving a private key query for IDi, the challenger runs the
key generation algorithm to generate the private key dIDi and responds by
returning dIDi .
– Challenge: Once the adversary decides that the phase 1 is over, it outputs
two distinct messages M0, M1 from the same message space and a challenge
identity set S∗ = (ID1, ID2, · · · , IDn). We require that the adversary has not
queried the private key on IDi ∈ S∗ in the phase 1. The challenger picks a
random bit µ ∈ {0, 1} and generates the challenge ciphertext CT ∗ on message
Mµ under S
∗, then it returns CT ∗ to the adversary.
– Phase 2: The adversary continues to issue more private key queries with
the restriction established in the challenge phase. The simulator responds the
same as in phase 1.
– Guess: Finally, the adversary outputs its guess µ′ ∈ {0, 1} of µ and wins the
game if µ = µ′.
We refer to such an adversary as an IND-ID-CPA adversary and define the
advantage of the adversary in winning the game as
AdvIND-ID-CPAFPP−IBBEA (λ) =
∣∣∣∣Pr [µ = µ′]− 12
∣∣∣∣ .
The probability is over the random coins of the adversary, the challenger and all
probabilistic algorithms run by the challenger.
Definition 5.1. We say that a scheme is IND-ID-CPA secure if for any proba-
bilistic polynomial time IND-ID-CPA adversary, the advantage AdvIND-ID-CPAFPP−IBBEA (λ) is
negligible.
ANON-ID-CPA Security. This security model claims that the identity set in the
CT is indistinguishable from a random identity set of the same length and it works
as follows.
– Setup: The challenger runs the setup algorithm to generate the master public
key mpk and sends mpk to the adversary.
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– Phase 1: In the phase, the adversary can issue private key queries as needed.
Upon receiving a private key query for IDi, The challenger runs the key gen-
eration algorithm to generate the private key dIDi and responds by returning
dIDi .
– Challenge: Once the adversary decides that the phase 1 is over, it outputs
a message M∗ and two distinct identity sets S0 = (ID0,1, ID0,2, ..., ID0,n),
S1 = (ID1,1, ID1,2, ..., ID1,n). We require that the adversary has not issued
the private key queries on any IDi in the phase 1, where IDi ∈ S04S1 =
(S0\S1)∪ (S1\S0). The simulator picks a random bit µ ∈ {0, 1} and generates
the challenge ciphertext CT ∗ on message M∗ under Sµ.
– Phase 2: The adversary continues to issue more private key queries with the
restriction established in the challenge phase. The challenger responds the
same as in phase 1.
– Guess: Finally, the adversary outputs its guess µ′ ∈ {0, 1} of µ and wins the
game if µ = µ′.
We refer to such an adversary as an ANON-ID-CPA adversary and define the
advantage of the adversary in winning the game as
AdvANON-ID-CPAFPP−IBBEA (λ) =
∣∣∣∣Pr [µ = µ′]− 12
∣∣∣∣ .
The probability is over the random coins of the adversary, the challenger and all
probabilistic algorithms run by the challenger.
Definition 5.2. We say that a scheme is ANON-ID-CPA secure if for any proba-
bilistic polynomial time ANON-ID-CPA adversary, the advantage AdvANON-ID-CPAFPP−IBBEA (λ)
is negligible.
IND-aID-CPA Security. This security model claims that the message in the
ciphertext CT ′ after authorization is indistinguishable from a random string of the
same length and it works as follows.
– Setup: The challenger runs the setup algorithm to generate the master public
key mpk and sends mpk to the adversary.
– Phase 1: In this phase, the adversary can issue private key queries as needed.
Upon receiving a private key query for IDi. The challenger runs the key gen-
eration algorithm to generate the private key dIDi and responds by returning
dIDi .
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– Challenge: Once the adversary decides that the phase 1 is over, it out-
puts two distinct messages M0, M1 from the same message space, a chal-
lenge identity set S∗ = (ID1, ID2, · · · , IDn) and an authorized identity set
L∗ = {IDl1 , IDl2 , · · · , IDlk}. We require that the adversary has not queried
the private key on IDi in the phase 1, where IDi ∈ S∗ ∩ L∗. The challenger
picks a random bit µ ∈ {0, 1} and generates the challenged ciphertext CT ′∗
on message Mµ under S
∗ and L∗, then it returns CT ′∗ to the adversary.
– Phase 2: The adversary continues to issue more private key queries with the
restriction established in the challenge phase. The challenger responds the
same as phase 1.
– Guess: Finally, the adversary outputs its guess µ′ ∈ {0, 1} of µ and wins the
game if µ = µ′.
We refer to such an adversary as an IND-aID-CPA adversary and define the advan-
tage of the adversary in winning the game as
AdvIND-aID-CPAFPP−IBBEA (λ) =
∣∣∣∣Pr [µ = µ′]− 12
∣∣∣∣ .
The probability is over the random coins of the adversary, the challenger and all
probabilistic algorithms run by the challenger.
Definition 5.3. We say that a scheme is IND-aID-CPA secure if for any proba-
bilistic polynomial time IND-aID-CPA adversary, the advantage AdvIND-aID-CPAFPP−IBBEA (λ)
is negligible.
ANON-aID-CPA Security. This security model claims that the authorized iden-
tity set in CT ′ is indistinguishable from a random identity set of the same length
without a valid private key, and it works as follows.
– Setup: The challenger runs the setup algorithm to generate the master public
key mpk and sends mpk to the adversary.
– Phase 1: In this phase, the adversary can issue private key queries as needed.
Upon receiving a private key query for IDi. The challenger runs the key
generation algorithm to generate the private key dIDi and sends dIDi to the
adversary.
– Challenge: Once the adversary decides that the phase 1 is over, it outputs a
message M∗, an identity set S∗ = (ID1, ID2, · · · , IDn) and two distinct autho-
rized identity sets L0 = (ID0,1, ID0,2, ..., ID0,k), L1 = (ID1,1, ID1,2, ..., ID1,k).
We require that the adversary has not issued the private key queries on any IDi
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in the phase 1, where IDi ∈ S∗ ∩ (L04L1), here L04L1 = (L0\L1)∪ (L1\L0).
The challenger randomly picks a bit µ ∈ {0, 1} and generates the challenge
ciphertext CT ′∗ on message M∗ under S∗ and Lµ.
– Phase 2: The adversary continues to issue more private key queries with the
restriction established in the challenge phase.
– Guess: Finally, the adversary outputs its guess µ′ ∈ {0, 1} of µ and wins the
game if µ = µ′.
We refer to such an adversary as an ANON-aID-CPA adversary and define the
advantage of the adversary in winning the game as
AdvANON-aID-CPAFPP−IBBEA (λ) =
∣∣∣∣Pr [µ = µ′]− 12
∣∣∣∣ .
The probability is over the random coins of the adversary, the challenger and all
probabilistic algorithm run by the challenger.
Definition 5.4. We say that a scheme is ANON-aID-CPA secure if for any proba-
bilistic polynomial time ANON-aID-CPA adversary, the advantage AdvANON-aID-CPAFPP−IBBEA (λ)
is negligible.
5.3 The Proposed Scheme
In this section, we give the concrete construction of our proposed scheme.
5.3.1 Construction
We now present our construction based on the symmetric bilinear group defined
in the Chapter 2. We choose an identity ID0 /∈ S as a dummy user. To do this,
we can make a simplifying assumption. We assume that the identity in the sys-
tem cannot be all zero or all one. No one allows to query such kind of identities.
This assumption is reasonable and has been used in many papers, such as [BB11].
Another method about how to choose dummy identities can be found in [HLR10].
Under this assumption, hence we can just simply set the dummy identity ID0 as the
one composed of all zero or all one. The usage of dummy identity also enables us
to prove the privacy of the identity set S even there are two identities in S, namely
the indistinguishability security of S for CT .
Setup(1λ). Given a security parameter λ, the setup algorithm randomly chooses a
bilinear group BG = (G,GT , e, p) with generator P ∈ G. Then it chooses a random
s ∈ Zp, three cryptographic hash functions H : {0, 1}∗ → Zp, H1 : {0, 1}∗ → G,
CHAPTER 5. FULLY PRIVACY-PRESERVING IBBEWITH AUTHORIZATION77
H2 : GT × {0, 1}∗ → G and sets Ppub = sP . The master public key and the master
secret key are
mpk = (BG, P, Ppub, H,H1, H2) , msk = s.
KeyGen(mpk,msk, ID). Given the master key pair (mpk,msk) and a user identity
ID ∈ {0, 1}∗, the key generation algorithm outputs the user’s private key dID by
computing
dID = sH1(ID).
Encrypt(mpk,M, S). Given the master public key mpk, a message M ∈ G and an
identity set S = {ID1, ID2, . . . , IDn}, the encryption algorithm chooses a random
ID /∈ S as the dummy user denoted by ID0 and performs as follows.
1. Pick K ∈ G as an encryption key and r ∈ Zp, and compute
C = K +M, C ′ = rP.
2. For each i ∈ [0, n], compute






















The output ciphertext is CT = (C,C ′, {Ci}ni=0).
From the setting of fi(x), we have fi (xi) = 1, fi (xj) = 0 where i 6= j.
Authorize(mpk,CT, L). Given the master public key mpk, a ciphertext CT =
(C,C ′, {Ci}ni=0) and an authorized identity set L = {IDl1 , IDl2 , · · · , IDlk}. For
simplicity, we denote L as the identity index set. The authorization algorithm, for
each i ∈ L, computes
xi = H(IDi),
A′i = C0 + xiC1 + x
2
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From the setting of gi(x), we also have gi(xi) = 1, gi(xj) = 0 where i 6= j. The










, an identity IDi and the corresponding private key dIDi ,
the decryption algorithm decrypts the ciphertext by computing
xi = H(IDi),






3 + · · ·+ xk−1i C ′k,
K ′ = W −H2
(




After retrieving the encryption key K ′, it is easy to obtain the message by computing
M = C −K ′.
5.3.2 Correctness
Below we show that our construction meets the correctness requirement defined pre-
viously. We observe that for a ciphertext CT ′ formed by calling Authorize(mpk,CT, L),
where CT is formed by calling Encrypt(mpk,M, S) and a key formed by calling
KeyGen(mpk,msk, ID), we have that if IDi ∈ S and xi = H(IDi),
A′i = C0 + xiC1 + x
2
iC2 + · · ·+ xni Cn
= (a0,0A0 + a1,0A1 + · · ·+ an,0An)
+ (a0,1A0 + a1,1A1 + · · ·+ an,1An)xi
+ (a0,2A0 + a1,2A1 + · · ·+ an,2An)x2i + · · ·
+ (a0,nA0 + a1,nA1 + · · ·+ an,nAn)xni
= (a0,0 + a0,1xi + a0,2x
2
i + · · ·+ a0,nxni )A0
+ (a1,0 + a1,1xi + a1,2x
2
i + · · ·+ a1,nxni )A1 + · · ·
+ (an,0 + an,1xi + an,2x
2
i + · · ·+ an,nxni )An
= f0(xi)A0 + f1(xi)A1 + · · ·+ fn(xi)An
= Ai,
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Table 5.1: Comparison of Performances.
Scheme Mpk Size of CT Size of CT ′ CT Anon. R./A. Anon. Multiple Security Model
[SCG+16] O(N) O(m) O(1) Ö Ö Ö Selective
[LMG+16] O(1) O(n) O(n) X Ö Ö Adaptive
[AD17] O(N) O(m) O(1) Ö Ö Ö Adaptive
Ours O(1) O(n) O(k) X X X Adaptive
Anon. is short for anonymity. R. and A. denote revocation and authorization respectively.
If IDi ∈ L and xi = H(IDi), we have


























2 + · · · bk,k−1A′k)xk−1i
=
(
b1,0 + b1,1xi + b1,2x
2





b2,0 + b2,1xi + b2,2x
2
i + · · ·+ b2,k−1xk−1i
)
A′2
+ · · ·
+
(
bk,0 + bk,1xi + bk,2x
2







2 + · · ·+ gn(xi)A′k
= A′i.
Therefore, if IDi ∈ S ∩ L, W = Ai, otherwise, A′i is a random number in G.
After obtaining Ai, it uses its private key dIDi and computes
K ′ = W −H2
(




























M = C0 −K ′ = K +M −K = M.
That is, if IDi ∈ S∩L, using a valid private key to the decryption on the ciphertext
produces the original message M .
5.3.3 Comparison and Discussion
In this section, we compare our scheme with the other three works [SCG+16, LMG+16,
AD17]. In our comparison, we use CT to denote the ciphertext generated by the
Encrypt algorithm. For the ciphertext generated by the Authorize algorithm in our
scheme and the ciphertext generated by the Revoke algorithm in [SCG+16, LMG+16,
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AD17], we use the same notation CT ′ to denote them. n is the number of identity
set S for one encryption in the encryption phase. k is the number of the authorized
identity set L in the authorization phase. N is the maximum size of the set of
receivers for one encryption, that is, n ≤ N . m is the maximum revocation number,
where m ≤ n.
From the Table 5.1, we observe that in [SCG+16] and [AD17], the size of public
key is linear in the maximum size of the set of the revoked receivers R for one en-
cryption in the encryption phase and have to specify the maximum receiver number
in the setup phase. These restrictions seem unavoidable for doing their security
reduction successfully. In contrast, there is no such restrictions in [LMG+16] and
our proposed scheme. Although the final ciphertext CT ′ in [SCG+16, AD17] is a
constant size, the ciphertext CT and CT ′ in both papers cannot preserve the privacy
of the receivers and the revoked users identities. In other words, in their scheme,
the ciphertext CT and CT ′ should attach the identity sets S and R, respectively.
Both attachments seem rather unavoidable for decrypting the ciphertext correctly.
In contrast, both the CT and CT ′ in Lai et al. [LMG+16] are linear in the num-
ber of broadcast identity set for one encryption. Their scheme protects the identity
in S, but, the revoked ciphertext CT ′ cannot hide the revoked users identities and
R should be attached as part of ciphertext.
In our construction, the length of CT and the length of CT ′ have no any re-
lationship. The length of each ciphertext only depends on the size of the input
identity set of the corresponding algorithm. This property achieves that the ci-
phertext size without subjecting to the size of each identity set and optimizes the
ciphertext size in each stage. Moreover, our scheme achieves full receiver privacy-
preserving, that is, the ciphertext generated in each phase will not leak the user
identity information, which has not been achieved in [SCG+16, LMG+16, AD17].
The work in [LMG+16, AD17] and ours achieve adaptive secure, while the scheme
in [SCG+16] is only selective secure.
Furthermore, the Authorize algorithm in our proposed scheme can be performed
several times by different executors to achieve multiple authorizations such that only
the users belonged to all authorized identity set can obtain the message finally. Also
in this case, our proposed scheme resists the collusion attack both for the message
confidentiality and the identity privacy.
5.4 Security Analysis
In this section, we show that the proposed scheme achieves the security requirements
defined in the security models previously. We use the proof technique of Boneh and
Franklin [BF01] to prove the security of our scheme under the BDH assumption in
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the random oracle model.
Theorem 5.1. Let hash functions H1, H2 be random oracles. If the BDH assump-
tion holds, the proposed scheme is IND-ID-CPA secure. Specifically, if there is an
IND-ID-CPA adversary A with advantage ε against our scheme, there is an algo-
rithm B that solves the BDH problem with advantage
ε′ ≥ ε
e · n · qE · qH2
,
where n is the number of the identities in the encryption algorithm, qE and qH2 are
the number of queries to private key and H2 respectively by the adversary. e is the
natural logarithm.
Proof. Suppose there exists an IND-ID-CPA adversary A that attacks our scheme
with non-negligible advantage ε. We build a simulator (algorithm) B that can solve
the BDH problem with advantage ε′. Let (P, aP, bP, cP ) be a random instance of
BDH problem taken as input by B and its goal is to compute e(P, P )abc. In order to
use A to solve the problem, B needs to simulate a challenger and respond all queries
from A. B works by interacting with A in an IND-ID-CPA game as follows.
Setup: B sets Ppub = aP and creates the master public key asmpk = (BG, P, Ppub, H).
Here H1 and H2 are viewed as random oracles controlled by B.
H1-queries: For an H1 query on IDi, B responds as follows. B maintains a list L1
of a tuple (IDi, ηi, ri, hi). This list is initially empty. B first checks the L1.
1. If the query IDi has already appeared in the L1 in a tuple (IDi, ηi, ri, hi), it
responses with hi.
2. Otherwise, it randomly picks ri ∈ Zp and a random ηi ∈ {0, 1} with Pr[ηi =
0] = δ for some δ (determine later). If ηi = 0, it computes hi = ribP otherwise,
it computes hi = riP . Then it adds the tuple (IDi, ηi, ri, hi) to the L1 and
returns hi .
H2-queries: For an H2 query on (Xi, IDi), B responds as follows. B maintains a
list L2 of a tuple (Xi, IDi, γi). This list is initially empty. B first checks the L2.
1. If the query (Xi, IDi) has already appeared in the L2 in a tuple (Xi, IDi, γi),
it returns the corresponding γi.
2. Otherwise, B randomly picks a γi ∈ G as the value of H2(Xi, IDi), and then
adds the tuple (Xi, IDi, γi) to the L2 and responds to A with γi.
Phase 1: In this phase, A can issue the private key queries on IDi as needed. For
each time, B first checks whether IDi in the L1, otherwise it runs the H1 query
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and gets the corresponding ηi and ri. If ηi = 0, B aborts. If ηi = 1, B computes
dIDi = sH1(IDi) = ariP = riPpub and responds with dIDi .
Challenge: Once A decides the phase 1 is over, it outputs two distinct messages
M0,M1 from the same message space and a challenge identity set S
∗ = (ID1,
ID2, · · · , IDn). We require that A has not queried the private key on IDi ∈ S∗
in the phase 1. B performs as follows.
1. Randomly choose C∗ ∈ G and set C ′∗ = cP .
2. For each i ∈ S∗, randomly choose A∗i ∈ G and compute x∗i = H(IDi).


















and set the challenge ciphertext as CT ∗ =
(





Phase 2: A continues to issue more private key queries on IDi /∈ S∗. B responds
the same as phase 1.
Guess: Finally, A outputs its guess µ′ ∈ {0, 1} of µ.
The above completes the description of the simulation. It is not hard to verify
that the simulation is indistinguishable from the scheme as the correctness and
randomness hold.







= e(P, P )rjabc. At this point, B ignores the guess of A and picks a
random tuple (Xj, IDj, γj) from the list L2. It then obtains the corresponding
rj from L1, and outputs X
r−1j
j as the solution to the given instance of BDH. To
complete the security proof, it remains to show that B outputs the correct answer
with advantage at least ε′.






where IDi ∈ S∗. In the real scheme, A∗i = K+H2(ωi). Before querying
the H2 value of ωi, the result of H2(ωi) is unknown and random. From the view of
the adversary, K is encrypted with a random number independent of ωi. Therefore,
A∗i is a one-time pad. That is, the challenge ciphertext is a one-time pad. According
to the assumption (A breaks our scheme with advantage ε), A must at least query
H2 on one ωi with probability δ.
For ease exposition, we define following events: E1, the simulation does not abort
in private key query. E2, at least one of the H1 values of challenge identities contains
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b. E3, A chooses an identity where ηi = 0 to distinguish challenge message. E4, B
chooses the correct solution from the L2. B successfully solves the hard problem if
and only if all events happen simultaneously. From the private key query, we know
when each ηi = 1, simulation will not abort, thus
Pr[E1] = Pr[ηi = 1, i = 1, 2, · · · , qE] = (1− δ)qE .
It is easy to compute that Pr[E2] = δ. Since ηi are secretly chosen by B, from the




Finally, from the point view of the simulator, if the adversary can guess the
correct µ′ under the conditions that E1, E2, E3 happen, it only knows that the




. Since these four events are independent, we have
ε′ = Pr[E1 ∧ E2 ∧ E3 ∧ E4] · ε
= Pr[E1] · Pr[E2] · Pr[E3] · Pr[E4] · ε
≥ (1− δ)qE · δ · ε
n·qH2
.
The function (1− δ)qE · δ is maximized at δopt = 1qE+1 . Using δopt, we have
ε′ ≥ ε
e · n · qE · qH2
.
This completes the proof.
Theorem 5.2. Let H1, H2 be random oracles. If the BDH assumption holds, the
proposed scheme is ANON-ID-CPA secure. Specifically, suppose there is an ANON-
ID-CPA adversary A that has advantage ε against our scheme, there is an algorithm
B to solve the BDH problem with advantage
ε′ ≥ ε
e · n · qE · qH2
,
where n is the number of the identities in the encryption algorithm, qE and qH2 are
the number of queries to private key and H2 respectively by the adversary. e is the
natural logarithm.
Proof. Suppose there exists an ANON-ID-CPA adversary A that attacks our scheme
with non-negligible advantage ε. We build a simulator (algorithm) B that can solve
the BDH problem with advantage ε′. Let (P, aP, bP, cP ) be a random instance of
BDH problem taken as input by B and its goal is to compute e(P, P )abc. In order to
use A to solve the problem, B needs to simulate a challenger and respond all queries
from A. B works by interacting with A in an ANON-ID-CPA game as follows.
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Setup: B sets Ppub = aP and creates mpk = (BG, P, Ppub, H). Here H1 and H2 are
viewed as random oracles controlled by B.
H1-queries: For an H1 query on IDi, B responds as follows. B maintains a list L1
of a tuple (IDi, ηi, ri, hi). This list is initially empty. B first checks the L1.
1. If the query IDi has already appeared in the L1 in a tuple (IDi, ηi, ri, hi), it
responses with hi.
2. Otherwise, it randomly picks ri ∈ Zp and a random ηi ∈ {0, 1} with Pr[ηi =
0] = δ for some δ (determine later). If ηi = 0, it computes hi = ribP otherwise,
it computes hi = riP . Then it adds the tuple (IDi, ηi, ri, hi) to the L1 and
returns hi .
H2-queries: For an H2 query on (Xi, IDi), B responds as follows. B maintains a
list L2 of a tuple (Xi, IDi, γi). This list is initially empty. B first checks the L2.
1. If the query (Xi, IDi) has already appeared in the L2 in a tuple (Xi, IDi, γi),
it returns the corresponding γi.
2. Otherwise, B randomly picks a γi ∈ G as the value of H2(Xi, IDi), and then
adds the tuple (Xi, IDi, γi) to the L2 and responds to A with γi.
Phase 1: In this phase, A can issue the private key queries on IDi as needed. For
each time, B first checks whether IDi in the L1, otherwise it runs the H1 query
and gets the corresponding ηi and ri. If ηi = 0, B aborts. If ηi = 1, B computes
dIDi = sH1(IDi) = ariP = riPpub and responds with dIDi .
Challenge: Once A decides that the phase 1 is over, it outputs a challenge mes-
sage M∗ and two distinct identity sets S0 = {ID0,1, ID0,2, · · · , ID0,n}, S1 = {ID1,1,
ID1,2, · · · , ID1,n}. We require that A has not queried the private key on IDi ∈
S04S1 in the phase 1. B picks a random bit µ ∈ {0, 1} and performs as follows.
1. Randomly choose K∗ ∈ G and compute C∗ = K∗ + M∗, C ′∗ = cP . For each
IDi ∈ Sµ, compute x∗i = H(IDi).
2. For each IDi ∈ Sµ\S1−µ, randomly choose A∗i ∈ G. For each IDi ∈ S0 ∩S1, it
firstly gets ri and ci from L1 (If IDi is not in the list L1, it runs H1 queries to
get ri and ηi). If ηi = 0, it randomly chooses A
∗
i ∈ G. If ηi = 1, it computes
Xi = e(aP, cP )
ri and checks whether the tuple (Xi, IDi) is in one of the tuples
(Xi, IDi, γi) in the L2. If yes, set τ ∗i = γi. Otherwise, it randomly picks
τ ∗i ∈ G and adds the new tuple (Xi, IDi, τ ∗i ) to the list L2. It then computes
A∗i = K
∗ + τ ∗i .
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and sets CT ∗ = (C∗, C ′∗, {C∗i }
n
i=0) .
Phase 2: A continues to issue private key queries as needed with the restriction
established in the challenge phase. B responds the same as in phase 1.
Guess: Finally, A outputs its guess µ′ ∈ {0, 1}.
The above completes the description of the simulation. It is not hard to verify
that the simulation is indistinguishable from the scheme as the correctness and
randomness hold. At this point, B ignores the guess of A and picks a random tuple
(Xj, IDj, γj) from the list L2. It then obtains the corresponding rj from L1 and
outputs X
r−1j
j as the solution to the given instance of BDH. We have noted that A
can obtain the private keys for IDi ∈ S0∩S1. But this will not help the adversary to
distinguish the identity set from our setting. Similar to the analysis in Theorem 5.1,
we have ε′ ≥ ε
e·n·qE ·qH2
. The details of analysis are omitted here.
This completes the proof.
Theorem 5.3. Let H1, H2 be random oracles. The proposed scheme is IND-aID-
CPA secure if the BDH assumption holds.





. But we claim that these information cannot provide
A any help to distinguish the challenge messages. From the decryption algorithm,
if IDi ∈ S∗\L∗, it will get a random A′i
∗ 6= A∗i . If IDi ∈ L∗\S∗, it will get a
correct A′i
∗ generated by the authorization algorithm, but this A′i
∗ also a random
element in G and does not equal to A∗i generated by the encryption algorithm.





adversary still cannot obtain the correct A∗i which hides the encryption key. Thus,
if the scheme is IND-ID-CPA secure, it is IND-aID-CPA secure, namely the security
against IND-ID-CPA attacks implies the security against IND-aID-CPA attacks. We
yield Theorem 5.1.
Theorem 5.4. Let hash functions H1, H2 be random oracles. If the BDH assump-
tion holds, the proposed scheme is ANON-aID-CPA secure. Specifically, if there is
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an ANON-aID-CPA adversary A with advantage ε against our scheme, there is an
algorithm B that solves the BDH problem with advantage
ε′ ≥ ε
e · n · qE · qH2
,
where n is the number of the identities in the encryption algorithm, qE and qH2 are
the number of queries to private key and H2 respectively by the adversary. e is the
natural logarithm.
Proof. Suppose there exists an ANON-aID-CPA adversaryA that attacks our scheme
with non-negligible advantage ε. We build a simulator (algorithm) B that can solve
the BDH problem with advantage ε′ by running A. Let (P, aP, bP, cP ) be a random
instance of BDH problem taken as input by B and its goal is to compute e(P, P )abc.
In order to use A to solve the problem, B needs to simulate a challenger and respond
all queries from A. B works by interacting with A in an ANON-aID-CPA game as
follows.
Setup: The simulator B sets Ppub = aP and creates the master public key as
mpk = (BG, P, Ppub, H). Here H1 and H2 are viewed as random oracles controlled
by B.
H1-queries: For an H1 query on IDi, B responds as follows. B maintains a list L1
of a tuple (IDi, ηi, ri, hi). This list is initially empty. B first checks the L1.
1. If the query IDi has already appeared in the L1 in a tuple (IDi, ηi, ri, hi), it
responses with hi.
2. Otherwise, it randomly picks ri ∈ Zp and a random ηi ∈ {0, 1} with Pr[ηi =
0] = δ for some δ (determine later). If ηi = 0, it computes hi = ribP otherwise,
it computes hi = riP . Then it adds the tuple (IDi, ηi, ri, hi) to the L1 and
returns hi .
H2-queries: For an H2 query on (Xi, IDi), B responds as follows. B maintains a
list L2 of a tuple (Xi, IDi, γi). This list is initially empty. B first checks the L2.
1. If the query (Xi, IDi) has already appeared in the L2 in a tuple (Xi, IDi, γi),
it returns the corresponding γi.
2. Otherwise, B randomly picks a γi ∈ G as the value of H2(Xi, IDi), and then
adds the tuple (Xi, IDi, γi) to the L2 and responds to A with γi.
Phase 1: In this phase, A can issue the private key queries on IDi as needed. For
each time, B first checks whether IDi in the L1, otherwise it runs the H1 query
and gets the corresponding ηi and ri. If ηi = 0, B aborts. If ηi = 1, B computes
dIDi = sH1(IDi) = ariP = riPpub and responds with dIDi .
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Challenge: Once A decides that the phase 1 is over, it outputs a challenge message
M∗, an identity set S∗ = {ID1, ID2, · · · , IDn} and two distinct authorized sets
L0 = {ID0,1, ID0,2, · · · , ID0,k}, L1 = {ID1,1, ID1,2, · · · , ID1,k}. We require that A
has not queried the private key on IDi in the phase 1, where IDi ∈ S∗ ∩ (L04L1).
B picks a random bit µ ∈ {0, 1} and performs as follows.
1. Randomly choose K∗ ∈ G, x∗0 ∈ Zp, A∗0 ∈ G and compute C∗ = K∗ + M∗,
C ′∗ = cP . For each IDi ∈ S∗, compute x∗i = H(IDi).
2. For each IDi ∈ (S∗ ∩ L0 ∩ L1), it first gets ri and ηi from L1. If ηi = 0, it
randomly chooses A∗i ∈ G. If ηi = 1, it computes Xi = e(aP, cP )ri and checks
whether the tuple (Xi, IDi) is in one of the tuples (Xi, IDi, γi) in the L2. If
yes, it sets τ ∗i = γi. Otherwise, it randomly picks τ
∗
i ∈ G and adds the new
tuple (Xi, IDi, τ
∗
i ) to the list L2. Then it computes A∗i = K∗ + τ ∗i . For each
IDi ∈ S∗\(S∗ ∩ L0 ∩ L1), randomly choose A∗i ∈ G.

















j , i = 0, 1, 2, · · · , n.
4. For each i ∈ Lµ, compute xi = H(IDi). After computing all xi, it then































and sets CT ′∗ =
(




Phase 2: A continues to issue private key queries as needed with the restriction
established in the challenge phase. B responds the same as in phase 1.
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Guess: Finally, A outputs its guess µ′ ∈ {0, 1} of µ.
The above completes the description of the simulation. It is not hard to see
that the simulation is indistinguishable from the scheme as the correctness and
randomness hold. At this point, B ignores the guess of A and picks a random tuple
(Xj, IDj, γj) from the list L2. It then obtains the corresponding ri in L1 and outputs
X
r−1j
j as the solution to the given instance of BDH. The only way for the adversary
to distinguish L0 and L1 is by querying the values of H2 on IDi ∈ S∗ ∩ (Lµ\L1−µ).
Similar to the analysis in the Theorem 5.1, we have ε′ ≥ ε
e·n·qE ·qH2
. We omit the
details of the analysis here and yield the Theorem 5.4.
This completes the proof.
5.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we presented a new notion of fully privacy-preserving identity-based
broadcast encryption with authorization. It allows any third party to perform the
authorization computations without knowing the message and the receiver identity.
Only the user whose identity belongs to the intersection set of the broadcast identity
set and the authorized identity set is able to obtain the message. The final ciphertext
reveals nothing about the encrypted message and the identity information of the
receivers and the authorized users. A concrete construction has been presented
and the security is proved in the random oracle model. Furthermore, the proposed
scheme supports multiple authorizations in a way that only the user whose identity
belongs to all authorized set can decrypt the ciphertext successfully.
Chapter 6
IBBE for Inner Products
This chapter introduces a new notion of identity-based broadcast encryption for
inner products, which is a variant of identity-based broadcast encryption. The pro-
posed scheme features the metrics of both the identity-based broadcast encryption
and the inner product encryption introduced by Abdalla et al. [ABCP15]. The
original scheme was submitted to The Computer Journal and is under review.
6.1 Introduction
Broadcast Encryption. The concept of broadcast encryption (BE) was introduced
by Fiat and Naor in [FN94] as a generalization of public key encryption aiming to
efficiently share a message among a group of users over a public broadcast channel.
In a BE scheme, a message is encrypted under a set of users selected by the encryptor
in a way that only those users can decrypt the encrypted message by providing their
private keys. While the users who are not chosen in the encryption learn nothing
about the message even they collude. BE has been widely deployed in the real-life
applications, such as Pay TV. Identity-based broadcast encryption (IBBE) [Del07,
SF07] is a variant of BE where a user’s public key is replaced by an arbitrary string
which can uniquely identify the user, such as an email address or a phone number.
IBBE has shown its merit in key management and has been studied extensively.
A number of remarkable IBBE schemes have been considered in [GW09, LPQ12,
BWZ14].
Inner Product Encryption. In 2015, Abdalla et al. [ABCP15] considered the inner
product encryption (IPE) as a special functional encryption which has expressive
practical applications. In the IPE system, a message is described as a vector ~x from
an inner product space and private keys are generated for vectors ~yi from the same
space. A user with a private key sk~y of vector ~y enables to decrypt an encrypted
message ~x and learns the inner product 〈~x, ~y〉 without knowing ~x. Differing from
inner product predicate schemes [SSW09, OT12, OT10, AAB+15], IPE computes the
real value of inner products via decryption while the predicate encryption retrieves
the message if and only if the inner product is zero. IPE has been studied extensively
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since it introduced as it is extremely useful in the context of descriptive statistics. For
example, it can be used to compute the weighted mean of a collection of information
without leaking the content of the message. More applications of IPE can be found
in [ABCP15]. Since the work of Abdalla et al., several schemes have been presented.
IPE with function privacy1 are studied in [BJK15, DDM16]. Multi-input IPE has
been considered in [AGRW17, LL16, KLM+16].
In the IBBE (or broadcast encryption), as we aforementioned, users are permit-
ted to either get the message or learn nothing. While in the IPE, users can only
obtain the inner product 〈~x, ~y〉 via decryption and learn nothing about the message
~x (so-called further protect the message), where ~y is associated with the decryption
key. If we apply an IBBE scheme to encrypt ~x, we are unable to protect ~x like in
the IPE. On the other hand, none of the existing IPE schemes allows the encryptor
to decide who is permitted to decrypt the encrypted message like in the IBBE, as
we observe that any private key in the IPE can be used to decrypt the encrypted
message and learn the corresponding inner product. In a nutshell, the comparison
of IBBE and IPE can be summarized as follows.
– IBBE can determine who is able to obtain the message, but it cannot further
protect the message.
– IPE cannot determine who is able to learn the inner products, but it can
further protect the message.
Our motivation is to introduce a system which captures the merits of both IBBE
and IPE. More precisely, a system in which the decryption only gives the inner
product associated with the encrypted message, and the encryptor can determine
who are allowed to learn the inner product by providing private keys. This new
system can be applied in those scenarios where IPE is desired and the encryptor
also wants to control who are allowed to obtain the inner products. One might
think that we could first use an IPE to encrypt the message and then perform an
IBBE to encrypt the IPE ciphertext for a group of specified users. Unfortunately,
this trivial solution gives rise to a security threat. That is, once the decryption result
of IBBE is made public (e.g. one of the specified users exposes the decryption result
of IBBE), any private key generated in the IPE system can obtain the corresponding
inner product.
In this chapter, we further explore the notion of IBBE and introduce an exten-
sion of IBBE called identity-based broadcast encryption for inner product (IBBE-IP).
In the IBBE-IP, each user is associated with an identity ID and a vector ~y, which
1Function privacy requires that functional keys reveal no necessary information about the func-
tionality. An IPE scheme is function private if the key for vector ~y reveals nothing about ~y. See,
e.g., [BRS13, BS15] for more details about function privacy.
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is chosen by the user or the private key generator (PKG) depending on the applica-
tion during the key generation. A message ~x is encrypted with a set of identities S
chosen by the encryptor without knowing their vectors. A user with a private key
of (ID, ~y) can decrypt the encrypted message ~x and learn the inner product 〈~x, ~y〉
without the knowledge of ~x if and only if ID ∈ S. Therefore, the notion of IBBE-IP
can further protect the message like in the IPE. The confidentiality of message in
the IBBE-IP can be protected as long as the number of selected identities is less
than the length of vectors. Better than the existing IPE schemes, which only allow
to query bounded number of private keys, the proposed IBBE-IP notion supports
unbounded private key queries2.
We give an instantiation of IBBE-IP. The private key size in the proposed scheme
is constant and the size of ciphertext is linear in the length of vectors. The security
of the proposed scheme relies on the intractability of one specific q-type problem
defined by Boneh, Boyen and Goh in [BBG05] and the scheme is proved to be
IND-sIDV-CPA secure (defined in Section 6.2.2) in the random oracle model.
Organization. The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 6.2,
we define the identity-based broadcast encryption for inner product and the cor-
responding security notions. A new complexity assumption which the security of
the proposed scheme based on is showed in Section 6.3. We describe the proposed
scheme in Section 6.4 and formally analyze its security in Section 6.5. Finally, we
conclude this chapter in Section 6.6.
6.2 Identity-Based Broadcast Encryption for In-
ner Product
In this section, we formally define the syntax of identity-based broadcast encryption
for inner product (IBBE-IP) and its security models.
6.2.1 Definitions
An IBBE-IP scheme is defined by the following algorithms.
– Setup(1λ, n): Taking as input a security parameter λ and n the length of
vectors, it outputs a master public key mpk and a master secret key msk.
2Here, the IPE schemes refer to those constructed in the public key setting. In this chapter, if
we say IPE, it means the public-key IPE unless otherwise stated explicitly. In the related work,
we will mention that there are some IPE works in the private key setting can achieve unbounded
private keys queries in the specified security models.
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The master public key mpk is publicly known, while the master secret key
msk is kept secretly. The master public key contains the descriptions of a
key space K and a message space X .
– KeyGen(mpk,msk, ID, ~y): Taking as input the master key pair
(mpk,msk), an identity ID and a vector ~y ∈ Kn, it outputs a private
key skID,~y of (ID, ~y).
– Encrypt(mpk,S, ~x): Taking as input the master public key mpk, a set of
identities S with |S| < n and a message ~x ∈ X n, it outputs a ciphertext
CT .
– Decrypt(mpk,CT,S, skID,~y, ~y): Taking as input the master public key mpk,
a ciphertext CT together with an identity set S and a private key skID,~y
of (ID, ~y), it outputs either a value 〈~x, ~y〉 or ⊥.
For correctness, it should satisfy the following requirements. For simplicity, we
omit the input of the master public key mpk in each algorithm. We suppose that
(mpk,msk) are the result of calling Setup(1λ, n), and skID,~y, CT are the result of
calling KeyGen(msk, ID, ~y) and Encrypt(S, ~x) respectively. We then require that if




Decrypt(CT, S, skID,~y, ~y) = 〈~x, ~y〉 : skID,~y←KeyGen(msk, ID, ~y)
CT←Encrypt(S, ~x);
 = 1.
In this chapter, we focus on the inner product functionality over Zp where the
key space Kn and message space X n both consisting of vectors in Zp of length n.
We require that it is 〈~x, ~y〉 when 〈~x, ~y〉 is from a fit polynomial range of values inside
Zp as stated in [ABCP15, ALS16], since this will allow a decryption algorithm to
compute it as a discrete logarithm in a group where discrete logarithm is generally
hard. A summary of IBBE, IPE and IBBE-IP is shown in table.6.1, where Dec. is
the short for decryption.
Remark. In the definition of IBBE-IP, when n = 1 and the vector of each user





This is why we say that the IBBE-IP is an extension of IBBE. In the encryption
algorithm, we require the number of selected identities must be less than n for one
encryption. It implies the number of inner products obtained from the decryption
is less than n (in our setting) which is determined by the functionality and appears
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Number of Keys Encrypt Decrypt Dec. Result Dec. Condition
IBBE unbounded (M, S) (CT,S, skIDj , IDj) M IDj ∈ S
IPE bounded ~x
(
CT, sk~yj , ~yj
)
〈~x, ~yj〉 None
IBBE-IP unbounded (~x, S)
(
CT,S, skIDj ,~yj , ~yj
)
〈~x, ~yj〉 IDj ∈ S
Table 6.1: Comparison of IBBE, IPE and IBBE-IP.
in all IPE schemes. With n inner products, the adversary can retrieve the message.
From table 6.1, who can learn the inner product in the IBBE-IP is finely controlled
by the encryptor and it can issue unbounded private keys.
6.2.2 Security Notions
Now, we describe the security of IBBE-IP. From the definition of IBBE-IP, we note
that the output of decryption is the inner product over Zp. Users can easily obtain
new inner products via collusion without performing any additional decryption.
This issue happens to all IPE schemes in the literature and has been considered
as something inherent to the functionality itself. As pointed out by Agrawal et
al. [ALS16], collusion is permitted in the IPE. Therefore, we do not consider such
security issue in our defined security models.
Based on the above statement, the security of an IBBE-IP scheme requires
that for an encrypted message ~x, only the user with identity ID ∈ S can compute
〈~x, ~y〉 via decryption using the private key associated with (ID, ~y). Attackers whose
identities are not in S are unable to compute the inner products even they can
access users’ vectors and the corresponding private keys. We define security against
chosen-plaintext attacks (IND-CPA security, for short) for IBBE-IP via the security
game played by a challenger and an adversary below. Both the challenger and the
adversary are given the length n of vectors as input.
– Setup: The challenger chooses a security parameter λ and runs algorithm
Setup(1λ, n) to obtain a master public key mpk, then it sends mpk to the
adversary.
– Phase 1: The adversary issues private key queries on (IDi, ~yi) as needed. The
challenger runs the KeyGen algorithm to generate the private key skIDi,~yi and
forwards skIDi,~yi to the adversary.
– Challenge: Once the adversary decides that the phase 1 is over, it outputs an
identity set S∗ = {ID∗1, ID∗2, · · · , ID∗s∗} with s∗ < n and two distinct messages





queried its private key, then 〈~x0, ~y∗i 〉 = 〈~x1, ~y∗i 〉. The challenger picks a random
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bit µ ∈ {0, 1} and generates a challenge ciphertext CT ∗ for ~xµ under S∗ and
returns CT ∗ to the adversary.
– Phase 2: The adversary issues more private key queries with the restriction
established in the challenge phase. The challenger responds as in phase 1.
– Guess: Finally, the adversary outputs a guess µ′ ∈ {0, 1} and wins the game
if µ = µ′.
We refer to such an adversary as an IND-CPA adversary and define the advan-
tage of the adversary in winning the game as
advIND-CPAIBBE-IP (λ) =
∣∣∣∣Pr[µ = µ′]− 12
∣∣∣∣ .
Definition 6.1. We say that an IBBE-IP scheme is IND-CPA if for any probabilis-
tic polynomial time IND-CPA adversary, the advantage advIND-CPAIBBE-IP (λ) is negligible.
Selective Security. The security analysis of the proposed IBBE-IP scheme makes
use of a weaker notion of security called selective security. In the selective security
model, the adversary should output the challenge identity set S∗ and the challenge
messages ~x0, ~x1 before seeing the system master public key, and then tells apart the
challenge ciphertext is generated under which message. We denote this model by
IND-sIDV-CPA. Similarly, IND-sIDV-CPA security is defined via a security game
played by a challenger and an adversary . Both the challenger and the adversary
are given the length n of vectors as input.
– Init: The adversary outputs a target identity set S∗ = {ID∗1, ID∗2, · · · , ID∗s∗}
with s∗ < n and two distinct messages ~x0, ~x1 that it wants to challenge.
– Setup: The challenger chooses a security parameter λ and runs algorithm
Setup(1λ, n) to obtain a master public key mpk, then it sends mpk to the
adversary.
– Phase 1: The adversary issues private key queries on (IDi, ~yi) as needed.
If IDi ∈ S∗, we require 〈~x0, ~yi〉 = 〈~x1, ~yi〉. The challenger runs the KeyGen
algorithm to generate the private key skIDi,~yi and forwards skIDi,~yi to the
adversary.
– Challenge: Once the adversary decides that the phase 1 is over, the challenger
picks a random bit µ ∈ {0, 1} and generates a challenge ciphertext CT ∗ for ~xµ
under S∗ and returns CT ∗ to the adversary.
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– Phase 2: The adversary issues more private key queries. The challenger
responds as in phase 1.
– Guess: Finally, the adversary outputs a guess µ′ ∈ {0, 1} and wins the game
if µ = µ′.
We refer to such an adversary as an IND-sIDV-CPA adversary and define the
advantage of the adversary in winning the game as
advIND-sIDV-CPAIBBE-IP (λ) =
∣∣∣∣Pr[µ = µ′]− 12
∣∣∣∣ .
Definition 6.2. We say that an IBBE-IP scheme is IND-sIDV-CPA secure if for
any PPT IND-sIDV-CPA adversary, the advantage advIND-sIDV-CPAIBBE-IP (λ) is negligible.
6.3 New Complexity Assumption
In this section, we define one specific q-type problem that we call the augmented
general decisional Diffie-Hellman exponent problem denoted by AGDDHE. We have
proved that the (f, g)-AGDDHE problem has generic security as it fits the general
Diffie-Hellman exponent problem framework of [BBG05]. The security of our IBBE-
IP scheme relies on the hardness of (f, ϕ)-AGDDHE problem.
Let G and GT be two cyclic groups of prime order p. A map e : G × G → GT







= e (g1, g2)
ab. (2) e(g1, g2) 6= 1 and there is an efficient algorithm to
compute e(g1, g2) for all g1, g2 ∈ G. A bilinear group BG = (G,GT , e, p) is composed
of the above defined objects. The (f, ϕ)-AGDDHE problem is depicted as follow:
Let g0, h0 be the random distinct generators of G, q, n be distinct integers.
Input: A random polynomial f(x) of degree q over Z∗p with f(a) 6= 0, a set Λ =
{zq+1, zq+2, · · · , zq+n} whose components are pairwise distinct elements chosen uni-
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and an element Z from GT , where a, b, c and γ are unknown random exponents of
Z∗p.
Output: a bit µ.
We say that the problem is correctly solved if the output is
µ =
1 Z = e(g0, h0)γbcf(a),0 Z 6= e(g0, h0)γbcf(a).
In other words, the goal of the (f, ϕ)-AGDDHE problem is to distinguish whether
Z is equal to e(g0, h0)
γbcf(a) or to a random value of GT .
Let us denote by I (f(x),Λ, a, b, c, γ, Z) the input of the instance, true the event
that Z is equal to e(g0, h0)
γbcf(a) and by false the event that Z is not equal to
e(g0, h0)
γbcf(a). We then define the advantage of an algorithm D in solving the




∣∣∣∣Pr [D(I (f(x),Λ, a, b, c, γ, Z)) = 1∣∣∣true]
−Pr
[
D(I (f(x),Λ, a, b, c, γ, Z)) = 1
∣∣∣false] ∣∣∣∣,
where the probability is taken over all random choices and over the random coins of
D.
Theorem 6.1. The defined (f, ϕ)-AGDDHE problem is one of the GDDHE problems
fulfilling the hardness conditions defined in [BBG05].
Proof. Let h0 = g
t




t, ta, ta2, ta3, · · · , taq+n,
tbc, tbca, tbca2, tbca3, · · · , tbca2n,
1, f(a), af(a), a2f(a), · · · , aq−1f(a),




We need to show that F is independent of (P,Q), that is, no not-all-zero coefficients
{xi,j} and y1 exist such that
tγbcf(a) = F =
∑
xi,jdidj + y1,
where di, dj ∈ P . For more details, the reader is referred to [BBG05, Del07]. All
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possible multiplications of any two elements from P must contain tγbc in order to
satisfy the above equation. By making all possible multiplications listed in P ′, we
want to prove that no linear combination among the elements from the P ′ below
leads to P .
P ′ =

tγbc · ϕ(a), tγbc · ϕ(a)f(a), tγbc · aϕ(a)f(a), tγbc · a2ϕ(a)f(a), · · · ,
tγbc · aq−1ϕ(a)f(a), tγbc · aϕ(a)f 2(a)
tγbc · af(a), tγbc · a2f(a), tγbc · a3f(a), · · · , tγbc · a2n+1f(a),
tγbc · af 2(a), tγbc · a2f 2(a), tγbc · a3f 2(a), · · · , tγbc · a2n+1f 2(a).
 .
As tγbc · aϕ(a)f 2(a) can be represented by the last line, P ′ can be simplified by
removing tγbc as below ϕ(a), ϕ(a)f(a), aϕ(a)f(a), a
2ϕ(a)f(a), · · · , aq−1ϕ(a)f(a),
af(a), a2f(a), a3f(a), · · · , a2n+1f(a),
af 2(a), a2f 2(a), a3f 2(a), · · · , a2n+1f 2(a),
 .
Any such linear combination associated with f(a) can be written as
f(a) = ϕ(a) + A(a)ϕ(a)f(a) +B(a)af(a) +B(a)af 2(a),
where A(a), B(a) are polynomials with 0 ≤ deg(A(a)) ≤ q− 1 and 0 ≤ deg(B(a)) ≤
2n. To satisfy the above equation, we have A(a) = 0, B(a) = 0 and ϕ(a) = f(a),
which contradicts that deg(f(a)) and deg(ϕ(a)) are distinct. Therefore, the defined
(f, ϕ)-AGDDHE problem is one of the intractable GDDHE problems.
6.4 The Proposed Scheme
In this section, we describe the proposed scheme.
6.4.1 Construction
Setup(1λ, n). Given a security parameter λ and n the length of vectors, a bilinear
group BG = (p,G,GT , e) is constructed. The size of the group is determined by the
security parameter λ. Two generators g, h ∈ G are randomly selected as well as a
secret value α ∈ Zp. As 〈~0, ~x〉 = 0 for any vector ~x ∈ Znp , if ~x ∈ Znp , we mean that ~x
is chosen from Znp\~0 in our construction. It chooses a cryptographic hash function
H : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗p. Then it samples ~β = (β1, β2, · · · , βn) ∈ Znp , chooses random
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The master secret key msk consists of (α, γ1, γ2, η1, η2, ~β).
KeyGen(mpk,msk, ID, ~y). Given the master key pair (mpk,msk), an identity
ID ∈ {0, 1}∗ and vector ~y = (y1, y2, · · · , yn) ∈ Znp , this algorithm randomly chooses
k ∈ Zp and computes a secret key







Encrypt(mpk, S, ~x). Assume for notational simplicity that S = {IDj}sj=1. On input
the master public key mpk and message ~x = (x1, x2, · · · , xn) ∈ Znp , it chooses a




i=1(α−H(IDi)), C1 = e(g
γ2η2 , h)r, C2 = (g
η1α)r ,








)r · e(g, h)xi .
The output ciphertext is CT =
(
C0, C1, C2, {Ci,1, Ci,2}ni=1
)
.
Decrypt(mpk,CT,S, skIDj ,~yj , ~yj). On input the master public key mpk, the cipher-
text CT , the identity set S, an identity IDj and the corresponding private key















After that, the user computes
A = e
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It hen obtains
D = (A ·B)
(−1)s+1∏s
i=1,i 6=j H(IDi) = e(g, h)r·γ1η1·〈~β,~yj〉.





i,2 = e(g, h)
r·γ1η1·〈~β,~yj〉 · e(g, h)〈~x,~yj〉,





i,2 /D = e(g, h)
〈~x,~yj〉.
6.4.2 Discussion
The decryption algorithm requires to compute a discrete logarithm that cannot be
avoided. We assume that the inner products will be contained in an interval [0, L]





by using the Pollard’s kangaroo method [Pol00].). This assumption as
pointed out in [ABCP15, ALS16] is reasonable for statistical applications since the
results will be in a small space. There is no bound for private key issuing in our
construction. For each message encryption, the only restriction is that the number
of identities in S is less than n.
6.5 Security Analysis
In this section, we analysis the security of the proposed scheme under the defined
security model. Now, we prove that the proposed IBBE-IP scheme is IND-sIDV-
CPA secure assuming that the (f, ϕ)-AGDDHE problem is hard. Our proof strategy
draws inspiration from [Gen06] and [Del07].
Theorem 6.2. Let H be a random oracle and q be the total number of private key
queries and oracle queries issued by the adversary. For any adversary A against the
IND-sIDV-CPA security of our proposed identity-based broadcast inner product en-
cryption scheme with advIND-sIDV-CPAA,IBBE-IP (λ), the (f, ϕ)-AGDDHE problem can be solved
by an algorithm B with advantage
Adv
(f,ϕ)-AGDDHE
B (λ) ≥ adv
IND-sIDV-CPA
A,IBBE-IP (λ).
Proof. Suppose that there exists an adversary A who has non-negligible advantage
advIND-sIDV-CPAA,IBBE-IP (λ) in breaking our proposed scheme. We can construct a simulator
(algorithm) B that uses A to solve the (f, ϕ)-AGDDHE problem. Assuming that
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both the adversary and the challenger are given as input an integer n and q the total
number of private key queries and random oracle queries. Let I (f(x),Λ, a, b, c, γ, Z)
be an (f, ϕ)-AGDDHE instance as the input of algorithm B. We have f(x) and ϕ
are polynomials of respective degrees q and n. B works by interacting with A in the
IND-sIDV-CPA game as follows.
Init: At the beginning of the game, A outputs a set of identities S∗ = {ID∗1,
ID∗2, · · · , ID∗s∗} and two distinct message vectors ~x0 = (x0,1, x0,2, · · · , x0,n) and ~x1 =
(x1,1, x1,2, · · · , x1,n) that it wants to attack, where s∗ < n.
Setup: B firstly picks θ1, θ2, · · · , θn uniformly at random in Zp and implicitly sets
α = a, γ1 = bc, γ2 = c, η1 = f(a), η2 = bf(a) and
~β = (β1, β2, · · · , βn) =
(
θ1f(a), θ2f(a), · · · , θnf(a)
)
.
As f(x) is a random polynomial from the instance and f(a) 6= 0, we have β in this
setting is random in Zp. We define
F~v(x) = θ1f(x)v1 + θ2f(x)v2 + · · ·+ θnf(x)vn,




and F~v(x) is a function with





0 , can be computed from line (1),
gη1α = g
af(a)
0 , from line (3)
gγ2η2 = g
bcf(a)
0 , from line (4)
gη1αβj = g
θja·f2(a)












0 , j ∈ [1, n] can be computed from line (2).
Here, we view H as a random oracle controlled by B. Before the hash query, B picks
z1, z2, · · · , zq uniformly at random in Zp until they are distinct from the elements in
Λ.
Hash-Queries: At any time A can query the random oracle on any identity IDi
(at most q − qE times, with qE the number of private key queries). To respond, B
maintains a list L of tuples (IDi, ~yi, zi, skIDi,~yi) that contains at the beginning:
{∗, ∗, zi, ∗}qi=1, {ID∗i , ∗, z∗i , ∗}s
∗
i=1 = {IDi, ∗, zi, ∗}
q+s∗
i=q+1,
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where ∗ denotes an empty entry in L. Upon receiving the query on IDi, B will first
check whether IDi already appears in the list L and respond with the corresponding
zi if so. Otherwise, B sets H(IDi) = zi and completes the list with (IDi, ∗, zi, ∗).
Phase 1: In this phase, A can issue private key queries on (IDi, ~yi), i ∈ [1,m],
where m is decided by the adversary. If IDi ∈ S∗, we require 〈~yi, ~x0〉 = 〈~yi, ~x1〉. To
generate the private keys, B performs as follows:
1. If A has already issued a private key query on (IDi, ~yi), B will respond with
the corresponding skIDi,~yi in the list L.
2. Else, if A has already issued a hash query on IDi, then B will use the corre-
sponding zi to compute
skIDi,~yi = (K1,IDi,~yi , K2,IDi,~yi) =
gf(a)(F~yi (a)−F~yi (zi))a−zi0 , F~yi(zi)

and complete the list L. K1,IDi,~yi is computable from the line (3). B responds
with the corresponding skIDi,~yi and updates the list L.
3. Otherwise, B runs the Hash-Queries to get zi, computes the corresponding
skIDi,~yi as step 2 and updates the list L.
Challenge: Once A decides the phase 1 is over, B randomly picks a random bit
µ ∈ {0, 1} and generates the challenge ciphertext CT ∗ for ~xµ as follows.
It first obtains the private keys for all identities in S∗ from the list L. If the
private key for ID∗i does not exist, it randomly picks a vector ~y
∗
i ∈ Znp such that ~y∗i
is different from all vectors that have been queried private keys and runs the private
key query in the phase 1 to obtain the corresponding private keys. Let the private
key of (ID∗i , ~y
∗
i ) is











0 , F~y∗i (z
∗
i )
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For i = 1, 2, · · · , n, it computes
C∗i,1 = g
−θiγaf2(a)
0 , which are computable from the line (4).
Let ~y∗j = {yj,1, yj,2, · · · , yj,n}. In order to compute the ciphertext component
C∗i,2, B firstly uses each private key of the identity ID∗j in S and the corresponding
vector ~y∗j to compute
Aj = e
(













































hpj,S(a) is computable from the line (2). Then it computes






) , e(g, h)〈~xµ,~y∗j 〉, j ∈ [1, s∗].

















ys∗,i = Ds∗ · e(g, h)〈~xµ,~y
∗
s∗〉.
We observe that it has n unknown elements C∗i,2, i ∈ [1, n], but only has
s∗ < n equations. It randomly pick (n − s∗) elements from GT and sets them
as C∗s∗+1, C
∗
s∗+2, · · · , C∗n such that the remaining s∗ equations have a solution for
C∗i,2, i ∈ [1, s∗] via the method of elimination. Finally, B responds with the chal-
















If Z = e(g0, h0)
γbcf(a), let r = γ, we have































































Then, from the setting,
Dj = e(g, h)
r·γ1η1〈~β,~y∗j 〉, j ∈ [1, s∗],
which is identical with the real scheme.
Phase 2: A continues to issue private key queries on (IDj, ~yj), j ∈ [m+ 1, qE] with
the restriction that if IDj ∈ S∗, it require that 〈~yj, ~x0〉 = 〈~yj, ~x1〉. C responds as in
phase 1.
Guess: Finally, A outputs a guess µ′ ∈ {0, 1}. If µ = µ′, B answers 1 as the
solution to the given instance of the (f, ϕ)-AGDDHE problem, meaning that Z =
e(g0, h0)
γbcf(a). Otherwise, B answers 0 which indicates that Z 6= e(g0, h0)γbcf(a).
Next, we analyze the advantage of B to solve the hard problem. For notation




∣∣∣∣Pr [B(I) = 1∣∣∣true]− Pr [B(I) = 1∣∣∣false] ∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣Pr [µ = µ′∣∣∣true]− Pr [µ = µ′∣∣∣false] ∣∣∣∣.
From the above simulation, we have that when the event true occurs, from the
point view of the adversary, the simulation is indistinguishable from the real scheme.
Thus, Pr [µ = µ′|true] = 1/2+advIND-sIDV-CPAA,IBBE-IP (λ). If it falls in the false event, the view
of A is independent of the bit µ. In this case, the probability Pr [µ = µ′|false] = 1/2.
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∣∣∣∣Pr [µ = µ′∣∣∣true]− Pr [µ = µ′∣∣∣false] ∣∣∣∣
= 1/2 + AdvIND-sIDV-CPAA (λ)− 1/2
= advIND-sIDV-CPAA,IBBE-IP (λ).
Remark. In the simulation of the challenge ciphertext, we draw inspiration from
Gentry IBE [Gen06]. We use the private keys of the identities in S∗ to generate one
component of the challenge ciphertext. To generate the challenge ciphertext, we
randomly pick a vector (e.g. ~y∗i ) for the challenge identity (e.g. ID
∗
i ) which has not
been queried its private key and generate the corresponding private key. One might
think that in phase 2, the adversary may query the private key of (IDj, ~yj) where
IDj = ID
∗
i but ~yj 6= ~y∗i . We stress that even this case happens, our simulation is still
indistinguishable from the real scheme. In our construction, the decryption condition
is that the user’s identity must be in S and there is no any restriction about the
vectors. The vector held by the user is decided by the user or the PKG. Therefore,
the adversary cannot distinguish the simulation from the challenge ciphertext.
6.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we introduced a notion of identity-based broadcast encryption for
inner product (IBBE-IP) and presented a concrete construction. The IBBE-IP cap-
tures the merits of both IBBE and IPE. In the IBBE-IP, each user is associated with
an identity and a vector which is selected by the user or the PKG depending on the
application. During an encryption, the encryptor can determine who are permitted
to learn the inner products of the encrypted message and the vector associated with
the decryption keys without leaking the message vector. The proposed IBBE-IP
scheme has constant-size private keys and supports unbounded private key queries.
The security of our proposed scheme is based on the hardness of one specific q-type
problem and the scheme is proved secure in the IND-sIDV-CPA security model with
random oracles.
Chapter 7
Conclusion and Future Work
In this chapter, we summarize the work presented in this thesis and put forward
several directions for further research.
7.1 Conclusion
Broadcast encryption plays a signification role in modern cryptography. It not only
efficiently protects the data (message) confidentiality but also allows the encryptor to
decide who can decrypt the encrypted data. These merits make broadcast encryption
popular in the real-life applications, such as in Pay-TV. Identity-based broadcast
encryption (IBBE) has shown its advantage in key management, where only those
users whose identities are selected in the computation of the ciphertext can decrypt
the encrypted message. IBBE has been studied extensively.
User revocation is another important research area in the broadcast encryption
system. If any of these users who can obtain the message is compromised, we should
revoke them such that they cannot decrypt the encrypted message. Most of the
revocation schemes in the literature focus on preventing the users from retrieving
the future broadcast message. The first work revokes the users from the IBBE
is studied in [SCG+16], which allows a third party to remove some of the receivers
from the identity set stated in the original broadcast ciphertext without knowing the
encrypted message. Recipient revocable IBBE has shown its expressive for practical
applications. However, the work in [SCG+16] does not consider the receiver privacy
which is indispensable in some scenarios. Based on this observation, we proposed
several anonymous revocable IBBE schemes from bilinear groups to fill this gap.
In Chapter 3, we formalized the definition of anonymous revocable IBBE to
capture the receiver privacy. We put forward the first revocable IBBE scheme with
the receiver anonymity. The third party who performs the revocation learns nothing
about the receiver identity. The security of the proposed scheme is proved in the
random oracle under the hardness of Bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem. However the
privacy of the revoked users still cannot be preserved, which might be a bottleneck
for some applications. The identities of the revoked users might expose some in-
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formation about other non-revoked receivers if some of the revoked users are the
original receivers.
In Chapter 4, we addressed the limitation of the proposed scheme in Chapter 3 to
achieve fully privacy-preserving. We described a fully privacy-preserving revocable
IBBE scheme, where both the identity information of the receivers and the revoked
users are hidden. The ciphertext size is linear in the number of the receivers stated
in the original ciphertext. We derived the security of the proposed scheme under
the hardness of Bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem in the random oracle.
In Chapter 5, we considered a variant of revocable IBBE, namely, authorization.
IBBE with authorization is capable for the situation where the receivers are decided
by more than one parties. We presented a novel construction of fully privacy-
preserving IBBE with authorization. The size of the final ciphertext depends on the
size of the authorized identity set instead of the number of receivers stated in the
original ciphertext. Its security is reduced to the hardness of Bilinear Diffie-Hellman
problem in the random oracle. The authorization algorithm can be performed by
different third parties with different authorized identity sets. Only the user belongs
to all the authorized identity sets enable to retrieve the encrypted message.
In Chapter 6, we reviewed the inner product encryption (IPE) [ABCP15] and
gave a comparison between IBBE and IPE. We noted that IPE is able to further
protect the message as the decryption only reveals the inner product of the encrypted
message and the vector associated with the decryption key, instead of the whole
message. While IPE cannot control who are able to learn the inner product via
decryption like in the IBBE. Based on this observation, we introduced a notion of
identity-based broadcast encryption for inner products (IBBE-IP), which captures
both the merits of IPE and IBBE. We then gave a concrete construction of IBBE-IP.
Our scheme supports unbounded private key queries. The security of the proposed
scheme is based on a q-type Diffie-Hellman exponent assumption in the generic group
model.
7.2 Future Work
The revocable identity-based broadcast encryption schemes presented in this thesis
can protect the user privacy well, but the security analysis is provided in the random
oracle model. Although the random oracle model has been widely used in the
research of cryptography, it is desirable if the cryptographic schemes could be proved
secure without relying on random oracles. Thus, our future work mainly focuses
on how to construct an anonymous revocable identity-based broadcast encryption
scheme whose security can be derived without using the random oracle. Secondly,
our proposed schemes only achieve selective security, we ask whether it is possible
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to design a revocable IBBE scheme with anonymity which can achieve adaptive
security.
In terms of the identity-based broadcast encryption for inner products, the pro-
posed IBBE-IP scheme captures both the advantages of IBBE and IPE, but its
security is based on one q-type assumption in the generic group model. The open
question is how to construct an IBBE-IP scheme which can derive its security based
on the standard assumptions.
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